The strategy for mastering governance is simple and is based on the best political practices:
1) the decision should be BFT resistant, meaning that at least 2/3 of voting power must be aligned - 69% support
2) Quorum is a subject of collective agreement between identified voters. Before such agreement, quorum is set empirically - last target set by dGov party in CIP was 0.5% (the same is defined by the charter)
3) Vote duration is set in respect to people working full time to have possibility at least 1 time a week to dive into the proposal and another week to review the feedback and make a final action - 14 days. Meanwhile delegates, who has intention and time resource for governance must commit in respect to that timeframe - 7 days. Then 48h of Quiet ending and 48h execution delay based on average 48h org response rate (like in a gov body). In case the decision flip another 7 days for a feedback action.
This giving the window of opportunity to engage passive voters and respect current charter regulation.
4) In order to secure the voting from spamming the proposal deposit should be set higher than medium monthly contribution reward. Any outsider proposal (applicant without enough ANTs) should receive initial support by any working group, party or guild - 1024 ANTs (2^10)
But the dispute deposit should be set less then an average monthly reward so any active contributor has possibility to safeguard legislative process - 128 ANTs (2^7)
Dispute duration should take another 7 days period for the same reasons.
Tao Voting Timeline From Proposal To Execution
This shows how the timeline stacks up for yes/no time based votes that can change the configuration after launch.
M-Governance
The strategy for mastering governance is simple and is based on the best political practices: 1) the decision should be BFT resistant, meaning that at least 2/3 of voting power must be aligned - 69% support 2) Quorum is a subject of collective agreement between identified voters. Before such agreement, quorum is set empirically - last target set by dGov party in CIP was 0.5% (the same is defined by the charter) 3) Vote duration is set in respect to people working full time to have possibility at least 1 time a week to dive into the proposal and another week to review the feedback and make a final action - 14 days. Meanwhile delegates, who has intention and time resource for governance must commit in respect to that timeframe - 7 days. Then 48h of Quiet ending and 48h execution delay based on average 48h org response rate (like in a gov body). In case the decision flip another 7 days for a feedback action. This giving the window of opportunity to engage passive voters and respect current charter regulation. 4) In order to secure the voting from spamming the proposal deposit should be set higher than medium monthly contribution reward. Any outsider proposal (applicant without enough ANTs) should receive initial support by any working group, party or guild - 1024 ANTs (2^10) But the dispute deposit should be set less then an average monthly reward so any active contributor has possibility to safeguard legislative process - 128 ANTs (2^7) Dispute duration should take another 7 days period for the same reasons.
Tao Voting Timeline From Proposal To Execution
Tao Voting
Timeline Data
Disputable Voting
FORK THIS PROPOSAL (link)