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This PR implements security improvements by sandboxing subprocess calls to prevent command injection attacks. The implementation wraps existing subprocess.run and subprocess.Popen calls with safe_command functions from the security package, which adds protection against command chaining and sensitive file access.
sequenceDiagram
participant User
participant Application
participant safe_command
participant subprocess
User->>Application: Request to execute command
Application->>safe_command: safe_command.run(subprocess.Popen, commands)
safe_command->>subprocess: Popen(commands, stdout=PIPE)
subprocess-->>safe_command: Output
safe_command-->>Application: Output
Application-->>User: Response with command output
classDiagram
class safe_command {
+run(func, *args, **kwargs)
+call(func, *args, **kwargs)
}
class subprocess {
+run(command, shell)
+call(command)
+Popen(command, stdout)
}
subprocess <|-- safe_command : wraps
note for safe_command "Provides security enhancements for subprocess calls"
Change | Details | Files |
---|---|---|
Added security package dependency for safe command execution |
|
_cite/requirements.txt |
Replaced unsafe subprocess call with sandboxed version |
|
_cite/util.py |
Hello @pixeebot[bot]! Thanks for opening this PR. We checked the lines you've touched for PEP 8 issues, and found:
_cite/util.py
:Line 179:80: E501 line too long (99 > 79 characters)
PR Details of @pixeebot[bot] in Ericsson-cognitive-labs : | OPEN | CLOSED | TOTAL |
---|---|---|---|
1 | 5 | 6 |
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In many situations, applications will rely on OS provided functions, scripts, macros and utilities instead of reimplementing them in code. While functions would typically be accessed through a native interface library, the remaining three OS provided features will normally be invoked via the command line or launched as a process. If unsafe inputs are used to construct commands or arguments, it may allow arbitrary OS operations to be performed that can compromise the server.
Injection flaws, such as SQL, NoSQL, OS, and LDAP injection, occur when untrusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker’s hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing data without proper authorization. Source: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
New dependencies detected. Learn more about Socket for GitHub ↗︎
Package | New capabilities | Transitives | Size | Publisher |
---|---|---|---|---|
pypi/security@1.3.1 | environment, eval, filesystem, network, shell Transitive: unsafe | +730 |
8.24 GB | clavedeluna, pixee |
This codemod sandboxes all instances of subprocess.run and subprocess.call to offer protection against attack.
Left unchecked,
subprocess.run
andsubprocess.call
can execute any arbitrary system command. If an attacker can control part of the strings used as program paths or arguments, they could execute arbitrary programs, install malware, and anything else they could do if they had a shell open on the application host.Our change introduces a sandbox which protects the application:
The default
safe_command
restrictions applied are the following:safe_command
functions attempt to parse the given command, and throw aSecurityException
if multiple commands are present./etc/passwd
, so the sandbox prevents arguments that point to these files that may be targets for exfiltration.There are more options for sandboxing if you are interested in locking down system commands even more.
Dependency Updates
This codemod relies on an external dependency. We have automatically added this dependency to your project's
requirements.txt
file.This library holds security tools for protecting Python API calls.
There are a number of places where Python project dependencies can be expressed, including
setup.py
,pyproject.toml
,setup.cfg
, andrequirements.txt
files. If this change is incorrect, or if you are using another packaging system such aspoetry
, it may be necessary for you to manually add the dependency to the proper location in your project.More reading
* [https://github.com/pixee/python-security/blob/main/src/security/safe_command/api.py](https://github.com/pixee/python-security/blob/main/src/security/safe_command/api.py) * [https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/OS_Command_Injection_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/OS_Command_Injection_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)🧚🤖 Powered by Pixeebot
Feedback | Community | Docs | Codemod ID: pixee:python/sandbox-process-creation
Summary by Sourcery
Enhance security by sandboxing subprocess calls using the 'safe_command' module to prevent command injection attacks. Update the project's dependencies to include the 'security' library necessary for this functionality.
Enhancements:
Build: