GovXS / Evaluating-Voting-Design-Tradeoffs-for-Retro-Funding

Measure how different Retro Funding voting designs perform against a number of requirements aimed at optimizing different objectives. Achieved by simulating different types of voter behavior and applying formal reasoning.
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Cost of Control (Metrics discussion) #25

Open AngelaKTE opened 3 weeks ago

AngelaKTE commented 3 weeks ago

Description

Open questions:

linear[bot] commented 3 weeks ago
GOV-33 Cost of Control (Metrics discussion)

#### Description * **Goal:** We measure how many voters have to be added or removed at minimum to achieve a certain funding increase * **Why here?:** * Optimism knows how many voters and what voters are eligible to vote in Retro Funding * in every round, badgeholders can decide whether they participate in a voting or not * a malicious actor could convince voters to abstain from voting in order to increase the funding results * also, since Optimism is trying to increase the number of voters, malicious voters could convince new voters to take part just to manipulate the result * **How we model it:** * in every round: * we randomly assign votes to projects * we iterate over all projects to find out which one needs the minimum of votes increase to reach to reach the target funding increase * we add voters accordingly * many rounds: we run many rounds and measure the average minimum number of voters required * all voting rules: we compare the results over all voting rules * **Chart:** * average of all round, plotting a line chart * x-axis: min. decrease/increase of voters (average minimum) * y-axis: funding increase * Scenarios: * Model for $10K / $50K / $100K / $500K funding increase * we can translate these values to a % based on the scenario design, it's just important to give readers a picture of the absolute value in OP tokens **Open questions:** * Token allocation only integers for voters? @a.kreitenweis to check with Optimism