Cyfrin / 2023-08-sparkn

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Code's fallback() vulnerability allows reentrancy attacks; mitigate with proper reentrancy guard implementation. #867

Closed codehawks-bot closed 1 year ago

codehawks-bot commented 1 year ago

Code's fallback() vulnerability allows reentrancy attacks; mitigate with proper reentrancy guard implementation.

Severity

High Risk

Summary

The code presents a vulnerability in the fallback() function of the Proxy contract, where a lack of a reentrancy guard could enable malicious contracts to exploit the proxy contract's execution flow and potentially perform unauthorized actions.

Vulnerability:

The vulnerability in the provided code lies in the usage of the fallback() function. Specifically, the lack of a guard against reentrancy attacks could allow malicious contracts to exploit the proxy and manipulate the contract's state or perform unauthorized actions.

Impact:

If a malicious contract or attacker manages to send a transaction to the fallback() function during the execution of another transaction, it can lead to reentrancy attacks. This can potentially allow the attacker to call back into the proxy contract and manipulate its state or interact with other contracts in unintended ways. Reentrancy attacks can lead to unauthorized fund transfers, manipulation of data, and disrupt the intended behavior of the contract.

Tools Used

Manual

Recommendations:

To mitigate the reentrancy vulnerability, consider implementing a reentrancy guard in the fallback() function. The guard should ensure that the function only executes once within a single transaction, preventing any further reentrant calls during that transaction. This can be achieved by using a state variable to track the execution status of the fallback() function and reverting if an attempt is made to reenter the function within the same transaction.

Here's an example of how the reentrancy guard could be implemented:

contract Proxy {
    address private immutable _implementation;
    bool private _isExecutingFallback;

    constructor(address implementation) {
        _implementation = implementation;
    }

    modifier noReentrancy() {
        require(!_isExecutingFallback, "Reentrant call detected");
        _isExecutingFallback = true;
        _;
        _isExecutingFallback = false;
    }

    fallback() external noReentrancy {
        address implementation = _implementation;
        assembly {
            // ... (rest of the function remains the same)
        }
    }
}

By adding the noReentrancy modifier to the fallback() function, the contract ensures that reentrant calls are blocked, reducing the risk of reentrancy attacks.

PatrickAlphaC commented 1 year ago

This is a hypothetical and not an attack path. If you can give a PoC during appeals, we can reconsider. But as written, this is not an attack.