Open adrelanos opened 2 months ago
QSB-40 says:
We concur with the analysis in XSA-263 that this vulnerability presents minimal risk to Xen itself and minimal risk of inter-guest attacks. Therefore, we believe that proper compartmentalization is sufficient for Qubes users to mitigate this issue without having to enable SSBD globally.
What do you mean by minimal risk? How minimal is minimal?
However, in most configurations, within-guest information leak is possible.
Are within-guest information leaks out-of-scope for Qubes?
Qubes OS release
4.2.2
Brief summary
CVE-2018-3639 aka 'Variant 4, speculative store bypass' is being reported by
spectre-meltdown-checker
(#4262) with Qubes dom0 default kernel boot parameters settings (GRUB configuration).Steps to reproduce
In dom0.
Expected behavior
No such notification about vulnerability.
Actual behavior
Suggested solution
Set kernel parameter
spec_store_bypass_disable=on
. This is how security-misc (#1885) is doing this.file
/etc/default/grub.d/40_cpu_mitigations.cfg
: