deposit can be DoS

[c4-bot-2]

Lines of code

https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-05-bakerfi/blob/59b1f70cbf170871f9604e73e7fe70b70981ab43/contracts/core/Vault.sol#L212

Vulnerability details

Impact

DoS attacks make it impossible for others to deposit

Proof of Concept

maxDeposit is set in the deposit function:

    if (maxDeposit > 0) {
        uint256 afterDeposit = msg.value + ((balanceOf(msg.sender) * _tokenPerETH(maxPriceAge)) / 1e18);
        if (afterDeposit > maxDeposit) revert MaxDepositReached();
    }

_tokenPerETH = (totalSupply() * 1 ether) / _totalAssets;

Because _totalAssets = totalCollateralInEth - totalDebtInEth So the value of _totalAssets might be small.

Suppose _totalAssets = 1wei, afterDeposit = msg.value + balanceOf(msg.sender) * totalSupply()

Since totalSupply is constantly increasing, Therefore, when the value of totalSupply is accumulated (many deposits in a short time) and _totalAssets in the pool is small, a user with balanceOf(msg.sender) greater than 0 May not be able to deposit.

The attacker can make totalSupply increase temporarily, or the attacker can donate the balance to the specified account so that his balance is greater than 0.

Tools Used

vscode, manual

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Change the calculation method of maxDeposit.

Assessed type

DoS

[c4-bot-4]

Withdrawn by zhaojie