Open bifurcation opened 9 months ago
While I'm not sure there's a really standard spelling here, the "-or" ending to Encapsulator and Decapsulator looks odd to me, and inconsistent with other crates in this repo, which use "-er".
FWIW we do use -or
in quite a few places: the aead::stream
module uses Encryptor
/Decryptor
(per the STREAM paper), and the rsa
traits also use Encryptor
/Decryptor
: https://docs.rs/rsa/latest/rsa/traits/index.html
We do use Signer
/Verifier
in signature
but that's largely because Signor
/Verifior
aren't words.
I would probably suggest using Encapsulator
/Decapsulator
since using -er
for these seems unusual at best.
Thanks for the detailed comments! I agree it was weird to hinge everything on EncappedKey
. I think the reason was, after a few iterations, that it was the only reasonable way to make the Auth- versions of the traits be consistent with the non-auth versions. Or something like that. But if Auth- is removed, the problem should go away. I'll take a crack at this
FWIW, I think you could do something similar for the Auth- versions, something like:
trait AuthEncapsulator<Encap, DK, SS> {
fn auth_encapsulate(&self, rng: &mut impl CryptoRngCore, from: &DK) -> Result<(Encap, SS), Error>;
}
trait AuthDecapsulator<Encap, EK, SS> {
fn auth_decapsulate(&self, enc: &Encap, from: &EK) -> Result<SS, Error>;
}
I think Auth- even goes away if you're willing to put the identity keys in Self
. Regardless though we probably don't need it for now
I would refactor this to be more like
Signer<S>
andVerifier<S>
, where the things the two sides need to agree on are in the generic parameters.The analogy here would be
Encapsulator<EK, SS>
andDecapsulator<EK, SS>
, since the encapsulation key and shared secret are the two things that the sender and receiver need to agree on.
I think it was a mistake in retrospect for Signer to be generic. Are there any examples of any key types that implement signer in more than one way to produce different signature outputs?
However, if we are going this route, I personally think the traits should be
trait Encapsulator<EK> {
type SS;
}
The pair (EncapsulatingKey, EncapsulatedKey)
should be enough to determine the SharedSecret
type. Likewise so should the pair (DecapsulatingKey, EncapsulatedKey)
.
I'd still prefer both of these traits though:
trait Signer { type Signature; }
trait Encapsulator { type EncapsulatedKey; type SharedSecret; }
This generally just helps with inference and if the types don't match it'll still compile fail.
On the topic of object safety, associated types lose you nothing. Instead of
dyn Encapsulator<EK, SS>
You have
dyn Encapsulator<EK, SharedSecret = SS>
I think it was a mistake in retrospect for Signer to be generic. Are there any examples of any key types that implement signer in more than one way to produce different signature outputs?
Note: these comments apply primarily to the signature
crate.
Yes, it comes up all the time. Check out the ecdsa
crate: https://docs.rs/ecdsa/0.16.9/ecdsa/struct.SigningKey.html#impl-Signer%3C(Signature%3CC%3E,+RecoveryId)%3E-for-SigningKey%3CC%3E
There are multiple types/formats for serializing ECDSA signatures including IEEE 1363, ASN.1 DER, and types which are parameterized with an additional OID which identifies the digest algorithm used to compute the signature, not to mention it's used with a 2-tuple as a way to compute an associated RecoveryId
which can be used to recover the public key from a signature.
RSA is a similar zoo of multitudes of signature formats.
I'm not sure these concerns apply to the kem
crate, however.
There are multiple types/formats for serializing ECDSA signatures including IEEE 1363, ASN.1 DER, and types which are parameterized with an additional OID which identifies the digest algorithm used to compute the signature, not to mention it's used with a 2-tuple as a way to compute an associated RecoveryId which can be used to recover the public key from a signature.
In theory, the SigningKey could be parameterised instead, and perhaps the tuple recovery key result should not even be an implementation of the trait but an inherent method. However, I concede the original point, it does have some usefulness I cannot deny
signature
is already at v2.0 and we don't plan on making breaking changes for years.
In theory, the SigningKey could be parameterised instead
That would preclude a SigningKey
being usable for multiple/dynamic signature encodings/formats at runtime, which is important for e.g. KMS systems.
(Also, this is all a bit off topic for this thread, except to contrast with KEM use cases)
As part of the work to add an ML-KEM implementation, I took a look at the KEM traits in this repo (in the
kem
directory). Given that crates.io shows only a few dependents, I thought some comments might still be acceptable. Mostly fairly minor things.The core point in this API is
EncappedKey
, in the sense that that's the type that knows about all of the types involved in this KEM. That seems odd to me.Signer<S>
andVerifier<S>
, where the things the two sides need to agree on are in the generic parameters.Encapsulator<EK, SS>
andDecapsulator<EK, SS>
, since the encapsulation key and shared secret are the two things that the sender and receiver need to agree on.EK
andSS
, but these are just byte arrays.Encapsulator::try_encap
method is incorrect to take a public key argument.self
should be represent the encapsulation key, just as inDecapsulator::try_decap
,self
represents the decapsulation key.I would drop the
AuthDecapsulator
trait for now. It's inappropriate to have that without a correspondingAuthEncapsulator
trait. And AFAIK the only known implementation of these operations is DHKEM, so it doesn't seem worth generalizing right now.In
Encapsulator::try_encap
, you don't need to be generic over the RNG type, you can just take&mut impl CryptoRngCore
, as inRandomizedDigestSigner
.Unless you're going to provide an infallible version like
Signer
does (try_sign
vs.sign
), I would remove thetry_
from the encap/decap methods.I note that there are no
as_bytes
/from_bytes
methods on the traits for encapsulation / decapsulation keys. That seems consistent with other traits in this repo, but just wanted to check it was intended, since at least for encapsulation keys, one will want to ship them around.My sense is that there is a general trend toward using more functional names for keys, so for example, "verifying key" or "encapsulation key" instead of "public key" / "signing key" or "decapsulation key" instead of "private key". That seems like a pattern we should follow here, e.g., in the decapsulation key argument to
Encapsulator::try_encaps
.I would generally avoid shortening "encapsulate" and "decapsulate" for clarity. So for example
EncapsulatedKey
instead ofEncappedKey
andtry_decapsulate
instead oftry_decap
.While I'm not sure there's a really standard spelling here, the "-or" ending to
Encapsulator
andDecapsulator
looks odd to me, and inconsistent with other crates in this repo, which use "-er".Encapsulate
/Decapsulate
, in parallel withCopy
,Clone
, etc.Signer
,Verifier
,PasswordHasher
. On the other hand,Aead
,KeyInit
,Digest
,Mac
.The
kem
traits are not linked from thecrypto
façade, but this seems to not be unique.In summary, I would probably simplify this interface down to two traits: