Voting Case Study: The Good, The Bad, and the Beautiful

[ghost]

Response to: https://medium.com/@moonpapers/why-governance-in-most-crypto-project-sucks-and-how-to-fix-it-3cfb7bd492c8

During the last hours of the Phase 1 Quadratic voting, an artist took advantage of a weakness in block chain governance. Namely, the lack of identity. This artist was able to vote for himself over 60 times in less than a hour, and spent around .38 ETH (which he would get back at the end) to push his logo to the number one spot.

A solution to this specific issue, could have been to limit addresses to one vote per entry, but even then nothing would stop a voter from making multiple accounts to then self vote. This would make it more of a hassle to vote so many times, as the user would have to A) make multiple accounts B) send ether to those accounts C) switch between accounts to then vote. The voter would have also been less likely to have been found out.

Fortunately this artist used the same account and self voted, which made the solution more simple (i.e. creating a community vote). The power of uniqueness is able to overcome a solo, or duo manipulator on the consensus. It also penalizes this user as those 55+transactions each had a fee, which will not be returned.

The question I had to myself was: what if the user did use multiple accounts? It would have been much harder to trace that it was manipulation (other than the logo's quality vs logos before it, and loud community disapproval). The mitigation of multiple account voting could be mitigated through the act of the phase 2 staking (yet to occur), which is proposing, then staking to the best. The perceived issue with staking is centralization concerns of the ownership in the tokens, but those users also have the most to lose if the branding does not fit with the identity of its users. Large stake holders have in their best interest the stake of ones own holdings and its success. If large holders do not vote in the best interest of the infrastructure then value goes down, and more users are able to come onboard to change the narrative.

The combination of parameters through smart contracts to arrive at a more fair governance model is being explored. This is what is unique about the DFO structure, and is just beginning to be explored. Identity has its own share of issues, and privacy concerns. When it comes to creating startups with anonymous founders a flexible design to accommodate variable scenarios quickly is the future.

I view unique participation as inherently more important than identity. The force of unique participation through filtration and combination of voting models can arrive at a more truthful answer: The Good, The Bad, and The Beauty of Flexibility.

Transaction of Quadratic Self-Voter (https://etherscan.io/txs?a=0x05a8b94cd607d5d611ff71161623f815535a4c73&p=2):

[alet89]

I think you get the point! After Phase 1, we're researching a solution to mitigate self-voting in a quadratic funding competition like the brand contest.

The main problem of Ethereum is that it is challenging to mitigate self-voting with multiple accounts because anyone can create an address and vote. I want to R&D new solutions for it for the next contest.

In Phase 2, the voting system will be by staking buidl until the end survey block. But if you have some ideas to create a better system, I'll be happy to R&D... These are my fav R&Ds.

I think we can maintain this issue open to R&D in time a solution for Quadratic Funding Competitions.

[oxmah]

While I find your proposal interesting you make a wrong assumption at the very beginning of your reasoning: "The perceived issue with staking is centralization concerns of the ownership in the tokens, but those users also have the most to lose if the branding does not fit with the identity of its users." That's simply not true. What you have to lose is relative to what you have, not relative to the sum of the token out there. This is why traders use % wise risk management and not absolute values. For someone who has an income let's say of 600€ per month, investing 2k in BUIDL is huge, and losing it would be horrendous. To the contrary, I know a few guys in crypto whom can throw litterally millions USD in trade and who laugh when they get liquidated on Bitmex. Losing 100 BTC is nothing when you have 50'000 BTC laying around right?

As said, it's relative. And this has to be taken in consideration when you balance a system where money can talk and vote.

[ghost]

@alet89 @ogreports

I can see both ways for the issues with whales who may not care to cause havoc, especially if there is no penalization, other than the long term viability of the project (i.e. bad decisions are made, leading to lower value, and more holders to potentially overtake through time with inflation.)

I drew up a rough concept of Quadratic Staking using Staking, and Reward Pools. Where there is no penalty for voting, rather all stakers (voters) receive a reward dependent on amount staked. Whales will receive a lower reward and less proportionate vote, while smaller stakers (for example holders in the top 500 as a threshold) will receive a higher reward (proportional to stake).

More incentives and participation from smaller voters/holders and also helps cover smart contract interaction fees.

Will disincentive someone from splitting holdings into multiple accounts, as smart contract interaction fees would accumulate to not make it worth the reward (i.e. smart contract interaction fees, transfer fees to different accounts, annoyance of having potentially 100's of different addresses staked with minimum of 250 buidl in each one> reward)

Aligned incentives: Whales will vote for the proposal that is best for the long term viability, while not having as much influence as many smaller holders. Smaller holders will be inclined to vote if the transaction fee's are "rewarded" in concept through the reward pool, but not receive a reward that is high enough to encourage going through all the hoops, and fees of splitting an account up many times (i.e. 2500 holder splitting into 10 accounts with 250 each at a 250 min). Another mitigation is the top 500 threshold, if many unique accounts split to game the system, then the threshold would change and would be hard to keep all the accounts in "voting range" i.e. further annoyance to splitting (less incentive).

Another thought: there are two Reward Pools one for accounts that are whale? i.e. top 100, and another pool for 200-500. The more that stake into the 200-500 the less reward that is giving out at end (less will want to split as it has diminishing returns).

[ghost]

@matlemad A few observations from the phase 1 competition. The first logos were focused on ideas (i.e. ufo/halo, function, alien eyes/ghost eyes, more simple/multiple meanings). The best logo emerged towards the end when ideas from the community were fleshed out, visible and ready to be put into a professional packaging. I also noticed trends in certain movements of logos (I.e. those focused on ufo/ghost/rainbows), while some where moving towards the idea of building (hammer), and others removing the ghost entirely and memes (ants, mafia glasses, dfo letters/function.)

This leads me to a conclusion that concepts are fleshed out initially leading to a best. If this is the case then a way to collect ideas together should exist as a way to pool ideas with each other. For example, the concept of ghost is popular, and the ghost idea pool has a lot of bets. Those who are part of the ghost pool see a ufo/ghost logo and want to "drag the idea" into its pool then those high equity pool holders can create a bridge to the UFO pool and invest in it from the ghost pool (I.e. nft unipool token(ghost nft and buidl)/ufoghost token.) This acquires the ufo ghost in potential appreciation (reward)? This rewards participants in the ghost nft pool who now want to change direction once an innovative idea emerges, without feeling the votes were locked and exhausted in to just the idea of the ghost (disadvantaged in innovation by its first mover advantage). This also allows a better logo to emerge through the co opting of ideas through the duration of the betting period.

In response to @matlemad (from discord 8/11/2020):

@maxxflyer Cubic voting is ^3 version of quadratic voting (1 vote = 1 credit, 2 votes = 8 credits etc.)

In general, I'm quite tempted by the idea of Consensus by Betting @maxxflyer proposed. I have something still incomplete in mind, that would need further reasoning. But here it is.

in my view, people will have to pay different tiers to join the betting table. TIER 1 - three move TIER 2 - seven moves TIER 3 - ten moves etc.

These TIERs could be made available by a time-faucet that mints NFT voting tickets twice a week at random times.

Once you buy a TIER and join the betting table, you can set the ranking of the Artworks by dragging the icons up or down. Artworks are visualized always in a different, random order, and no info are given on the state of the general bet.

Every time you move one artwork up and down in the ranking and confirm, you "burn" one move (TIER 1,2,3) the TIER price you paid gets split and allocated to pools for each Artwork you moved and confirmed.

Of course, you can bet on ANY ranking position. For example, I can bet that Artwork X will reach position #1 just like #25 or come last. AT THE END of the betting period, the Artworks position themselves at the place determined by the weighted average of bets (e.g. if Artwork X was ranked #10 by 2 people and #4 by one, its final ranking will be #8).

It remains to determine, as a player, what do I get from guessing the rightest ranking (% from each Artwork's pools) and most important, how to define the best Artwork for the Contest proposed.

[Matlemad]

Nice one @NovedNav

I would add, as a UX/UI tip, that when submitting a proposal, creators have a 3D semantic tree graph available they can contribute to. E.G. I made a Robot-ghost NFT, and contribute to the semantic tree by extending a branch from the Ghost tag into a new Robot-Ghost tag into the tree.

the legitimacy of this contribution will be validated not only by the direct votes on the new NFT, but as you said by the stake the people in the Ghost-pool will move into the Robot-Ghost pool.

Imagine then that out of the Robot-Ghost NFT/pool someone creates a Cabbage-Robot NFT/pool, thus giving up on the Ghost but actually harnessing that innovation line. Imagine that the Cabbage-Robot wins it all, with a relative majority of votes on the NFT, 15% of stake from the folks in the Ghost pool and perhaps 35% from the people in the Robot-Ghost pool.

Any dividends can then be split accordingly.

I would also take it further as to create a DNA in the NFT smart-contract, like in CryptoKitties/Zombies. The Origin DNA "chromosomes"/possibilities" in the contract would represent the Brand's general indications for the creative contest (ex. Ghost shape y/n, tongue out y/n, hammer y/n, rainbow y/n, etc.). Then "mutations" can happen depending on new "chromosomes" being added to the DNA, and approved by the community depending on the the stake moving from previous pools.

Remains to consider a community-governed policy to allow slashing of DNA, should it be malicious or lobbying move that does not represent the Contest's purpose.

[ghost]

@matlemad I am not a fan of slashing, and am more so for Opportunity/Missed Opportunity (profit, and less profit).

I like the breakdown of the semantic tree by Yes/No's, the DNA application is a great idea! I also think this can extend also into Community Covered Policy itself, and economic frameworks. Such as NFT's as idea models that can then be branched into better models that derive from the previous models (this can be text, or visualizations of mechanisms). The winning model is then constructed into a system to be implemented, perhaps the profits used to fund those with the expertise to code etc.

Below shows how Malicious/Lobbying behavior would be counteracted through a Opportunity/Miss Opportunity tree. As can be seen the 50% who split into the continual growing branches also boost the growth of the non malicious branch. While the lobbying/malice branch is now locked into its state, losing out on the potential of the other branch that continues on.

To quote @Khonsu from discord #governance-standards (8/11/2020):

"I’d like to think of this as the Danger Room, the holographic training chamber the X-Men practice wielding their mutant powers and weapons at, but in a virtual gymnasium they can control."

[ghost]

An additional Image to show the Deterministic event away from Malicious/lobbied voters, and back to main branches. The staking split of which direction to go to main branch, stay, or go to malicious determines if the malicious because a branch that is unable to move to "good" branch".

[Matlemad]

Again @NovedNav , great visual contribution!

I support this Opportunity Rule. Also Voting by Stake is a great principle, and it could be turned into Quadratic Staking to prevent plutocracy.

As an external consideration, I see this so much needed into political elections, where candidates propose their "electoral contracts" to the public, gather votes based on that, but too often fail to stick to it. E.g., In Italy, the day after the political elections most politicians have already "broken" some points of their proposed "electoral contract" (on which they base their whole campaign) by compromising with another Party or Lobby.

So, I would only add one tweak to the Deterministic Scenario slide.

DEVIANT IDEAS COST HIGHER Just like in evolution, successful mutations are always tiny and do not jeopardize the newborn' existence in the habitat or within the pack/tribe. Whenever a newborn presents severe mutations, he usually finds it x times harder to survive and to be accepted by the pack. If he still gets accepted, usually that implies high maintenance costs on the pack/tribe.

In a similar way, we could make it harder for Lobbies to propose Malicious Ideas by giving financial incentives to opt "yes" to some previous DNA traits (Robot, Cabbage, Legs, Tongue, Rainbow) , and by imposing extra costs when they branch-out a new idea without keeping any of the original DNA traits (Ladybug only). This cost could consist in

1. higher gas (similar to deploying a new contract) or
2. if they branch out without keeping any previous DNA traits, the staking from Quadratic becomes Cubic = this means that the Lobby will have to obtain some real spread support from the community, else pay ^3 for every additional vote. If we want to tight up this Rule, Voting by Stake could actually move between Quadratic to Cubic (^2, ^2.1, ^2.2... ^3) depending on number of DNA traits kept in the new branch Idea. But I reckon this is becoming tricky to put up.

COMMUNITY SLASHING // "EAT UP" SCENARIO Here I propose an interesting use of Negative Quadratic Voting. Imagine that it's me who branched out the LadyBug Idea, but just for the sake of keeping it in the same Tree line, I opt yes for the Robot, WITHOUT actually having any robot traits in my final, visual rendition. This is where I intended some form of community resolution (slashing), and here Negative Quadratic Voting could come useful: participants could have the possibility to vote negative and "eat up" the deviant proposal, thus eating up the stake put on it by the lobby. This implies that ANY Proposal can be voted PLUS or MINUS, IF the PLUS wins, the MINUS stake is eaten up and the proposal goes on, stronger than before. IF the MINUS wins, the proposal is eaten up alive (i.e. excluded from the contest) and all the Stake goes to those who voted MINUS.

FINAL NOTE We could go as further as proposing that every DNA trait has its own "success" ranking, derived from observing the total Stake allocation throughout the evolution process.

[ghost]

Notes on Deviant Ideas Costing More:

1. My worry with deviant ideas costing more is it will lower participation by added complexity, and perceptive risk of putting forward a far out idea. Also an attack vector could be to put in "valid" parameters even though the information visually contradicts this information just to get the lower gas cost. The check on validating parameters might add further complexity, i.e. using machine learning to verify that the image/information validates what is known by a consensus machine before sending the contract.

2. I like the idea of quadratic becoming cubic as a way of "freezing" the growth of the deviant path, unless the community sees it as a beneficial "out there" idea. I am curious in the scenario that a deviant idea is an outlier, but also good, could the community move all support to that branch or co op it into thee new main branch. This may be the best option.

Notes on Community Slashing:

My worry is that the more rules are enforced through consequences, the less participation will occur. My rational is that as perceived risks of partaking in a game increase, participation will decrease, higher UI complexity, fewer rule breaking ideas, and less innovation will result. I imagine it a bit like a garden, there is a bag of seed with a general idea to start off with that is expected to grow. However, this bag of seed holds outliers as well as seeds that fall within the mean of the general idea. I do not know if these outliers are beautiful roses, or invasive weeds. Once the garden of mystery seeds grows, the sun i.e. ("the community") can encourage and accelerate growth of the "good" deviant, while the deviant outliers are overshadowed and stunted through lost opportunity of sun rays.

Final Thought Notes:

My greatest worry is losing rule breaking deviant outliers before the seed can be planted (i.e. increased gas, risk of slashing etc.). The glitch in the system can radicalize the general parameters to something greater than the parts it set out to be. I think an interesting experiment is with meme's, how does a culture and idea carry to its further generations? Meme's are simple in parameters, but complex in thought relationships to the person interpreting. A meme deviant outlier can easily overtake its initial parameters due to simple swapping of an idea to the meme "template" to become more culturally successful (but not initially set upon).

[Matlemad]

I see your dilemma with game rules killing participation, although I would reckon that some basic "game theory" physiological rules could be applied to smaller interaction schemes.

In the end, we do need a mechanism to prevent X while preserving and fostering Y and Z. I believe that the "Eat up" scenario (similar to what AdChain tried to do) would be not a rule, but rather a governing tool that anyone can take at his/her own risk.

It's somehow like going to politics: you can top the bill if you get enough consensus to flip down an adversary at the elections, but you can also get irremediably burnt.

[ghost]

I see the issue with not having burn, in that it may arise in a non-focused state, too many ideas and branches. A burn function can be seen as a Focus State. I think both mechanisms can work together, but separate (Freezing and Burning). A step UP approach with each other (separate but interoperate with the whole). When I think of random data being put together to interact with each other, sub-structures may form that hold different values, ethics and morals than the initial anonymous group. The sub-structure idea would need a burn function as a benefit to unlock/distribute the cubic funded idea to its community or freeing to main wallet for a failed idea=success or fail idea=two different burn reactions.

The new frozen community group, which could be considered deviant from the initial anonymous group as it holds different idea, tooling or values will want to opt in to a burn function so this community may accomplish its goals without other deviant ideas forking away the focus or funding (and to prove it can be successful). Below I constructed a diagram of how the burn and freeze functions could co-exist. The freezing as a means of setting cubic voting in motion for a "community formation", and the burn is then used by the community as a distribution/funding mechanism to the deviant idea goal. If the goal or idea is not achieved (i.e. not innovative), then the burn funding goes to the main anon open branch wallet (towards the larger idea generative motives).

The general branch is the open and anonymous chain (normal primitive state behavior), which is continuous and moves forward as the universal system exists (ie. the general shared protocol).

[Matlemad]

This is becoming sick! :) great concept the Freeze and Burn overall. What I like about it is that it's attracting more and more gamification elements, which are always fun, even in the "lose" scenario.

I think we're getting very close to a proposal here.

for sake of clarity would you mind describing the Freeze and Burn spells :) using User Stories in the format:

as (user), I want to (desire), so that I can (goal) it would also be helpful an example using characters if you can.

[ghost]

An Environment Sided Perspective of FREEZE and BURN:

The Merzoz:

Merzoz is one of many, from a clan hailing from high crested mountains. They wear cloth covering the full face and body to block from the severe mountain winds. The clan has the power to freeze, a power that suits their environment, and allows strong frozen walls to be built. Merzoz's love beauty, and seeing things grow. Merzoz gather food below in the Sacred Swamp of Rando, in this lush enviroment different plants/trees/fruit grow that stir the imagination. Merzoz enjoy freezing, transporting and sharing with fellow Merzoz the interesting growths found in the Rando Swamp.

A Merzoz Adventure:

A Merzoz finds a eye catching object in the Sacred Rando Swamp (Rando's FREEZE, which make it eye catching), and then transports it to the High Mountain for all Merzoz to see.

• Scenerio 1: The Merzoz enjoy the item (proposal accepted), and send a frozen block of seeds back down with Merzoz A to deliver liquidity to be planted and grown (funding).

• Scenerio 2: The Merzoz will miss the item, so the document of collective ideas (NFT) on the strange item's properties is frozen and placed upon the ice wall (on-chain storage).

*Scenerio 1 and 2 are connected.

• Scenerio 3: The Merzoz find the item dangerous and throw it into the crested mountain's volcano (burned), which carries the ash filled air to the whole Rando Swamp for nutrients (a small reward).

Environment Clarification:

Rando Swamp: can be imagined as a platform for making combinations, building upon the pool of idea's

Merzoz: Can be imagined as arbitrators who worship the processes of the Rando Swamp, when an outlier emerges in the combinations (good or bad) the Merzoz emerge to freeze it, and is either supported (the good) through a show of interest from the rando swamp in the form of liquidity funding (opens up to growth from the combiners of the swamp), or burn the cubic funds (the bad) removing from supply (all swamp combiners benefit indirectly) and a small reward (can be accumulated in a reward pool) for highlighting the item as an outlier (summoning a Merzoz to freeze).

Burn is triggered when the highlighted item (i.e. summons a Merzoz to freeze or burn) fails to receive support (i.e. no demand for staking liquidity, rather staking BURN). The incentive for the small reward outweighs the potential for the idea, the cubic votes are locked for x time if no stake to BURN.

Freeze the idea reaches a cubic threshold (i.e. a ratio of its quadratic votes), then voting to BURN happens through a staking event, where idea has to meet certain threshold quorum of the quadratic votes to either succeed (disbursement of the seed capital to the rando swamp (supporters)), early cubic votes can be seen as a discount to a successful staking event (such as a ILO).

The Goal

The intention is to capture the phenomenon nature of a platform ruled by the unknown and unexpected combinations. It puts both the GOOD, and the BAD up on the metaphorical ice block stage through the participation of the RANDO (smaller votes that direct the growth of an idea), to then summon the attention of the MERZOZ (user who stake to BURN or APPROVE). The BEAUTIFUL are the successful that receive the support from stakeholders and the overall well being of the nature of the Sacred Rando (the environment of creativity).

The aim is to capture and document knowledge of these beautiful ideas/collaborations/scientific inquires in a perpetual way, without disincentive to idea's that are outliers. The artifact (NFT) is its mechanism of funding, and its shared co-ownership in the growth.

[ghost]

A User Sided Perspective of FREEZE and BURN:

The rando Swamp main nutrient is from the sun. The sun is a mass of user's who is crowdfunding idea's and development in the Rando swamp. These funds are represented by quadratic votes. The people of the sun have the power to move these votes to new developments to push the evolution.

The Rando creators also receive a proportionate amount of votes to the received crowdfunded votes.

FREEZE QUORUM: QUAD/CUBIC vote ratio >50%

For example Rando Creator recieves 2 uSD to an idea, which equates to 4 votes quadratic for Sun People and 8 votes Cubic for Rando Creators

The Function of Votes the Sun People VS The Votes of the Rando Creators:

Sun people can shift votes to new developments creating a pool of ideas, the process of branching and capturing its evolution.

The cubic votes to the Rando Creators can be used to freeze idea's i.e. summon MERZOZ who stake to BURN/Nothing/FUND

Sun People receive quadratic votes that can be moved to new ideas (NFT idea split into itself in x quantity), while Rando Creators receive Cubic Votes which can be moved to FREEZE. The Sun People do not know, what developments Rando's are freezing.

There are three factors combining the user perspective with the environment perspective:

1. The sun people users who spend uSD and receive a quadratic credit/vote (those who are investing in the developments as they evolve).

2. The Rando's in the swamp (recieving a cubic credit/vote from the sun people) these are used to freeze and summon Merzoz (to burn or to push a ice block wall offering...FUNDING/liquidity).

3. The Merzoz are summoned by a rando's use of votes to push past a freeze threshold 50% ratio of QUAD/CUBIC. The Merzoz stake assets for liquidity and long term in the idea or vision, which triggers distribution.

The distribution for a successful idea can then be distributed based on these different votes:

For Example, FREEZE and SUCCESS:

50% of Supply

• Rando Vote proportion of ownership of cubic locked votes 50%

-Sun people vote of proportion of quadratic locked votes 50%

The pool is an archive of the pooled ideas, a pool of NFT's (the visual representation of the branch through its Rando swamp of collective ideas), such as a collection of NFT's leading to the final.

The other half of the 50% of Supply:

-The Merzoz staked assets %'s to determine distribution of the 50% supply (such as an ILO?)

Distribution for BURN:

-Rando Vote Proportion of locked cubic credit/vote for reward distribution (for example cubic voters receive 10% of the sun peoples burned assets, and 10% of my cubic was locked into the burned NFT, then 10% of the 10%.

-Sun people proportion of ownership is burned (i.e. 90% of funds sent to the GOODWILL wallet)

• Merzoz Staked assets are unlocked after x time (able to retrieve assets staked to failed ILO)

-The NFT quantity is not included within the pool branch and is burned.

The MERZOZ and the SUN people are on two different sides of the equation, with the Rando swamp in the middle, but also encompass a larger picture

[ghost]

Merzoz Magic Box

User A Votes for an Idea and receives Voting Tokens quadratically

Content Creator A receives Voting Tokens Cubic to the quadratically minted.

User A moves quadratic votes to a an idea that develops content Creator B (i.e purchases it cheap nft token pool).

Content Creator B receives voting tokens cubic to the quadratically moved tokens.

User C Creates deviant idea and self votes, recieves votes cubic to the quadratically self voted funds.

Content Creator A and B move cubic votes and lock them into User C's Deviant idea and FREEZE

IF FREEZE

Content Created C now is locked for x time, if x time passes without a show of x amount of staked intrest, then LOCK cubic votes for x time

OR

Staker can stake to BURN, stake is locked for x time.

IF BURN

Content Creator A and B recieve reward 10% reward of quadratic votes/funds of Deviant User C (quadratic votes/funds) based on % ownership of cubic votes used to FREEZE

90% of quadratic funds from Deviant USER C are BURNED and sent to the GOODWILL Wallet.

IF

Quorum % of X of Cubic voters FREEZE user content creator D and it also has a % quorum of quadratic votes.

Then it goes to liquidity staking show of public intrest.

If reaching a % filled tiers.

Then GOAL, token is distributed based on 50% of supply towards liquidity provided %, and the other 50% half towards the distribution based on ownership of % of the cubic vote, and % of the quadratic vote

If % Tier is not filled in x of time to to a % quorum then content development is still in play, Quadratic votes/funds, cubic votes are locked for X time (opportunity penalty for collusion assumption, i.e. cannot move into cheap developments), while staked assets are unlocked immediately after failed staking % tier quorum.

[ghost]

[ghost]

GOAL: To create a "FUND" or "BURN" Button on NFT's, this on-chain "YES" or "NO" function is through using deposit and creator backed NFT's

Below shows the mechanics of using one token i.e. uSD for the Merzoz Box. The quadratic and Cubic are token calculators on each side of the NFT to determine ratios of when to pop-up staking option's to "BURN" or "FUND":

Questions:

Is there a state snapshot (archive of all NFT participants) after the X duration of staking "Fund" and "Burn" period?

Does the NFT distribute out copies of itself to the FUND disbursement (i.e. visual archive disbursement?) as Proof of Participation of the development?

Can the NFT serve as an archive of its own development (visual snapshot of its branch of visual developments)? In this case is the whole state of all the other NFT's included in the FUND disbursement as not only a Proof of Participation, but also ownership of it's unique creation line (both via its onchain data, vote movements, funding addresses, creator etc, and its visual development)?

What would happen if instead of staking for the phase two "BURN" and "FUND" a normal transaction is used (transaction + TIPS)? Reductive voting, using negative quadratic and cubic instead of staking?

What happens at scale? Would negative quadratic and cubic funds go to the disbursement to creators reward?

[ghost]

Using Merzoz Box with TIPS (voters) to an NFT package with Creators:

A NFT package can be defined as an evolution of concept to code. This package includes the initial proposal idea's and concepts leading to development, and then the code that is to be voted on. In this scenario Merzoz Box is used in the context of TIPING to VOTE and empowering creators.

In this scenerio:

TIPS are used to BURN stake, by putting that power in the hands of the creators.

Instead of Freeze in play it is FREEZE to start, the Ratio of staked uSD to staked cubic (representing a redemption of uSD) is based on rolling block time if NO vote the stake sent to TIPS pool, and block time is extended.

The stake/TIP is used as the quadratic vote, but also represents a YES claim to launch the NFT package.

The Cubic Creator token represents the voice of the creator in deciding if the proposal is finished or not. The Cubic Creator Token can be used to stake as a means to vote NO on the proposal (i.e. proposal is not finished block time is extended out, and puts staked into TIPS pool).

If NO is successful then the uSD staked is placed into the TIPS pool (TIPS pool is distributed only if YES).

If YES then NFT package (code) is launched, TIPS are rewarded to creators at percentage of ownership of cubic creator tokens. NFT package Proof of Participation (platform token) is sent out in proportion to the participation of the stake/tippers, and cubic vote holders= (participants uSD percentage of participation to the final vote value of the NFT package value).

Tipping is a way to allow voters to compensate the person who executes the package if YES (success) to cover gas costs+developing. It is then more likely for the executors of the NFT package to also be creators.

[Matlemad]

Here's the Rendition we came up with. Some gaps needing filling, still.

THE FOREST

Summary THE FOREST is a consensus environment for developing, voting and growing ideas, NFTs an other kinds of proposals. There are two kinds of players involved in THE FOREST: the CREATORS and the USERS. CREATORS can propose new ideas (TREEs), or branch (= fork) innovation out of a previous CREATOR's idea. USERS are external voting power, casting sun energy in the form of tokens or stable-coins (e.g. uSD).

Process Example: INNOVATION TREE. CREATOR A starts a TREE by proposing NFT A as an idea consisting of, say, 4 elements (e.g. a Winged Alien Robot with a Laser Gun). NFT A receives a good feedback from the USERS community, who votes for NFT A by casting uSD onto NFT A. As a result to this vote, each USER receives a QUADRATIC voting power equivalent to the uSD amount cast (1 uSD = 1 vote; 2 uSD = 4 votes etc) while CREATOR A receives a CUBIC voting power for each USER's voting (1 uSD = 1 vote; 2 uSD = 8 votes etc). These votes can be represented by voting tokens or a simple on-chain accounting mechanism.

a new CREATOR likes the NFT A and has an innovation idea called NFT A.B (a Winged Alien Robot wearing Sneakers Shoes). He branches NFT A.B out of NFT A, thus becoming CREATOR A.B.

The incentive of branching out, instead of proposing a totally new NFT B is represented as follows. By branching (CREATOR A.B acknowledging his direct inspiration from NFT A) he accesses the possibility of being voted fluidly by those USERS who voted for NFT A, who would simply moves their votes (uSD? quadratic votes?) to his NFT A.B proposal. CREATOR A can recognize the goodness of NFT A.B idea by quickly moving his CUBIC votes onto NFT A.B, thus giving it momentum and taking part in the future earnings of NFT A.B innovative idea.

NFT A.B is thus represented as a GOOD BRANCH, well exposes to the uSD Sunlight. Also, the whole trees gains strenght from this process (how?)

More CREATORS e.g. A.C, A.D, A.E can also propose valid innovation and receive USERS' votes as well as other CREATORS' Cubic votes.

THEN A NEW CREATOR APPEARS. He proposes a new branch of the idea (either direcly from A or from an A.B, A.C, A.D, A.E branches). His submission looks malicious because there is no movement of quadratic votes from the USERS in TREE, but only uSD cast on the NFT A.F (or A.B.A, A.C.A, A.D.A in case of a branch-of-a-preexisting-branch). NO quadratic votes nor Cubic are being cast on the new NFT, only direct uSD. We call this DEVIANT NFT. It could be legit (a new community joining THE FOREST thanks to a new NFT) or a total scam.

in this scenario, the DEVIANT NFT is FROZEN until the CREATORS balance the RATIO... [RATIO to be explained].

Should this DEVIANT NFT situation not be balance by the TREE Community, this branch would be signaled to the entire FOREST as a PARASITE (RED ALERT). OTHER CREATORS from other TREES (NFT B, NFT C, NFT D etc) can check this RED ALERT and decide to help the CREATORS in the NFT A TREE balance the situation by BURNING the BRANCH (and claiming a share of the uSD deposit).

WHAT HAPPENS if NOTHING HAPPENS? Is it a stall? the TREE dies? Can the FOREST CREATORS Community Validate the DEVIANT NFT? What would happen to TREE A if that happened?

[ghost]

A visual to accompany "The Forest" rendition.

A component of block time to the forest was added, after x Period of time the funds are released to the creators.

Situations need to be experimented upon, such as what is the ideal ratio of Quad to Cubic 50%? 60% 70%? For burning. Should there be a cap on initial voting amounts, i.e. $6 max vote per address? Can there be rounds composed of a larger rounds that allows incremental increases of this cap as more funds are locked into the contract?