A universal bounty hunting scheme can be usefully implemented in various occasions within Paratii's system, basing itself on a common reputation measure. Example 1: the consensus-seeking process triggered when a video surpasses a "flagging threshold" (governance level: content curation). Example 2: a user account has reached a minimum amount in holdings and wants to withdraw, needing to be validated first (governance level: user validation, in the case an identity solution is not yet in place). A, easy straightforward approach to organize payouts could be like:
Half of the "redistribution pool" goes to network contributions. These are many little tasks, rewarded from their "subpools" in the "redistribution pool". Bounty hunting of the kind mentioned here has its "subpool". So, every time an account goes to validation process:
If it's approved, validators who voted "approve" divide a portion of the "bounty hunting subpool" allocated to this validating task, and earn reputation (positive outcome). Validators who voted "dissaprove" lose reputation and earn nothing (negative outcome).
If it's not approved, validators who voted "approve" lose reputation and earn nothing (negative outcome). Validators who voted "disaprove" earn the portion of the "bounty hunting subpool" plus a share of the bounty proportional to the account's holdings (best outcome).
(in all cases, the account to be validated covers tx costs).
Multiple rounds of evaluation can take place, with their own punishment/reward conditions. In any case, decisions that end up unaligned with consensus can do damage to reputation (see the Backfeed protocol for a go-to example), and decrease the chance of the user being selected for bounty hunting.
A universal bounty hunting scheme can be usefully implemented in various occasions within Paratii's system, basing itself on a common reputation measure. Example 1: the consensus-seeking process triggered when a video surpasses a "flagging threshold" (governance level: content curation). Example 2: a user account has reached a minimum amount in holdings and wants to withdraw, needing to be validated first (governance level: user validation, in the case an identity solution is not yet in place). A, easy straightforward approach to organize payouts could be like:
Half of the "redistribution pool" goes to network contributions. These are many little tasks, rewarded from their "subpools" in the "redistribution pool". Bounty hunting of the kind mentioned here has its "subpool". So, every time an account goes to validation process:
If it's approved, validators who voted "approve" divide a portion of the "bounty hunting subpool" allocated to this validating task, and earn reputation (positive outcome). Validators who voted "dissaprove" lose reputation and earn nothing (negative outcome).
If it's not approved, validators who voted "approve" lose reputation and earn nothing (negative outcome). Validators who voted "disaprove" earn the portion of the "bounty hunting subpool" plus a share of the bounty proportional to the account's holdings (best outcome). (in all cases, the account to be validated covers tx costs).
Multiple rounds of evaluation can take place, with their own punishment/reward conditions. In any case, decisions that end up unaligned with consensus can do damage to reputation (see the Backfeed protocol for a go-to example), and decrease the chance of the user being selected for bounty hunting.
Ideal PRs for proposed models should come along a discussion thread, the theory behind, and simulations. There's some interesting ideas for resoluting disputes here: https://blog.aragon.one/aragon-network-jurisdiction-part-1-decentralized-court-c8ab2a675e82