Open Andoryuuta opened 2 months ago
Hello @Andoryuuta, very interesting idea but packets of several attack will be different TS (and different geoip and so NTP) I think we have to assume that there is no a single client that generate all targets (requests), that would be too dumb and inefficient.
From web news we can know that It appears that these waves of fake Internet traffic originate from millions of spoofed IP addresses from a variety of sources, including the CDNs of Chinese platforms QQ, WeChat and WePay, and target specific vendors (such as Cogent, Lumen and Hurricane Electric) while avoiding others , such as Amazon Web Services (AWS).
On some of the IP address DoD is listening. Traceroute Tracing route to 43.152.0.24 [43.152.0.24]...
hop rtt rtt rtt ip address fully qualified domain name
1 1 0 0 169.254.158.58
2 1 1 0 169.48.118.156 ae103.ppr01.dal13.networklayer.com
3 19 32 1 169.48.118.128 80.76.30a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com
4 3 2 2 169.45.18.86 ae16.cbs01.eq01.dal03.networklayer.com
5 1 1 1 50.97.17.55 ae33.bbr02.eq01.dal03.networklayer.com
6 52 36 36 84.16.6.197
7 142 142 142 213.140.35.119
8 141 141 141 5.53.3.142
9 142 142 142 213.140.36.17
10 154 150 159 216.184.112.59 gvt-te-0-1-0-24-2-4-grtriotw2.priv.net.telefonicaglobalsolutions.com
11 151 149 150 30.33.185.38
12 155 151 150 30.33.174.225
13 147 148 148 43.152.0.24
Network Whois record Queried whois.arin.net with "n 30.33.174.225"...
NetRange: 30.0.0.0 - 30.255.255.255
CIDR: 30.0.0.0/8
NetName: DNIC-NET-030
NetHandle: NET-30-0-0-0-1
Parent: ()
NetType: Direct Allocation
OriginAS:
Organization: DoD Network Information Center (DNIC)
RegDate: 1991-07-01
Updated: 2009-06-19
Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/30.0.0.0
OrgName: DoD Network Information Center
OrgId: DNIC
Address: 3990 E. Broad Street
City: Columbus
StateProv: OH
PostalCode: 43218
Country: US
RegDate:
Updated: 2011-08-17
Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/DNIC
Hello!
First of all: this is pretty neat, so thanks for sharing!
After looking at it a bit, the ICMP data seems to always be 56 bytes in length and follow the format:
The provided timestamps seem fairly truthful - a few tens of milliseconds off from the actual received time logged in the pcap.
Under the assumption that the client(s) generating these packets are syncing with an NTP server somewhere and are providing truthful timestamps, I wonder if you could get a (very rough) geographic origin of these packets by looking at the delta between the receive time and client-provided timestamp in various locations.
Does GreyNoise have multiple geographically-diverse sensors that are seeing the
LOVE
ICMP packets?