Holders need to feel secure in their possession and be able to better predict their holding period to maximize investment (akin to a lease)
Mechanics
Fixed time: block to block start/end
Continuous auction – whoever holds it at the end of the auction period locks in stewardship
Avoid clustered bids at the very end: each bid within t-window of closing pushes the bid window (e.g. bids within last 30 minutes push end out 20 minutes)
Public bids or commit-reveal (blind) scheme? [Graven]
Reveal
is it possible to have a time-dependent zero-knowledge reveal?
Each bidder encrypts their bid with a public key and the pk is used to decrypt all bids simultaneously?
Encrypt the address so that other bidders can't view wallet balance and predict max bid
Requires central (off-chain?) intermediary
May require placing a deposit as collateral on each bid; collateral amount may reveal info on bid?
Solution A: Call ERC20 approve with amount = max bid + random int [Similar to Space]
Reserve Price?
Clean-slate: bidding starts at zero
Matt's mild preference – "intuitively it feels weird to build in a system where people don't have to engage; auto-pilot disincentivizes people paying attention to their valuation"
Is there a transition between auto-pilot over the short term (monthly) and the longer term (annually)?
Dutch-auction down from previous-lease price into a subsequent bid is put in (previous lease-holder inherits the lease by default if no other bids)
How are people paying the taxes and fees? If deposit can exceed lease time, different implication: don't expect to need to re-auction [Graven]
Price Paid? Highest bid or second highest bid (Vickrey)
Highest: true self-assessed value?
Second: blind, pays the second highest
How does this impact bidding true self-assessed value?
Regular: should always bid lower than true subject-valuation; if bidding true then you earn 0 when you win
Mechanics
approvewithamount = max bid + random int[Similar to Space]