JennaySDavis
commented
5 months ago #463 Acceptance Criteria
| Pass/Fail | Description |
|---|---|
| Pass | Login and complete a training |
| Pass | Login as Admin User |
Comments/Additional Notes N/A
| ADA Compliance (Automated scan via Chrome Lighthouse) | Criteria | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Performance | 99 | |
| Accessibility | 100 | |
| Best Practices | 100 |
Passed 01/26/2024 - JSD
LoraBradford
Impact Summary Crypto-js PBKDF2 is 1,000 times weaker than originally specified in 1993, and at least 1,300,000 times weaker than current industry standard. This is because it both (1) defaults to SHA1, a cryptographic hash algorithm considered insecure since at least 2005 and (2) defaults to one single iteration, a 'strength' or 'difficulty' value specified at 1,000 when specified in 1993. PBKDF2 relies on iteration count as a countermeasure to preimage and collision attacks.
Potential Impact:
If used to protect passwords, the impact is high. If used to generate signatures, the impact is high. Probability / risk analysis / attack enumeration:
For at most $45,000, an attacker, given control of only the beginning of a crypto-js PBKDF2 input, can create a value which has identical cryptographic signature to any chosen known value. Due to the length extension attack on SHA1, we can create a value that has identical signature to any unknown value, provided it is prefixed by a known value. It does not matter if PBKDF2 applies 'salt' or 'pepper' or any other secret unknown to the attacker. It will still create an identical signature. crypto-js has 10,642 public users as displayed on NPM, today October 11th 2023. The number of transient dependents is likely several orders of magnitude higher.
A very rough GitHub search shows 432 files cross GitHub using PBKDF2 in crypto-js in Typescript or JavaScript, but not specifying any number of iterations.
Affected versions All versions are impacted. This code has been the same since crypto-js was first created.