Closed ghost closed 3 years ago
If a name is used instead of an IP address, the name is resolved with a query to the local resolver, which has already been configured to use dnscrypt-proxy. So, no unencrypted queries leaves the host.
the name is resolved with a query to the local resolver, which has already been configured to use dnscrypt-proxy.
It requires that the system-wide dns resolver to be set to like 127.0.0.1:x
(x is the port dnscrypt-proxy is listening on)
I wish that dnscrypt-proxy use itself instead of use system-wide dns resolver, for the cloaking domains.
But if the system hasn't been configured to use the proxy, how are you using it?
A censorship-circumvention tool use a built-in dnscrypt-proxy for dns lookups, as a child process of itself
I thought it'll be better if making a pull request myself...
dnscrypt-proxy should instead find itself then use net.Resolver
...
built-in dnscrypt-proxy
New case ...
Normally, the configured different name will go back to SDNS finally, I agree. And by my tests on Windows, there are a little differences for cloaking:
cache = false
It can't control the OS cache strategy. The cloaked host result depends on the OS cache.cloak_ttl
. dnscrypt-proxy
always counts the cloak_ttl
, even cache = false
.
For the configured different name, TTL depends on the remote.
I don't use this feature much ;p
Is your feature request related to a problem?
clocking-rules.txt
For the above conf, dnscrypt-proxy will not send
forcesafesearch.google.com
to remote DNSCrypt servers in an encrypted protocol, Instead, querying for local DNS in unencrypted UDP protocolDescribe the solution you'd like
As said in the issue title
Additional context
In the rare case if
1. State's censorship is affecting the domain `cn.nytimes.com` 2. To access the site, use domain fronting tool [Accesser](https://github.com/URenko/Accesser/blob/master/README.en.md) which is relying on dnscrypt-proxy to get correct DNS response 3. `cn.nytimes.com` itself sometimes return non-domain-frontable IPs, and we want it always use domain-frontable `x.cloudfront.net` IPs 4. so below written in cloaking-rules.txt ``` cn.nytimes.com d1emgxxou2di91.cloudfront.net ``` 5. and its CNAME `d1emgxxou2di91.cloudfront.net` is also affected (return malformed response) 6. dnscrypt-proxy use local poisoned DNS (and of course, unencrypted) for `d1emgxxou2di91.cloudfront.net` dnscrypt-proxy and the domain fronting tool never got the correct IP