Axelrod concluded that the strategy's
robustness was due to four properties, which he adapted into four suggestions on
doing well in an IPD:
\begin{itemize}
\item Do not be envious by striving for a payoff larger than the opponent's payoff
\item Be ``nice''; Do not be the first to defect
\item Reciprocate both cooperation and defection; Be provocable to retaliation and forgiveness
\item Do not be too clever by scheming to exploit the opponent
\end{itemize}
Forgiveness is a strategy's ability to go from a (DC) to (C) aiming to achieve
mutual cooperation again, the only way Tit For Tat would end up in (DC), in
environments without noise, is if it had received a defection and then retaliated.
Subsequently, Tit For Tat would forgive an opponent that apologises (in a (DC) round)
by returning to cooperation, since mutual cooperation is better than mutual defection.
Axelrod concluded that the strategy's robustness was due to four properties, which he adapted into four suggestions on doing well in an IPD:
\begin{itemize} \item Do not be envious by striving for a payoff larger than the opponent's payoff \item Be ``nice''; Do not be the first to defect \item Reciprocate both cooperation and defection; Be provocable to retaliation and forgiveness \item Do not be too clever by scheming to exploit the opponent \end{itemize}
Forgiveness is a strategy's ability to go from a (DC) to (C) aiming to achieve mutual cooperation again, the only way Tit For Tat would end up in (DC), in environments without noise, is if it had received a defection and then retaliated. Subsequently, Tit For Tat would forgive an opponent that apologises (in a (DC) round) by returning to cooperation, since mutual cooperation is better than mutual defection.