Closed fyquah closed 2 years ago
Solution: add a check that all the staking-pools account_ids are in the form .poolv1.near, and that will solve the issue, because all staking-pools created as .poolv1.near can only be deployed by the whitelisted stake-pool factory
Thanks @fyquah for the report!
How does meta-pool prevent a malicious operator / owner from setaling coins via a malicious staking pool? A attack vector i'm thinking of:
deposit
simply increases their balance in the staking pool, regardless of the sender. Andwithdraw
only ever withdraws to the attacker's addresshttps://github.com/Narwallets/meta-pool/blob/607556c38d19947f3f7113617e2a5b30f0b1cfd3/metapool/src/owner.rs#L71
ping
orstake
, then coins are "stolen" into the malicious staking pool that implements the NEP, but is otherwise maliciousI feel like I'm missing something - or is such attacks simply possible?