Open NestProtocol opened 3 years ago
The game for every miner to play is complete, which all the rules are the same and transparent for all the players.
So I think the game is fair for everyone want to join, considering if you are bitcoin miner, if you know the rules and you still want to solo mining by a MacBookPro, then nobody can stop you from wasting your hashrate.
If we are going to make the oracle permissionlessly, there is no way we can help the "small players", the direction is that we should make the game harder and harder to enforce those "small players" join the pool to make money together like what bitcoin mining is doing in pool.
So, IMO, the distribution now is fine.
あなたは犬Bについて話している。私は何も理解していない。それは素晴らしいと思う。狂ったときは引っ張るのが王様の方法だ。なぜ私が日本語を使う必要があるのかについては、あなたの意図を見るために翻訳が必要なので、もう一度やらなければならない。 翻訳、多分私はあなたにそれをすぐに理解してほしくない! NESTが上がる!
The game for every miner to play is complete, which all the rules are the same and transparent for all the players.
So I think the game is fair for everyone want to join, considering if you are bitcoin miner, if you know the rules and you still want to solo mining by a MacBookPro, then nobody can stop you from wasting your hashrate.
If we are going to make the oracle permissionlessly, there is no way we can help the "small players", the direction is that we should make the game harder and harder to enforce those "small players" join the pool to make money together like what bitcoin mining is doing in pool.
So, IMO, the distribution now is fine.
我赞同:the direction is that we should make the game harder and harder to enforce those "small players" join the pool to make money together like what bitcoin mining is doing in pool.
@NestProtocol Insteaf of proposing a solution, it would be helpful to spend time talking about why the current design has a problem. You're suggesting that the current scheme gives advantages to players with large funds. If would be helpful to explain:
Then we can talk about whether it's necessary to make a change.
@NestProtocol Insteaf of proposing a solution, it would be helpful to spend time talking about why the current design has a problem. You're suggesting that the current scheme gives advantages to players with large funds. If would be helpful to explain:
- why do you believe that's the case
- why that's a bad thing (in the extreme case, there may be only 1 big player that crowds out everyone else and does all the quote mining)
Then we can talk about whether it's necessary to make a change.
Due to the "preemptive transaction", some miners will withdraw. This disguisedly raised the mining threshold, causing some people to want to participate in mining but were unable to participate. Some miners asked whether this problem could be improved, and everyone needs to discuss it.
I'm not sure what you meant by "preemptive". By suggesting "preemptive", you imply there's a "correct time" to quote. If someone is willing to quote early, they're willing to pay more to get NEST rewards. I'm not sure that's a problem.
If someone is willing to consistently pay more ETH for NEST than everyone else when they mine, they'll get all the NEST rewards. If other miners want to break the monopoly, they can quote earlier.
I'm not sure what you meant by "preemptive". By suggesting "preemptive", you imply there's a "correct time" to quote. If someone is willing to quote early, they're willing to pay more to get NEST rewards. I'm not sure that's a problem.
If someone is willing to consistently pay more ETH for NEST than everyone else when they mine, they'll get all the NEST rewards. If other miners want to break the monopoly, they can quote earlier.
This is an auction game model. In principle, the higher bidder wins, but this doesnt mean that only the higher bidder will participate. Some miners have a defensive strategy and specialize in making use of loophole. Once the miners who are willing to pay higher prices do not quote for some reason, the mining cost reduces, and they just take advantage of it. This constitutes the game structure of mining.
In my opinion, even dividing the blocks according to 25 blocks will not change the essence of this GAME, because it is essentially an auction. If the participants in the auction cannot be restricted, it is impossible to avoid competition through such allocation, unless Introduce a kind of randomness.
In current quotation mining, multiple quotations in the same block will allocate the amount of mining between different bidders according to the proportion of handling fees. There will be a problem, "preemptive transaction". In different blocks, the quotation and the proportion of the handling fee are irrelevant, and the problem of malicious card orders will occur, resulting in different mines for the same handling fee (cost).
So consider extending 1 block to 25 blocks or 30 blocks. All bidders will allocate the amount of ore in a block according to the proportion of the commission. At least it can be guaranteed that everyone’s costs are the same for a period of time. The purpose is to lower the threshold for quotation mining and allow more people to participate. But this change is still a cost issue in the long run, that is, large funds will crowd out small funds.