Closed c4-submissions closed 1 year ago
raymondfam marked the issue as primary issue
raymondfam marked the issue as sufficient quality report
raymondfam marked the issue as high quality report
hieronx marked the issue as disagree with severity
increase/decreaseAllowance
were removed from OZ recently for a reason: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/pull/4585 This has never been exploited in production. I would consider this low
.
hieronx (sponsor) acknowledged
gzeon-c4 marked the issue as unsatisfactory: Overinflated severity
gzeon-c4 marked the issue as unsatisfactory: Invalid
gzeon-c4 marked the issue as unsatisfactory: Invalid
Lines of code
https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-centrifuge/blob/512e7a71ebd9ae76384f837204216f26380c9f91/src/token/ERC20.sol#L131 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-centrifuge/blob/512e7a71ebd9ae76384f837204216f26380c9f91/src/token/ERC20.sol#L139 https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-centrifuge/blob/512e7a71ebd9ae76384f837204216f26380c9f91/src/token/ERC20.sol#L148
Vulnerability details
Vulnerability Details
There are no checks in the already approved spender function, which may lead to frontrunning.
Ethereum mempool is the place where all pending transactions sit until miner decided to include them into the block. For the most time, transactions with the highest gas prices are included first as the miners get the gas price for including them into the block.
Some have found a way to exploit this miners behaviour. Front-running, works like this: Transaction A is broadcasted with a higher gas price than an already pending transaction B so that A gets mined before B.
Exploit Scenario
If Bob monitors the mempool, he could submit his transaction with a higher gas cost so it would be executed before Alice's TX.
Attack is also possible because approve() overrides current allowance. It doesn't increase/decrease allowance.
1) Alice allows Bob to transfer 20 of Alice's tokens by calling approve method on Token smart contract passing Bob's address and 20 as method arguments. approve("0xBob", 20); 2) After some time, Alice decides to change from 20 to 10 the number of Alice's tokens Bob is allowed to transfer, so she calls approve method again, this time passing Bob's address and 10 as method arguments. approve("0xBob", 10); 3) Bob notices Alice's second transaction before it was mined and quickly sends another transaction that calls transferFrom method to transfer 20 Alice's tokens to himself. transferFrom("0xAlice", "0xBob", 20); 4) If Bob's transaction will be executed before Alice's transaction, Bob will successfully transfer 20 Alice's tokens and gain the ability to transfer another 10 tokens. 5) Before Alice noticed that something went wrong, Bob calls transferFrom method again, this time to transfer 10 Alice's tokens. This results in Bob acquiring 30 Alice's tokens instead of only 10.
Impact
Unsafe ERC20 approve that do not handle non-standard erc20 behavior. 1.Some token contracts do not return any value. 2.Some token contracts revert the transaction when the allowance is not zero.
Proof of Concept
Tools Used
Manual Review
Recommended Mitigation Steps
First: To address this issue, Alice must initiate two transactions. First, she sets the allowance to 0, effectively resetting it for Bob. The second transaction is required to approve the new desired allowance.
Second: Employ non-standard functions provided by ERC20, namely increaseAllowance() and decreaseAllowance(). So if the Bob was approved before, and the approved amount is higher/lower, call the increaseAllowance() or decreaseAllowance(). These functions are integral components of the widely adopted OpenZeppelin ERC20 implementation but the problem is it's possible to have human error calling the approve function instead of increaseAllowance() and decreaseAllowance().
Assessed type
ERC20