MalwareBytes: multiple security issues

[GoogleCodeExporter]

[[ This issue is a duplicate of issue 615 and issue 631, but with the hardcoded 
RC4 key censored. MalwareBytes are concerned that publishing the RC4 key could 
be damaging, and while I'm quite certain anyone interested in the key is 
capable of figuring it out, I agreed to censor it ]]

Malwarebytes updates are not signed or downloaded over a secure channel.
========================================================================

MalwareBytes fetches their signature updates over HTTP, permitting a man in the 
middle attack. The protocol involves downloading YAML files over HTTP for each 
update from http://data-cdn.mbamupdates.com. Although the YAML files include an 
MD5 checksum, as it's served over HTTP and not signed, an attacker can simply 
replace it.

It's possible the developer believed that an attacker cannot tamper with the 
data, as it's encrypted with the hardcoded RC4 key 
`██████████████████████████�
��█████` for configuration data, and 
`██████████████████████████�
��█████` for definitions. However, this is not the case. The 
following openssl commands can be used to decrypt, edit, and then re-encrypt 
the definitions and configuration data:

For configuration data:

$ openssl enc -rc4 -d -nosalt -in net.conf -K 
██████████████████████████��
�█████ > net.conf.txt

For definitions, which are also deflate compressed:

$ openssl enc -rc4 -d -nosalt -in rules.ref -K 
██████████████████████████��
�█████ | zlib-flate -uncompress > rules.txt

Therefore, this scheme is not sufficient to prevent tampering and the developer 
should sign them.

There are numerous simple ways to turn this into code execution, such as 
specifying a target file in the network configuration, writing a new TXTREPLACE 
rule to modify configuration files, or modifying a Registry Key with a REPLACE 
rule.

Malwarebytes uses incorrect ACLs allowing trivial privilege escalation.
=======================================================================

MalwareBytes stores it's configuration and definitions in %PROGRAMDATA%, but 
the default ACLs permit all Users the ability to create and modify files. This 
is trivial for unprivileged users to exploit and become SYSTEM.

C:\>icacls "%PROGRAMDATA%\Malwarebytes\Malwarebytes Anti-Malware"
C:\ProgramData\Malwarebytes\Malwarebytes Anti-Malware NT 
AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)
                                                      BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)
                                                      CREATOR OWNER:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
                                                      BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)
                                                      BUILTIN\Users:(I)(CI)(WD,AD,WEA,WA)

Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files

C:\>dir "%PROGRAMDATA%\Malwarebytes\Malwarebytes Anti-Malware"
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is 4A36-A1CA

 Directory of C:\ProgramData\Malwarebytes\Malwarebytes Anti-Malware

11/09/2015  01:07 PM    <DIR>          .
11/09/2015  01:07 PM    <DIR>          ..
10/05/2015  09:46 AM             2,025 actions.ref
10/05/2015  09:46 AM                92 akadomains.ref
10/05/2015  09:46 AM                92 akaips.ref
11/05/2015  01:14 PM    <DIR>          Configuration
10/05/2015  09:46 AM           267,877 domains.ref
10/05/2015  09:46 AM                 0 exclusions.dat
10/05/2015  09:46 AM            18,787 ips.ref
11/05/2015  01:14 PM    <DIR>          Logs
11/05/2015  01:14 PM    <DIR>          Quarantine
10/05/2015  09:46 AM        10,258,263 rules.ref
11/09/2015  01:07 PM                 0 swissarmy.ref
               8 File(s)     10,547,136 bytes
               5 Dir(s)  24,273,035,264 bytes free

The configuration files are encrypted with the hardcoded symmetric RC4 key 
`██████████████████████████�
��█████` for configuration data, and 
`██████████████████████████�
��█████` for definitions. The following openssl commands can be used 
to decrypt, edit, and then re-encrypt the definitions and configuration data:

For configuration data:

$ openssl enc -rc4 -d -nosalt -in net.conf -K 
██████████████████████████��
�█████ > net.conf.txt

For definitions, which are also deflate compressed:

$ openssl enc -rc4 -d -nosalt -in rules.ref -K 
██████████████████████████��
�█████ | zlib-flate -uncompress > rules.txt

Symmetric RC4 encryption does not authenticate or prevent tampering of 
configuration or definition files. An unprivileged attacker can easily create a 
hostile rule or configuration to execute arbitrary code, such as writing a new 
TXTREPLACE rule to modify configuration files, or modifying a Registry Key with 
a REPLACE rule

TXTREPLACE rules are not context aware
======================================

Malwarebytes has various classes of rules, such as PESECTION, DIGISIG and 
REPLACE. The TXTREPLACE rules specify simple patterns that should be 
substituted if found. There are hundreds of rules like this that do not 
understand context that they execute in, and can result in remote code 
execution.

For example, consider this rule:

TXTREPLACE=PUP.Optional.ChatZum, 
%FFPROFILE%\prefs.js,browser.startup.homepage*chatzum.com, 
browser.startup.homepage",,"https://www.malwarebytes.org/restorebrowser/

An attacker can arrange for a preference to contain the string 
browser.startup.homepage=chatzum.com, and the action would result in 
incorrectly substituting new code.

ACTIONs can result in remote code execution
===========================================

Malwarebytes defines several custom cleanup procedures for various detection 
rules, these are called ACTION's, and are generally a list of commands to 
execute. Several ACTIONs, like BRWSRFLSH_ACTION and CLRSHORT2_ACTION, attempt 
to programmatically generate visual basic scripts or batch files, and then run 
them. These scripts do not adequately handle untrusted input and can result in 
remote code execution.

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. If 90 days elapse
without a broadly available patch, then the bug report will automatically
become visible to the public.

Original issue reported on code.google.com by tav...@google.com on 2 Feb 2016 at 7:13

[GoogleCodeExporter]

MalwareBytes have published an advisory for this issue.

https://blog.malwarebytes.org/news/2016/02/malwarebytes-anti-malware-vulnerabili
ty-disclosure

Original comment by tav...@google.com on 2 Feb 2016 at 7:14

• Changed state: Fixed

[GoogleCodeExporter]

Issue 615 has been merged into this issue.

Original comment by tav...@google.com on 2 Feb 2016 at 7:14

[GoogleCodeExporter]

Issue 631 has been merged into this issue.

Original comment by tav...@google.com on 2 Feb 2016 at 7:15