the rfbGetScreen() function triggers the stack-buffer-overflow vulnerability

[Dabiaoge6]

testcase:EASYFUZZ(FwqYLJGS){ //用户被测接口需要的与fuzz无关的变量声明以及接口上下文。 // ---comment int rfbGetScreen.argc int argc_YNnvjaJn = (int ) fuzzInt32(0); // ---comment char rfbGetScreen.argv char EcOVZIWm = (char ) fuzzstring(1); char argv_fUdAxCJF = & EcOVZIWm; // ---comment int rfbGetScreen.width int width_uLpmnCVk = (int ) fuzzInt32(2); // ---comment int rfbGetScreen.height int height_fpHPNqHb = (int ) fuzzInt32(3); // ---comment int rfbGetScreen.bitsPerSample int bitsPerSample_WAHEnxom = (int ) fuzzInt32(4); // ---comment int rfbGetScreen.samplesPerPixel int samplesPerPixel_hGttfBZf = (int ) fuzzInt32(5); // ---comment int rfbGetScreen.bytesPerPixel int bytesPerPixel_uxkrfWUW = (int *) fuzzInt32(6); rfbScreenInfoPtr FvPkThpQ = rfbGetScreen(argc_YNnvjaJn, argv_fUdAxCJF, width_uLpmnCVk, height_fpHPNqHb, bitsPerSample_WAHEnxom, samplesPerPixel_hGttfBZf, bytesPerPixel_uxkrfWUW);
}

the crash logs:

==132==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffca1760de8 at pc 0x7f360bdbc780 bp 0x7ffca1760c20 sp 0x7ffca1760c10 READ of size 8 at 0x7ffca1760de8 thread T0

0 0x7f360bdbc77f in rfbProcessArguments /cloud_proj/pr1679550382741imagysjawxnitcux/libvncserver/cargs.c:88

#1 0x7f360bd51d35 in rfbGetScreen /cloud_proj/pr1679550382741imagysjawxnitcux/libvncserver/main.c:999
#2 0x5593caa738c4 in easyloop /dockerin/test_file.c:35
#3 0x5593caa7340b in main /opt1/software/betafuzz/srap/wrapentry.c:108
#4 0x7f360ba63d8f  (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29d8f)
#5 0x7f360ba63e3f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x29e3f)
#6 0x5593caa73464 in _start (/dockerin/clouditera+0x1464)

Address 0x7ffca1760de8 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 72 in frame

0 0x5593caa73538 in easyloop /dockerin/test_file.c:7

This frame has 2 object(s): [32, 40) 'forkloop' (line 14) [64, 72) 'EcOVZIWm' (line 20) <== Memory access at offset 72 overflows this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork (longjmp and C++ exceptions are supported) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow /cloud_proj/pr1679550382741imagysjawxnitcux/libvncserver/cargs.c:88 in rfbProcessArguments Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x1000142e4160: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x1000142e4170: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x1000142e4180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 0x1000142e4190: f1 f1 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x1000142e41a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x1000142e41b0: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 f2 f2 f2 00[f3]f3 f3 0x1000142e41c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x1000142e41d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x1000142e41e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x1000142e41f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x1000142e4200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc