The following crash due to a static out-of-bounds read can be observed in an
ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to
tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):
--- cut ---
==24377==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address
0x7f7a3ce4efe0 at pc 0x7f7a39a5a121 bp 0x7ffe1fcb92e0 sp 0x7ffe1fcb92d8
READ of size 4 at 0x7f7a3ce4efe0 thread T0
#0 0x7f7a39a5a120 in hiqnet_display_data wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-hiqnet.c:523:15
#1 0x7f7a39a59354 in dissect_hiqnet_pdu wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-hiqnet.c:906:34
#2 0x7f7a39a560b7 in dissect_hiqnet_udp wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-hiqnet.c:1031:9
#3 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
#4 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
#5 0x7f7a38aa35fd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1151:9
#6 0x7f7a38aa41a4 in dissector_try_uint wireshark/epan/packet.c:1177:9
#7 0x7f7a3abc065d in decode_udp_ports wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:536:7
#8 0x7f7a3abce912 in dissect wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:1031:5
#9 0x7f7a3abc31a0 in dissect_udplite wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:1044:3
#10 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
#11 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
#12 0x7f7a38aa35fd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1151:9
#13 0x7f7a39beae0b in ip_try_dissect wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:1976:7
#14 0x7f7a39bf5a21 in dissect_ip_v4 wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:2468:10
#15 0x7f7a39beb569 in dissect_ip wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:2491:5
#16 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
#17 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
#18 0x7f7a38aa35fd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1151:9
#19 0x7f7a38aa41a4 in dissector_try_uint wireshark/epan/packet.c:1177:9
#20 0x7f7a3a3d1830 in dissect_ppp_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:4346:10
#21 0x7f7a3a3d0fec in dissect_ppp_hdlc_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:5339:5
#22 0x7f7a3a3c92a5 in dissect_ppp_hdlc wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:5380:5
#23 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
#24 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
#25 0x7f7a38aa35fd in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1151:9
#26 0x7f7a397e00d3 in dissect_frame wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:491:11
#27 0x7f7a38ab14a1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:619:8
#28 0x7f7a38aa3e2a in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:694:9
#29 0x7f7a38aad96e in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2665:8
#30 0x7f7a38a9f3df in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2678:8
#31 0x7f7a38a9ea2b in dissect_record wireshark/epan/packet.c:502:3
#32 0x7f7a38a4f9b9 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps wireshark/epan/epan.c:376:2
#33 0x52856b in process_packet wireshark/tshark.c:3728:5
#34 0x5219e0 in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3484:11
#35 0x517e2c in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13
0x7f7a3ce4efe0 is located 32 bytes to the left of global variable '' defined in
'packet-hiqnet.c' (0x7f7a3ce4f000) of size 16
'' is ascii string 'packet-hiqnet.c'
0x7f7a3ce4efe0 is located 16 bytes to the right of global variable
'hiqnet_datasize_per_type' defined in 'packet-hiqnet.c:282:19' (0x7f7a3ce4efa0)
of size 48
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow
wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-hiqnet.c:523:15 in hiqnet_display_data
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0fefc79c1da0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9
0x0fefc79c1db0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9
0x0fefc79c1dc0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 f9 f9
0x0fefc79c1dd0: f9 f9 f9 f9 06 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 07 f9 f9 f9
0x0fefc79c1de0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 04 f9 f9
=>0x0fefc79c1df0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9[f9]f9 f9 f9
0x0fefc79c1e00: 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fefc79c1e10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fefc79c1e20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fefc79c1e30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fefc79c1e40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
--- cut ---
The crash was reported at
https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11983. Attached are three
files which trigger the crash.
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. If 90 days elapse without
a broadly available patch, then the bug report will automatically become
visible to the public.
Original issue reported on code.google.com by mjurc...@google.com on 8 Jan 2016 at 11:39
Original issue reported on code.google.com by
mjurc...@google.com
on 8 Jan 2016 at 11:39Attachments: