EthereumCommonwealth / Auditing

Ethereum Commonwealth Security Department conducted over 400 security audits since 2018. Not even a single contract that we audited was hacked. You can access our audit reports in the ISSUES of this repo. We are accepting new audit requests.
https://audits.callisto.network/
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VCP Coin #257

Closed yuriy77k closed 5 years ago

yuriy77k commented 5 years ago

Audit request

VCP Coin (VCP) This contract creates a million token and will be used in a foundation

Source code

https://etherscan.io/address/0x9b7922f5c51b43b59ea666ed77191c4cdbfca72f#code

Disclosure policy

patosofty@hotmail.com

Platform

ETH

Number of lines:

108

MrCrambo commented 5 years ago

Auditing time 1 day

yuriy77k commented 5 years ago

@MrCrambo assigned

RideSolo commented 5 years ago

auditing time 1 day.

danbogd commented 5 years ago

Auditing time 1 day.

danbogd commented 5 years ago

My report is finished.

yuriy77k commented 5 years ago

@RideSolo @danbogd assigned

yuriy77k commented 5 years ago

VCP Token Security Audit Report

1. Summary

VCP Token smart contract security audit report performed by Callisto Security Audit Department

Symbol      : VCP
Name        : VCP Coin
Total supply: 1,000,000
Decimals    : 18 
Standard    : ERC20

2. In scope

3. Findings

In total, 2 issues were reported including:

No critical security issues were found.

3.1. Known vulnerabilities of ERC-20 token

Severity: low

Description

  1. It is possible to double withdrawal attack. More details here.

  2. Lack of transaction handling mechanism issue. WARNING! This is a very common issue and it already caused millions of dollars losses for lots of token users! More details here.

Recommendation

Add the following code to the transfer(_to address, ...) function:

require( _to != address(this) );

3.1. Transfer to address(0)

Severity: low

Description

Token transfers to address(0) are allowed by transfer and transferFrom functions. They are used as basic burn mechanism, however users might by mistake send tokens to 0x0 address and lose their tokens.

Code snippet

    function totalSupply() public constant returns (uint) {
        return _totalSupply  - balances[address(0)];
    }
    function transfer(address to, uint tokens) public returns (bool success) {
        balances[msg.sender] = safeSub(balances[msg.sender], tokens);
        balances[to] = safeAdd(balances[to], tokens);
        emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, tokens);
        return true;
    }
    function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint tokens) public returns (bool success) {
        balances[from] = safeSub(balances[from], tokens);
        allowed[from][msg.sender] = safeSub(allowed[from][msg.sender], tokens);
        balances[to] = safeAdd(balances[to], tokens);
        emit Transfer(from, to, tokens);
        return true;
    }

Recommendation

Do not allow transfers to 0x0 address and implement a burn function for better event handling and to avoiding token loss.

4. Conclusion

The audited smart contract can be deployed. Only low severity issues were found during the audit.

5. Revealing audit reports

https://gist.github.com/yuriy77k/2ccffd005f727f172e6b879ab9565f05

https://gist.github.com/yuriy77k/a944cbbffe7d1728eb0df95a56abe164

https://gist.github.com/yuriy77k/a2a7861fe80ec3998379aee697a876ae