search

42milez / go-oidc-expt

An experimental implementation of OpenID provider with Go.
MIT License
0 stars 0 forks source link

Bump github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2 from 2.0.15 to 2.0.16 #69

Closed dependabot[bot] closed 1 year ago

dependabot[bot] commented 1 year ago

Bumps github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2 from 2.0.15 to 2.0.16.

Release notes

Sourced from github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2's releases.

v2.0.16

v2.0.16 31 Oct 2023
[Security]
  * [jws] ECDSA signature verification requires us to check if the signature
    is of the desired length of bytes, but this check that used to exist before
    had been removed in [#65](https://github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/issues/65), resulting in certain malformed signatures to pass
    verification.

One of the ways this could happen if R is a 31 byte integer and S is 32 byte integer,
both containing the correct signature values, but R is not zero-padded.

   Correct = R: [ 0 , ... ] (32 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)
   Wrong   = R: [ ... ] (31 bytes)     S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)

In order for this check to pass, you would still need to have all 63 bytes
populated with the correct signature. The only modification a bad actor
may be able to do is to add one more byte at the end, in which case the
first 32 bytes (including what would have been S's first byte) is used for R,
and S would contain the rest. But this will only result in the verification to
fail. Therefore this in itself should not pose any security risk, albeit
allowing some illegally formated messages to be verified.



    

  • [jwk] jwk.Key objects now have a Validate() method to validate the data
stored in the keys. However, this still does not necessarily mean that the key's
are valid for use in cryptographic operations. If Validate() is successful,
it only means that the keys are in the right format, including the presence
of required fields and that certain fields have proper length, etc.
    • 



[New Features]


    

  • 

    [jws] Added jws.WithValidateKey() to force calling key.Validate() before
signing or verification.
    

    • 

  • 

    [jws] jws.Sign() now returns a special type of error that can hold the
individual errors from the signers. The stringification is still the same
as before to preserve backwards compatibility.
    

    • 

  • 

    [jwk] Added jwk.IsKeyValidationError that checks if an error is an error
from key.Validate().
    

    • 



[Bug Fixes]


    

  • [jwt] jwt.ParseInsecure() was running verification if you provided a key
via jwt.WithKey() or jwt.WithKeySet() (#1007)
Changelog

Sourced from github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2's changelog.

v2.0.16 31 Oct 2023 [Security]

  • [jws] ECDSA signature verification requires us to check if the signature is of the desired length of bytes, but this check that used to exist before had been removed in #65, resulting in certain malformed signatures to pass verification.

    One of the ways this could happen if R is a 31 byte integer and S is 32 byte integer, both containing the correct signature values, but R is not zero-padded.

    Correct = R: [ 0 , ... ] (32 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes) Wrong = R: [ ... ] (31 bytes) S: [ ... ] (32 bytes)

    In order for this check to pass, you would still need to have all 63 bytes populated with the correct signature. The only modification a bad actor may be able to do is to add one more byte at the end, in which case the first 32 bytes (including what would have been S's first byte) is used for R, and S would contain the rest. But this will only result in the verification to fail. Therefore this in itself should not pose any security risk, albeit allowing some illegally formated messages to be verified.

  • [jwk] jwk.Key objects now have a Validate() method to validate the data stored in the keys. However, this still does not necessarily mean that the key's are valid for use in cryptographic operations. If Validate() is successful, it only means that the keys are in the right format, including the presence of required fields and that certain fields have proper length, etc.

[New Features]

  • [jws] Added jws.WithValidateKey() to force calling key.Validate() before signing or verification.

  • [jws] jws.Sign() now returns a special type of error that can hold the individual errors from the signers. The stringification is still the same as before to preserve backwards compatibility.

  • [jwk] Added jwk.IsKeyValidationError that checks if an error is an error from key.Validate().

[Bug Fixes]

  • [jwt] jwt.ParseInsecure() was running verification if you provided a key via jwt.WithKey() or jwt.WithKeySet() (#1007)
Commits


Dependabot compatibility score

Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting @dependabot rebase.

Dependabot commands and options
You can trigger Dependabot actions by commenting on this PR: - `@dependabot rebase` will rebase this PR - `@dependabot recreate` will recreate this PR, overwriting any edits that have been made to it - `@dependabot merge` will merge this PR after your CI passes on it - `@dependabot squash and merge` will squash and merge this PR after your CI passes on it - `@dependabot cancel merge` will cancel a previously requested merge and block automerging - `@dependabot reopen` will reopen this PR if it is closed - `@dependabot close` will close this PR and stop Dependabot recreating it. You can achieve the same result by closing it manually - `@dependabot show ignore conditions` will show all of the ignore conditions of the specified dependency - `@dependabot ignore this major version` will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this major version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself) - `@dependabot ignore this minor version` will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this minor version (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself) - `@dependabot ignore this dependency` will close this PR and stop Dependabot creating any more for this dependency (unless you reopen the PR or upgrade to it yourself)