Potential vulnerability: topic names from ROS parameters

[tandf]

Hi,

We notice that you are using topic names from ROS parameters at the following locations: https://github.com/RobotnikAutomation/phantomx_reactor_arm/blob/5b88ef75a2678557a2bd799a90bfdc0deffa5da5/phantomx_reactor_arm_controller/src/phantomx_reactor_parallel_motor_joints.py#L69-L84 https://github.com/RobotnikAutomation/phantomx_reactor_arm/blob/5b88ef75a2678557a2bd799a90bfdc0deffa5da5/phantomx_reactor_arm_controller/src/phantomx_reactor_gripper.py#L73 https://github.com/RobotnikAutomation/phantomx_reactor_arm/blob/5b88ef75a2678557a2bd799a90bfdc0deffa5da5/phantomx_reactor_arm_controller/src/phantomx_reactor_gripper.py#L75 https://github.com/RobotnikAutomation/phantomx_reactor_arm/blob/5b88ef75a2678557a2bd799a90bfdc0deffa5da5/phantomx_reactor_arm_controller/src/dynamixel_joint_state_publisher.py#L56 For security reasons detailed below, we strongly suggest avoiding the usage of strings from parameters as topic names.

Although parameters are usually set in parameter files, they can also be changed by nodes. Specifically, other nodes in the same ROS application can also change the parameters listed above before it’s used, either by accident or intentionally (i.e., by potential attackers). For example, if the phantomx_reactor_controller/controller_1 parameter is changed, the phantomx_reactor_controller node will publish the control commands for the shoulder yaw joint to a wrong topic, which disable the control of the shoulder yaw joint. If an attacker exists, she can even take full control of the robot arm, by first fooling the phantomx_reactor_controller to publish joint positions to wrong topics, and then forward the joint positions from the wrong topics to the correct one after modifying the contents as she wants. The attacker can therefore move the robot arm to arbitrary positions, which may cause harm to the robot arm itself and also surrounding people. Because ROS is an OSS (open-source software) community, third-party nodes are widely used in ROS applications, usually without complete vetting of their behavior, which gives the opportunity to potentially malicious actors to inject malicious code (e.g, by submitting hypocrite commits like in other OSS systems [1]) to infiltrate the ROS applications that use it (or software supply chain attacks, one of the primary means for real-world attackers today [2]).

We understand that using parameters to set topic names brings flexibility. Still, for the purpose of security, we strongly suggest that you avoid such vulnerable programming patterns if possible. For example, to avoid the exposure of this specific vulnerability, you may consider alternatives like remapping, which is designed for configuring names when launching the nodes.

[1] Q. Wu and K. Lu, “On the feasibility of stealthily introducing vulnerabilities in open-source software via hypocrite commits,” 2021, https://linuxreviews.org/images/d/d9/OpenSourceInsecurity.pdf. [2] Supply chain attacks are the hacker’s new favourite weapon. and the threat is getting bigger. https://www.zdnet.com/article/supply-chain-attacks-are-the-hackers-new-favourite-weapon-and-the-threat-is-getting-bigger/.

[tandf]

Hi there, I wanted to follow up on this security vulnerability. Could you please let me know if there have been any updates or concerns regarding this issue? Thanks