Number of clicks to create the first wallet backup
This is currently only used as a criterion for OBPPV3-CM56:
Use eternal backups
Under this attack:
Users may reuse non-ECDH addresses due to the fear of losing funds if avoiding reuse increases the risk that wallet backups will become unexpectedly invalid
The other criterion under that countermeasure is OBPPV3-CR62:
Number of clicks needed to update an existing backup due to the creation of a new receiving or change address
CR61 doesn’t seem relevant to the privacy properties of eternal backups; you’re equally screwed whether you reuse addresses or not if you do 0 backups. CR62 does properly capture the intention of the countermeasure, IMHO.
If others agree, we can simply delete this criterion.
OBPPV3-CR61 is:
This is currently only used as a criterion for OBPPV3-CM56:
Under this attack:
The other criterion under that countermeasure is OBPPV3-CR62:
CR61 doesn’t seem relevant to the privacy properties of eternal backups; you’re equally screwed whether you reuse addresses or not if you do 0 backups. CR62 does properly capture the intention of the countermeasure, IMHO.
If others agree, we can simply delete this criterion.