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GrapheneOS / linux-hardened

Minimal supplement to upstream Kernel Self Protection Project changes. Features already provided by SELinux + Yama and archs other than multiarch arm64 / x86_64 aren't in scope. Only tags have stable history. Shared IRC channel with KSPP: irc.freenode.net ##linux-hardened. Currently maintained at https://github.com/anthraxx/linux-hardened.
https://grapheneos.org/
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probabilistic return address protection for Clang #58

Closed thestinger closed 2 years ago

thestinger commented 6 years ago

Could be done by moving the SSP guard value to a reserved register to make it faster and teaching the compiler to XOR the return address into the canary like https://gist.github.com/thestinger/b8502a881d871fbc75d91bc00576157b (which is only complete for x86_64 as we don't want frame pointers enabled but it currently depends on them for arm64).

Lelmister101 commented 2 years ago

I guess this can be closed? (referring to https://app.element.io/#/room/#offtopic:grapheneos.org/$43Qqo7iluFVIEuRVVW8UbEXnvkw2zAh-olrJPENe0L8). As mentioned there, stack tagging and/or pointer authentication can fix this issue. ShadowCallStack can also likely be extended to fix this (XOR and store instead of just storing the stack), but it seems to be unnecessary.