RabbitHoleReceipt can stop minting of receipts for claims

[code423n4]

Lines of code

https://github.com/rabbitholegg/quest-protocol/blob/8c4c1f71221570b14a0479c216583342bd652d8d/contracts/RabbitHoleReceipt.sol#L83-L86 https://github.com/rabbitholegg/quest-protocol/blob/8c4c1f71221570b14a0479c216583342bd652d8d/contracts/RabbitHoleReceipt.sol#L98-L104 https://github.com/rabbitholegg/quest-protocol/blob/8c4c1f71221570b14a0479c216583342bd652d8d/contracts/QuestFactory.sol#L228

Vulnerability details

Impact

The mint() function in RabbitHoleReceipt contract mints a Quest receipt which can be claimable. In the mintReceipt() function in QuestFactory contract, it is expected that the QuestFactory contract is already set as Minter on the receipt contract as defined in the dev comments.

However, there is a possibility where the owner of RabbitHoleReceipt contract can set minterAddress address by calling RabbitHoleReceipt .setMinterAddress() to a different address other than the QuestFactory contract, thus making QuestFactory.mintReceipt() redundant by revert in such scenario and preventing users from being able to mint receipts for a Quest and claiming rewards

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Some check to ensure the new minterAddress set in RabbitHoleReceipt contract is the current QuestFactory contract.

[c4-judge]

kirk-baird changed the severity to QA (Quality Assurance)

[c4-sponsor]

waynehoover marked the issue as sponsor acknowledged

[c4-judge]

kirk-baird marked the issue as grade-c