[Feature Request] Reintegrate the GPG security features.

[ioogithub]

Please, reconsider adding GPG support back to the app. Can the original code be used? Why was it removed in the first place? This was one of the best features of the original oandbackup and what initially drew me to this backup solution. I was saddened to see it was replaced with a password solution.

The current solution is less portable. Before I could easily work with my backup archives by decrypting my Android GPG encrypted backups on my computer. I can't work with the new files now.

From a security perspective it is usually better to use open and established standards and time tested implementations when it comes to encryption rather than "rolling your own". As GPG is an open standard, it's many implementations are cross-compatible. The Android implementation Openkeychain is a mature, stable app recommended by the Guardian project and works seamlessly with several other Android apps. GPG is also recommended by the highly respected privacytools.io.

It would be great to have this functionality back int oandbackupx.

[machiav3lli]

GPG isn't something that every single user is using while the data of each app is more sensitive to be left not encrypted this is why I went this way.

Simply Re-adding this feature is no more possible as the app logic is fully rewritten. Will put it in the todo list, but this has a low priority as there's more important fixes and improvements on the list.

[ioogithub]

I understand, it was a really nice feature to have on my phone where all my important apps (email, chat, file archive, app backups) all used openkeychain and GPG for security. This new version removed some of that nice integration.

I understand that it might be better to focus on workflow and automation, there is where backup apps can really help users. Perhaps in the future it can be a feature again.

[CodeCracker-oss]

@machiav3lli Im not sure how secure password solution even is when said password is written in plain text within app data directory, if an attacker has access to that data directory and your backup copies then data could then be decrypted. Am I missing something?

[machiav3lli]

@dhammel reading the preferences would generally require root permission for the attacker. If it's so far, then, it could copy the data by itself, not needing those backups. Anyway, the encryption password among other preferences is no encrypted using Android KeyStore.

[Skirmisher]

I appreciate the work done to revive and rewrite oandbackup, but the lack of OpenKeychain/GPG integration is discouraging me from using this, mainly for data portability reasons. I hope this can be revisited soon.

[powerman]

Having password stored in an unencrypted file just doesn't feels safe.

Sure, it does require root to read it, and at a glance this is probably good enough… but there are some extra attack vectors allowed by this design. E.g.:

• Users with NB have root, and also often have file manager with root access, so if anyone got access to unlocked phone for a several seconds (like you give your phone to a friend to show some photos) he can use file manager to view the password.
• If user uses same backup password not only for this device backups but also for something else (which is also very usual case) then root access for the device result in leaking password used for other things.
• ...

So, please consider using private/public keys instead.

[machiav3lli]

@powerman I understand your wish and will the feature will come at a certain point in the future. But to make it clear, you've theorized something you didn't check: the password is saved encrypted using Android's KeyStore.