Encryption of drives does not make sense in an HPC environment. Attackers should not have physical access to the systems in the first place, which is the primary protection. If they do have physical access, stealing drives is the least of your worries, not to mention the attacker can also just change the unencrypted bootloader to store the encryption password somewhere they can retrieve it or modify it to use whatever mechanism is being used to decrypt, or steal the whole box to get the TPM, etc. Even if an attacker does get physical access and manages to steal a drive undetected, they will likely just get random bits of random files with no surrounding context as most HPC file systems use striping and store the metadata separately. All this does is increase complexity and decreases availability through performance degradation and the potential for other data loss up to and including the destruction of the entirety of a site's data if the encryption keys are somehow lost. This item is meant for laptops where it makes perfect sense as they are out in the wild and not in a secured data center with highly restricted access. This assumes, of course, that sites destroy media before it leaves the facility (or hands off to a vetted destruction agent), which is a must for physical security.
Encryption of drives does not make sense in an HPC environment. Attackers should not have physical access to the systems in the first place, which is the primary protection. If they do have physical access, stealing drives is the least of your worries, not to mention the attacker can also just change the unencrypted bootloader to store the encryption password somewhere they can retrieve it or modify it to use whatever mechanism is being used to decrypt, or steal the whole box to get the TPM, etc. Even if an attacker does get physical access and manages to steal a drive undetected, they will likely just get random bits of random files with no surrounding context as most HPC file systems use striping and store the metadata separately. All this does is increase complexity and decreases availability through performance degradation and the potential for other data loss up to and including the destruction of the entirety of a site's data if the encryption keys are somehow lost. This item is meant for laptops where it makes perfect sense as they are out in the wild and not in a secured data center with highly restricted access. This assumes, of course, that sites destroy media before it leaves the facility (or hands off to a vetted destruction agent), which is a must for physical security.