osadj
commented
4 years ago Hi all,
I just wanted to share this announcement regarding the too-close for too-long (TC4TL) detection challenge that NIST is organizing in collaboration with the MIT PACT consortium. Please feel free to forward this to anyone that you think might be interested in participating in the challenge:
We are pleased to announce that, in collaboration with the MIT PACT consortium (https://pact.mit.edu), we will be organizing a pilot too-close-for-too-long (TC4TL) event detection challenge.
For more information please visit: https://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/mig/nist-tc4tl-challenge
Evaluation Plan https://www.nist.gov/document/nist-pilot-tc4tl-challenge-evaluation-plan
Registration https://tc4tlchallenge.nist.gov
Keywords: Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Distance Estimation, Exposure Notification, Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), Motion Sensor, Proximity Detection, Ranging
I'm very surprised that I couldn't find an existing issue for this and it's most likely that it's my fault (I checked through all open issues twice), so please do close this issue if it's a duplicate or if it's already resolved.
My main concern with DP-3T currently is not a privacy/security one but actually regarding the harsh physical limitations of the Bluetooth LE communication channel. Is it really sufficient for determining actual contact events?
Consider for example: I drive around and stop at the traffic light next to someone in their own car who's infected. Thanks to how EphID exchange works over Bluetooth LE, now I've "been in contact" and our devices have exchanged EphIDs, despite neither of us having left their car.
Many such examples can be imagined.
My concern is that this would lead to such a large number of false contact events that it would bring down the usefulness of DP-3T almost completely, despite it not being a blight from a privacy or security standpoint.
What existing measures are being considered to mitigate this class of problems?