GovXS / Evaluating-Voting-Design-Tradeoffs-for-Retro-Funding

Measure how different Retro Funding voting designs perform against a number of requirements aimed at optimizing different objectives. Achieved by simulating different types of voter behavior and applying formal reasoning.
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Ground Truth (Metrics discussion) #19

Open AngelaKTE opened 1 month ago

AngelaKTE commented 1 month ago

Description

In the voting, we assume that every voter provides a noisy estimate of this objective truth. Each voter’s preference can be seen as an approximation of the truth, influenced by own information, biases, and constraints. In simulations, we can assign a voter’s deviation of the true optimal allocation, and compare the aggregated output the different voting rules give. The goal is to find a voting rule that is as close as possible to (any) true optimal allocation.

Note: we don’t define the objective truth itself here, we measure how well the voting rule outputs the objective truth (Impact = Profit). To optimize Impact = Profit for Retro Funding, more areas have to be addressed, such as

How we model it:

Open questions:

Notes for simulation updates:

Chart:

linear[bot] commented 1 month ago
GOV-27 Ground Truth (Metrics discussion)

### Description * **Goal:** * **Why here?:** * 1. In Social Choice/Epistemic Democracy there is a concept called Objective Truth, that refers to the “right” allocation that should ideally be achieved. In OP Retro Funding we assume that there is an objective truth, the *positive impact made to the Optimism Collective*. We also know, that there’s an optimal distribution of the funds: impact = profit, ”positive impact to the Collective should be rewarded with profit to the individual”. https://www.optimism.io/vision The voting conducted in Retro Funding aims to find this objective truth using crowd wisdom, since we don’t have any better instrument to measure impact and define profit. (Otherwise, we could simply write an algorithm that computes funding for projects based on application data). * 2. In the voting, we assume that every voter provides a noisy estimate of this objective truth. Each voter’s preference can be seen as an approximation of the truth, influenced by own information, biases, and constraints. In simulations, we can assign a voter’s deviation of the true optimal allocation, and compare the aggregated output the different voting rules give. The goal is to find a voting rule that is as close as possible to (any) true optimal allocation. * 3. Note: we don’t define the objective truth itself here, we measure how well the voting rule outputs the objective truth (Impact = Profit). To optimize Impact = Profit for Retro Funding, more areas have to be addressed, such as  - the information projects provide (e.g. KPIs, Open Source Observer data) - the incentives for voters to vote according to impact = profit - and more. That’s why we marked this objective in bright green. In our deliverable, we’ll evaluate the voting rules as outlined above, and we make proposals how to improve the voting design & evaluation methods, so that “Objective 9 Impact = Profit” can be evaluated with rigor. * **We compare:** * compare across all voting rules to see what voting rule produces the minimal deviation between votes and "objective truth" * we take the exact same set of (randomly generated) voting matrices * measure the distance to any pre-defined "objective truth" **How we model it:** * To define the ground truth, we generate a random (normalized) distribution of funds (`ground_truth` array) * We calculate the Hamming distance between the ground truth, (hamming distance is the number of all votes that differ from ground truth!) and all voters' votes, focusing on the top `top_k` projects (to optimize model performance?) * We simulate x rounds with random votes (columns for each voting rule's Hamming distance across rounds) * Note that the Hamming distance finds ***how many votes differ***, NOT how much they differ! **Chart:** * I'd like to see the aggregated deviation per voting rule: If I go over all simulated voting rounds, and all randomly created ground truths, is there any pattern we can see? * does the voting rule affects how many votes differ from ground truth? **Open questions:** * @nimrodtalmon77 @briman as far as I can see in [https://github.com/GovXS/OP-Evaluating-Voting-Design-Tradeoffs-for-Retro-Funding-RESEARCH-/blob/main/evaluations/ground_truth_alignment.ipynb](https://github.com/GovXS/OP-Evaluating-Voting-Design-Tradeoffs-for-Retro-Funding-RESEARCH-/blob/main/evaluations/ground_truth_alignment.ipynb) there's no significant impact of the voting rule. Did you expect this? Any comments? * For the report, let's discuss more approaches to address the "Impact = Profit" question (see above)

AngelaKTE commented 1 month ago

Open questions:

@nimrodgithub134 @EyalBriman
a) there's no significant impact of the voting rule. Did you expect this? Any comments? (see in https://github.com/GovXS/OP-Evaluating-Voting-Design-Tradeoffs-for-Retro-Funding-RESEARCH-/blob/main/evaluations/ground_truth_alignment.ipynb)

b) For the report, let's discuss more approaches to address the "Impact = Profit" question (see "Why here?")

nimrodgithub134 commented 1 month ago

Hmm.. No, I didn't expect no significant impact of the voting rule. One way to make the impact shine more is to consider perhaps other settings? Otherwise we can say that indeed for the settings we check this doesn't seem to make a lot of difference.