Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.
Currently, the iOS Piwigo app stores the user password in the device native keychain.
Even though the native keychain should be safe, their is obviously room for improvement here in terms of account security.
Every time the app is opened, the account credentials are sent server-side for login.
One can easily observe this behavior using an HTTPS proxy such as mitmproxy.
Describe the solution you'd like
The mobile app should only use the account password on first login, receiving both an access token and a refresh token from the identity server in exchange (for now, only a cookie named pwg_id is delivered from the server as authentication).
Those tokens should be the ones stored in the device keychain instead of the password, and only those be used for all further requests with the Piwigo server.
Describe alternatives you've considered
This is what OAuth2 / OpenID Connect is designed for (there are authorization grant designed for mobile apps).
I understand that this app can only use what the Piwigo server can provide so I do not expect a resolution for this immediately, but I think this is worth mentioning for future enhancements.
Additional context
Example of "bad request" when re-opening the app with an already logged-in account (captured using mitmproxy):
EddyLB
commented
5 years ago
Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. Currently, the iOS Piwigo app stores the user password in the device native keychain. Even though the native keychain should be safe, their is obviously room for improvement here in terms of account security. Every time the app is opened, the account credentials are sent server-side for login. One can easily observe this behavior using an HTTPS proxy such as
mitmproxy.Describe the solution you'd like The mobile app should only use the account password on first login, receiving both an access token and a refresh token from the identity server in exchange (for now, only a cookie named
pwg_idis delivered from the server as authentication). Those tokens should be the ones stored in the device keychain instead of the password, and only those be used for all further requests with the Piwigo server.Describe alternatives you've considered This is what OAuth2 / OpenID Connect is designed for (there are authorization grant designed for mobile apps). I understand that this app can only use what the Piwigo server can provide so I do not expect a resolution for this immediately, but I think this is worth mentioning for future enhancements.
Additional context Example of "bad request" when re-opening the app with an already logged-in account (captured using
mitmproxy):