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JohnCRuf / alderman_machine

This is the repository for a research project investigating clientelistic politics in Chicago
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Replace current theoretical model with something with a little more panache #17

Open JohnCRuf opened 1 year ago

JohnCRuf commented 1 year ago

The current model is very basic. It would be advisable to create a more interesting model that better reflects the situation at hand.

Eg. Citizens have a probability of getting a concern, and utility depends on how many concerns are addressed and how much the politician extracts rents. Politician can spend time addressing concerns (to get reelected) or extract rents. Political experience lowers DWL of rent extraction and increases productivity of addressing concerns. Over time, politician gets so good at extracting rents that they address a minimal number of concerns.

Because there is an initial strategy of extracting maximal rents at maximum inefficiency, people choose the devil they know instead of the devil they don't know.

JohnCRuf commented 1 year ago

Some notes from meeting Yu-chi today.

The story should roughly go, take 3 sets of constituents, none of which form a majority (denote by race or location, whatever works) i in A,B,C

each constituency provides funds-enhancing information I according to the utility function U_i = E(m_ij)*I_i - c_i I_i + epsilon_i

next, we have an incumbent alderman D vs a challenger E. Each makes a proposal of funds m_ij by considering the expected voting function V_ij(m_ij)

JohnCRuf commented 1 year ago

Another note to self, this should probably be top priority as soon as the new DiD results come in. Apparently, admissions committees really like to see good theory.

JohnCRuf commented 1 year ago

Another thought on this. It may be good to think in PB vs non-PB terms. Under what conditions is it better to have citizens propose projects and vote on how to spend menu funds vs having an elected representative?

JohnCRuf commented 1 year ago

Finally I should probably tie this to the fiscal federalism lit:

https://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/oates.pdf

JohnCRuf commented 12 months ago

Ok, one more thing that came to me today: Why not just adapt a traditional lobbying model to explain this?

https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/inline-files/Lecture%20Notes.pdf

Unorganized groups give votes, organized groups give campaign contributions. Assume myopia from both. Adjustments include

  1. Turn it into a dynamic model
  2. Add challenger entry from a fixed talent distribution
  3. Contributions roll over, votes don't.

Therefore, when there's no challengers then alderman targets contributions in case there's another challenger.