search

code-423n4 / 2024-03-saltyio-mitigation-findings

0 stars 0 forks source link

H-04 MitigationConfirmed #30

Open c4-bot-5 opened 8 months ago

c4-bot-5 commented 8 months ago

Lines of code

Vulnerability details

Summary

H-04 talked about the possibility of the virtualRewardsToAdd being more than type(uint128).max and hence impacting reward variables here.

Mitigation

All calculations related to rewards are now represented in uint256. The attack was based on the ability of the first depositor to donate some SALT and cause the calculation to surpass the limit. This is not practically possible now due to the prerequisite values being ridiculously high.

Conclusion

LGTM

c4-judge commented 8 months ago

Picodes marked the issue as satisfactory

c4-judge commented 8 months ago

Picodes marked the issue as confirmed for report