More information
#### Details
An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames.
Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed.
This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send.
The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.
#### Severity
Unknown
#### References
- [https://go.dev/issue/65051](https://go.dev/issue/65051)
- [https://go.dev/cl/576155](https://go.dev/cl/576155)
- [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/YgW0sx8mN3M](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/YgW0sx8mN3M)
This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2024-2687) and the [Go Vulnerability Database](https://togithub.com/golang/vulndb) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://togithub.com/golang/vulndb#license)).
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This PR contains the following updates:
v0.19.0->v0.23.0HTTP/2 CONTINUATION flood in net/http
BIT-golang-2023-45288 / CVE-2023-45288 / GHSA-4v7x-pqxf-cx7m / GO-2024-2687
More information
#### Details An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection. #### Severity Unknown #### References - [https://go.dev/issue/65051](https://go.dev/issue/65051) - [https://go.dev/cl/576155](https://go.dev/cl/576155) - [https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/YgW0sx8mN3M](https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/YgW0sx8mN3M) This data is provided by [OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GO-2024-2687) and the [Go Vulnerability Database](https://togithub.com/golang/vulndb) ([CC-BY 4.0](https://togithub.com/golang/vulndb#license)).Configuration
📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).
🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.