[CISA] AA23-040A: #StopRansomware: Ransomware Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Fund DPRK Malicious Cyber Activities

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Original release date: February 9, 2023

Summary

Note: This Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and various ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories detail historically and recently observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The United States National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Republic of Korea (ROK) National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the ROK Defense Security Agency (DSA) (hereafter referred to as the “authoring agencies”) are issuing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to highlight ongoing ransomware activity against Healthcare and Public Health Sector organizations and other critical infrastructure sector entities.

This CSA provides an overview of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) state-sponsored ransomware and updates the July 6, 2022, joint CSA North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. This advisory highlights TTPs and IOCs DPRK cyber actors used to gain access to and conduct ransomware attacks against Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector organizations and other critical infrastructure sector entities, as well as DPRK cyber actors’ use of cryptocurrency to demand ransoms.

The authoring agencies assess that an unspecified amount of revenue from these cryptocurrency operations supports DPRK national-level priorities and objectives, including cyber operations targeting the United States and South Korea governments—specific targets include Department of Defense Information Networks and Defense Industrial Base member networks. The IOCs in this product should be useful to sectors previously targeted by DPRK cyber operations (e.g., U.S. government, Department of Defense, and Defense Industrial Base). The authoring agencies highly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered and may pose sanctions risks.

For additional information on state-sponsored DPRK malicious cyber activity, see CISA’s North Korea Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 661 kb.

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 12. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.

This CSA is supplementary to previous reports on malicious cyber actor activities involving DPRK ransomware campaigns—namely Maui and H0lyGh0st ransomware. The authoring agencies are issuing this advisory to highlight additional observed TTPs DPRK cyber actors are using to conduct ransomware attacks targeting South Korean and U.S. healthcare systems.

Observable TTPs

The TTPs associated with DPRK ransomware attacks include those traditionally observed in ransomware operations. Additionally, these TTPs span phases from acquiring and purchasing infrastructure to concealing DPRK affiliation:

• Acquire Infrastructure [ T1583]. DPRK actors generate domains, personas, and accounts; and identify cryptocurrency services to conduct their ransomware operations. Actors procure infrastructure, IP addresses, and domains with cryptocurrency generated through illicit cybercrime, such as ransomware and cryptocurrency theft.
• Obfuscate Identity. DPRK actors purposely obfuscate their involvement by operating with or under third-party foreign affiliate identities and use third-party foreign intermediaries to receive ransom payments.
• Purchase VPNs and VPSs [ T1583.003]. DPRK cyber actors will also use virtual private networks (VPNs) and virtual private servers (VPSs) or third-country IP addresses to appear to be from innocuous locations instead of from DPRK.

• Gain Access [ TA0001]. Actors use various exploits of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) to gain access and escalate privileges on networks. Recently observed CVEs that actors used to gain access include remote code execution in the Apache Log4j software library (known as Log4Shell) and remote code execution in various SonicWall appliances [ T1190 and T1133]. Observed CVEs used include:

  • CVE 2021-44228
  • CVE-2021-20038
  • CVE-2022-24990

Actors also likely spread malicious code through Trojanized files for “X-Popup,” an open source messenger commonly used by employees of small and medium hospitals in South Korea [ T1195].

The actors spread malware by leveraging two domains: xpopup.pe[.]kr and xpopup.com. xpopup.pe[.]kr is registered to IP address 115.68.95[.]128 and xpopup[.]com is registered to IP address 119.205.197[.]111. Related file names and hashes are listed in table 1.

_Table 1: Malicious file names and hashes spread by xpopup domains_File NameMD5 Hashxpopup.rar1f239db751ce9a374eb9f908c74a31c9X-PopUp.exe6fb13b1b4b42bac05a2ba629f04e3d03X-PopUp.execf8ba073db7f4023af2b13dd75565f3dxpopup.exe4e71d52fc39f89204a734b19db1330d3x-PopUp.exe43d4994635f72852f719abb604c4a8a1xpopup.exe5ae71e8440bf33b46554ce7a7f3de666

• Move Laterally and Discovery [ TA0007, TA0008]. After initial access, DPRK cyber actors use staged payloads with customized malware to perform reconnaissance activities, upload and download additional files and executables, and execute shell commands [ T1083, T1021]. The staged malware is also responsible for collecting victim information and sending it to the remote host controlled by the actors [ TA0010].
• Employ Various Ransomware Tools [ TA0040]. Actors have used privately developed ransomware, such as Maui and H0lyGh0st [ T1486]. Actors have also been observed using or possessing publically available tools for encryption, such as BitLocker, Deadbolt, ech0raix, GonnaCry, Hidden Tear, Jigsaw, LockBit 2.0, My Little Ransomware, NxRansomware, Ryuk, and YourRansom [ T1486]. In some cases, DPRK actors have portrayed themselves as other ransomware groups, such as the REvil ransomware group. For IOCs associated with Maui and H0lyGh0st ransomware usage, please see Appendix B.

• Demand Ransom in Cryptocurrency. DPRK cyber actors have been observed setting ransoms in bitcoin [ T1486]. Actors are known to communicate with victims via Proton Mail email accounts. For private companies in the healthcare sector, actors may threaten to expose a company’s proprietary data to competitors if ransoms are not paid. Bitcoin wallet addresses possibly used by DPRK cyber actors include:

  • 1MTHBCrBKYEthfa16zo9kabt4f9jMJz8Rm
  • bc1q80vc4yjgg6umedkut3e9mhehxl4q4dcjjyzh59
  • 1J8spy62o7z2AjQxoUpiCGnBh5cRWKVWJC
  • 16ENLdHbnmDcEV8iqN4vuyZHa7sSdYRh76
  • bc1q3wzxvu8yhs8h7mlkmf7277wyklkah9k4sm9anu
  • bc1q8xyt4jxhw7mgqpwd6qfdjyxgvjeuz57jxrvgk9
  • 1NqihEqYaQaWiZkPVdSMiTbt7dTy1LMxgX
  • bc1qxrpevck3pq1yzrx2pq2rkvkvy0jnm56nzjv6pw
  • 14hVKm7Ft2rxDBFTNkkRC3kGstMGp2A4hk
  • 1KCwfCUgnSy3pzNX7U1i5NwFzRtth4bRBc
  • 16sYqXancDDiijcuruZecCkdBDwDf4vSEC
  • 1N6JphHFaYmYaokS5xH31Z67bvk4ykd9CP
  • LZ1VNJfn6mWjPzkCyoBvqWaBZYXAwn135
  • 1KmWW6LgdgykBBrSXrFu9kdoHz95Fe9kQF
  • 1FX4W9rrG4F3Uc7gJ18GCwGab8XuW8Ajy2
  • bc1qlqgu2l2kms5338zuc95kxavctzyy0v705tpvyc
  • bc1qy6su7vrh7ts5ng2628escmhr98msmzg62ez2sp
  • bc1q8t69gpxsezdcr8w6tfzp3jeptq4tcp2g9d0mwy
  • bc1q9h7yj79sqm4t536q0fdn7n4y2atsvvl22m28ep
  • bc1qj6y72rk039mqpgtcy7mwjd3eum6cx6027ndgmd
  • bc1qcp557vltuu3qc6pk3ld0ayagrxuf2thp3pjzpe
  • bc1ql8wsflrjf9zlusauynzjm83mupq6c9jz9vnqxg
  • bc1qx60ec3nfd5yhsyyxkzkpts54w970yxj84zrdck
  • bc1qunqnjdlvqkjuhtclfp8kzkjpvdz9qnk898xczp
  • bc1q6024d73h48fnhwswhwt3hqz2lzw6x99q0nulm4
  • bc1qwdvexlyvg3mqvqw7g6l09qup0qew80wjj9jh7x
  • bc1qavrtge4p7dmcrnvhlvuhaarx8rek76wxyk7dgg
  • bc1qagaayd57vr25dlqgk7f00nhz9qepqgnlnt4upu
  • bc1quvnaxnpqlzq3mdhfddh35j7e7ufxh3gpc56hca
  • bc1qu0pvfmtxawm8s99lcjvxapungtsmkvwyvak6cs
  • bc1qg3zlxxhhcvt6hkuhmqml8y9pas76cajcu9ltdl
  • bc1qn7a3g23nzpuytchyyteyhkcse84cnylznl3j32
  • bc1qhfmqstxp3yp9muvuz29wk77vjtdyrkff4nrxpu
  • bc1qnh8scrvuqvlzmzgw7eesyrmtes9c5m78duetf3
  • bc1q7qry3lsrphmnw3exs7tkwzpvzjcxs942aq8n0y
  • bc1qcmlcxfsy0zlqhh72jvvc4rh7hvwhx6scp27na0
  • bc1q498fn0gauj2kkjsg35mlwk2cnxhaqlj7hkh8xy
  • bc1qnz4udqkumjghnm2a3zt0w3ep8fwdcyv3krr3jq
  • bc1qk0saaw7p0wrwla6u7tfjlxrutlgrwnudzx9tyw
  • bc1qyue2pgjk09ps7qvfs559k8kee3jkcw4p4vdp57
  • bc1q6qfkt06xmrpclht3acmq00p7zyy0ejydu89zwv
  • bc1qmge6a7sp659exnx78zhm9zgrw88n6un0rl9trs
  • bc1qcywkd7zqlwmjy36c46dpf8cq6ts6wgkjx0u7cn

Mitigations

Note: These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. For more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections, see cisa.gov/cpg.

The authoring agencies urge HPH organizations to:

• Limit access to data by authenticating and encrypting connections (e.g., using public key infrastructure certificates in virtual private network (VPN) and transport layer security (TLS) connections) with network services, Internet of Things (IoT) medical devices, and the electronic health record system [ CPG 3.3].
• Implement the principle of least privilege by using standard user accounts on internal systems instead of administrative accounts [ CPG 1.5], which grant excessive system administration privileges.
• Turn off weak or unnecessary network device management interfaces, such as Telnet, SSH, Winbox, and HTTP for wide area networks (WANs) and secure with strong passwords and encryption when enabled.
• Protect stored data by masking the permanent account number (PAN) when displayed and rendering it unreadable when stored—through cryptography, for example.

• Secure the collection, storage, and processing practices for personally identifiable information (PII)/protected health information (PHI), per regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Implementing HIPAA security measures could prevent the introduction of malware to the system [ CPG 3.4].

  • Secure PII/ PHI at collection points and encrypt the data at rest and in transit using technologies, such as TLS. Only store personal patient data on internal systems that are protected by firewalls, and ensure extensive backups are available.
  • Create and regularly review internal policies that regulate the collection, storage, access, and monitoring of PII/PHI.
• Implement and enforce multi-layer network segmentation with the most critical communications and data resting on the most secure and reliable layer [ CPG 8.1].
• Use monitoring tools to observe whether IoT devices are behaving erratically due to a compromise [ CPG 3.1].

In addition, the authoring agencies urge all organizations, including HPH Sector organizations, to apply the following recommendations to prepare for and mitigate ransomware incidents:

• Maintain isolated backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration[ CPG 7.3]. These practices safeguard an organization’s continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware incident and protect against data losses.

  • Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.

• Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan and associated communications plan that includes response procedures for a ransomware incident [ CPG 7.1, 7.2].

  • Organizations should also ensure their incident response and communications plans include data breach incidents response and notification procedures. Ensure the notification procedures adhere to applicable laws.
  • See the CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide and CISA Fact Sheet Protecting Sensitive and Personal Information from Ransomware-Caused Data Breaches for information on creating a ransomware response checklist and planning and responding to ransomware-caused data breaches.
• Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released [ CPG 5.1]. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Regularly check for software updates and end-of-life notifications and prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.

• If you use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), or other potentially risky services, secure and monitor them closely [ CPG 5.4].

  • Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate credential theft and reuse [ CPG 1.3]. If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports [ CPG 1.1, 3.1].
  • Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols not in use for a business purpose (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol port 3389).
  • Restrict the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.
  • Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity [ CPG 5.6, 6.2].
  • Implement application control policies that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs [ CPG 2.1].
  • Open document readers in protected viewing modes to help prevent active content from running.
• Implement a user training program and phishing exercises [ CPG 4.3] to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting websites, clicking on links, and opening attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails.
• Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible [ CPG 1.3]—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.
• Use strong passwords [ CPG 1.4] and avoid reusing passwords for multiple accounts. See CISA Tip Choosing and Protecting Passwords and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines for more information.
• Require administrator credentials to install software [ CPG 1.5].
• Audit user accounts with administrative or elevated privileges [ CPG 1.5] and configure access controls with least privilege in mind.
• Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts.
• Only use secure networks. Consider installing and using a VPN.
• Consider adding an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations [ CPG 8.3] indicating that they are higher risk messages.
• Consider participating in CISA’s no-cost Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) program to receive real-time exchange of machine-readable cyber threat indicators and defensive measures.

If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization:

• Follow your organization’s ransomware response checklist.
• Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise.
• U.S. organizations: Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan. Report incidents to appropriate authorities; in the U.S., this would include the FBI at a local FBI Field Office, CISA at cisa.gov/report, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office.

• South Korean organizations: Please report incidents to NIS, KISA (Korea Internet & Security Agency), and KNPA (Korean National Police Agency).

  • NIS (National Intelligence Service)
  • Telephone : 111
  • https://www.nis.go.kr
  • KISA (Korea Internet & Security Agency)
  • Telephone : 118 (Consult Service)
  • https://www.boho.or.kr/consult/ransomware.do
  • KNPA (Korean National Police Agency)
  • Electronic Cybercrime Report & Management System: https://ecrm.police.go.kr/minwon/main
• Apply incident response best practices found in the joint Cybersecurity Advisory, Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity, developed by CISA and the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Resources

Stairwell provided a YARA rule to identify Maui ransomware, and a Proof of Concept public RSA key extractor at the following link:

https://www.stairwell.com/news/threat-research-report-maui-ransomware/

Request For Information

The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, bitcoin wallet information, the decryptor file, and/or benign samples of encrypted files. As stated above, the authoring agencies discourage paying ransoms. Payment does not guarantee files will be recovered and may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. However, the agencies understand that when victims are faced with an inability to function, all options are evaluated to protect shareholders, employees, and customers.

Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay a ransom, the authoring agencies urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents using the contact information above.

Acknowledgements

NSA, FBI, CISA, and HHS would like to thank ROK NIS and DSA for their contributions to this CSA.

Disclaimer of endorsement

The information and opinions contained in this document are provided "as is" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Trademark recognition

Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation. Apache®, Sonicwall, and Apache Log4j are trademarks of Apache Software Foundation. TerraMaster Operating System is a registered trademark of Octagon Systems.

Purpose

This document was developed in furtherance of the authors’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders.

Appendix A: CVE Details

CVE-2021-44228     CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical)Vulnerability Description

Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects.Recommended Mitigations

Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates.Detection Methods

See vendors’ Guidance For Preventing, Detecting, and Hunting for Exploitation of the Log4j 2 Vulnerability.Vulnerable Technologies and Versions

There are numerous vulnerable technologies and versions associated with CVE-2021-44228. For a full list, please check https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228.See https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228 for more information.

CVE-2021-20038     CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)Vulnerability Description

A Stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in SMA100 Apache httpd server's mod_cgi module environment variables allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to potentially execute code as a 'nobody' user in the appliance. This vulnerability affected SMA 200, 210, 400, 410 and 500v appliances firmware 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv, 10.2.1.2-24sv and earlier versions.Recommended Mitigations

Apply all appropriate vendor updates

Upgrade to:

• SMA 100 Series - (SMA 200, 210, 400, 410, 500v (ESX, Hyper-V, KVM, AWS, Azure):
• SonicWall SMA100 build versions 10.2.0.9-41sv or later
• SonicWall SMA100 build versions 10.2.1.3-27sv or later

System administrators should refer to the SonicWall Security Advisories in the reference section to determine affected applications/systems and appropriate fix actions.

Support for 9.0.0 firmware ended on 10/31/2021. Customers still using that firmware are requested to upgrade to the latest 10.2.x versions.

Vulnerable Technologies and Versions

Sonicwall Sma 200 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv

Sonicwall Sma 200 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv

Sonicwall Sma 200 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv

Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv

Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv

Sonicwall Sma 210 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv

Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv

Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv

Sonicwall Sma 410 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv

Sonicwall Sma 400 Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv

Sonicwall Sma 400 Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv

Sonicwall Sma 400 Firmware 10.2.1.2-24Sv

Sonicwall Sma 500V Firmware 10.2.0.8-37Sv

Sonicwall Sma 500V Firmware 10.2.1.1-19Sv

Sonicwall Sma 500V Firmware 10.2.1.2-24SvSee https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20038 for more information.

CVE-2022-24990    CVSS 3.x: N/AVulnerability Description

The TerraMaster OS Unauthenticated Remote Command Execution via PHP Object Instantiation Vulnerability is characterized by scanning activity targeting a flaw in the script enabling a remote adversary to execute commands on the target endpoint. The vulnerability is created by improper input validation of the webNasIPS component in the api.php script and resides on the TNAS device appliances' operating system where users manage storage, backup data, and configure applications. By exploiting the script flaw a remote unauthenticated attacker can pass specially crafted data to the application and execute arbitrary commands on the target system. This may result in complete compromise of the target system, including the exfiltration of information. TNAS devices can be chained to acquire unauthenticated remote code execution with highest privileges.Recommended Mitigations

Install relevant vendor patches. This vulnerability was patched in TOS version 4.2.30Vulnerable Technologies and Versions

TOS v 4.2.29See https://octagon.net/blog/2022/03/07/cve-2022-24990-terrmaster-tos-unauthenticated-remote-command-execution-via-php-object-instantiation/ and https://forum.terra-master.com/en/viewtopic.php?t=3030 for more information.

Appendix B: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The IOC section includes hashes and IP addresses for the Maui and H0lyGh0st ransomware variants—as well as custom malware implants assumedly developed by DPRK cyber actors, such as remote access trojans (RATs), loaders, and other tools—that enable subsequent deployment of ransomware. For additional Maui IOCs, see joint CSA North Korean State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Use Maui Ransomware to Target the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.

Table 2 lists MD5 and SHA256 hashes associated with malware implants, RATs, and other tools used by DPRK cyber actors, including tools that drop Maui ransomware files.

_Table 2: File names and hashes of malicious implants, RATs, and tools_MD5HashSHA256Hash079b4588eaa99a1e802adf5e0b26d8aaf67ee77d6129bd1bcd5d856c0fc5314169

b946d32b8abaa4e680bb98130b38e70e9e256d8173854a7bc26982b1dde783--12c15a477e1a96120c09a860c9d479b36263e421e397db821669420489d2d3084

f408671524fd4e1e23165a16dda2225131fc4375971af391b459de33f81c253--17c46ed7b80c2e4dbea6d0e88ea0827cb9af4660da00c7fa975910d0a19fda0720

31c15fad1eef935a609842c51b7f7d1875f6a68f70bee316c8a6eda9ebf8de672ec8899b8ee513dbfc4590440a61023

846ddc2ca94c88ae637144305c497e71a74c8d8b74ca2411c1d3d22373a6769ba8f9e7afe5f78494c111971c39a89111ef

9262bf23e8a764c6f65c818837a441f6d9f8fbdbbd4e6ed8cd73b9e95a9284f089afa51fd0c1b2a39cc11cedb3a4a32

6111837a5408379384be6fe846e0162d02f5499d35a8dffb4c8bc0b7fec5c2830207029d83fd46a4a89cd623103ba23

21b866428aa04360376e6a3900635702e18350194e59bc6a2a3f6d59da11bd8655aa64860f1655081489cf85b77f72a49

de846a99dd122093db4018434b83ae3bd22e0ac965ebb6a18bb71ba39e96dc6b7f566889b80d1dba4f92d5e2fb2f5ef24

f57fcfd56bb594978dffe9edbb9eb40f21743f9cb927b2c84ecdb7dfb14a65081f54761947bc9ce4aa2a259a0bd60b

4ec03d32605f8e3635c4d4edaf488944118d9adce7350c3eedeb056a33353465b7ecf7e9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd76

9dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e43e756d80225bdf1200bc34eef5adca8afb2d4d88f59e528f0e388705113ae54b7

b97db4f03a35ae43cc386a48f263a047791bf9e017e3001ddc68a7351ca2d6863b707873f7d653911e46885e261380b

410bb3bf6b158daefb47562e93cb657505262547f8879249794fc31eea41fc6f32f6b229913d68daad937cc72a57aa452

91a9d623109ed48938815aa7b6005c5130888a0ad3d64ad33c65de696d3fa2c92c1f3e77a1876086ce530e87aa9c1f9c

bc5e93c5e755b29cad10a2f399143558ad3103295afcc22bde8d81e77c282f18b75949e03f8dcad513426f1f9f3ca209d

779c24cd4e941d935633b1bec00cb5be1e382cd9730fbe386b69bd8045ee75ad106e333de056eac78403b033b89c58

b4c4bdda12e2f774625d47ccfd3d3ae5c6f9c83426c6d33ff2d4e72c039b747a3b7e88d998078cfd8cdf37fa5454c45f6c

bd65f4595fb94b2e9c85fe767ad47640e70b0230dc026eff922fb1e44c2ea6319102bac226dfc117c3c9e620cd99c7e

afbf3874832f2ce085850aa042f19c67f4dad1a94ed8a47283c2c0c05a75943fe624c33790b409421f4fa2bb8abfd701d

f2231a959493c33187ed34bec0ae770652edadedbacfd30d33a826853467d196fb1b6eff4e7a049cea323459cfd6c0e3

900d8d69e1d80bffbaabd24c06eba739812e2ae1327a94e441719b885bd196122c94cbfa11311bea7129ecd5aea6fae

6c51d23228f7378b5f6b2398728f6776c3d2092737d964dfd627f1ced0af80bffe910904efd1f69544daa9b72f2a70fb29

f73c51070bde4ea563de862ce4b1802e7d6e80d7a60e17f9ffbd62fcbbeb87bdb1de1dd6b0b75879d8b8aef80b562

ec4fad365d7abbc629bcfc1d386afa6827103a6b6185191fd5618b7e82da292--830bc975a04ab0f62bfedf27f7aca673--85995257ac07ae5a6b4a86758a2283d7--85f6e3e3f0bdd0c1b3084fc86ee59d19f1576627e8130e6d5fde0dbe3dffcc8bc9e

ef1203d15fcf09cd877ced1ccc72a87a6bda486554ab16c82bdfb12452e8b980bb08ef3e8afcb8c0c1a879ec11c41b2

9fd30ac65436495e69de79c555b2be891db50188a90ddacfaf7567d2d0355d0837dd54268c373069fc5c1628c6e3d75e

b99c3b3efc94c45b73e2cf9a6f3207894de380a249e677be2acb8fbdfba2ef--8b395cc6ecdec0900facf6e93ec48fbb--92a6c017830cda80133bf97eb77d3292d1aba3f95f11fc6e5fec7694d188919555b

7ff097500e811ff4a5319f8f230be9b0e7c460a80f740d455a7521f0eada145d8ac1ac692d6bb0fe776620371fca02b

60cac8db23c4cc7ab5df262da42b789b9d4cb1f681f19417e541178d8c75d7f5f6e538001803b0aa008422caf2c3c2a7

9b2eeee9ddc7feda710e4aba96fea4a1f9e9f5061313325a275d448d4ddd59dfdd72c9ce1212f9d9455e2bca5a327c88

d2d424ea5c086725897c83afc3d42da452a5f693036320b580d28ee55ae2a399b0056b7cc2e305d4ccb0ac0a8a270d3f

ceb21ef6fc2eb13521a930cea8bd9fa6e1efd70a077be032f052bb755443583b9fe1713f638f85f20ea56fd09d20a96cd

6d288732b04b073248b56cdaef878ad4eababfe125110299e5a24be84472ea557a0c67b5baa7cf64bd4d42103d3b285

2f67acf96b4c5f14992c1289b55eaab1c1d28dc7da1d58abab73fa98f60a8338491f48d0cbaab7305b5ddca64ba41a2b

eb89d81d5fb920e67d0c7334c89131b6f91a965b8404d1a276e43e61319931--bdece9758bf34fcad9cba1394519019b9d6de05f9a3e62044ad9ae66111308ccb9

ed2ee46a3ea37d85afa92e314e7127c3850f4cc12717c2b54753f8ca5d5e0e99b448e91669b92c2cc3417a4d9711209

509274dab5d7582baacfab5028a818cc50b839f2fc3ce5a385b9ae1c05def3a458d258005f39d72ce47c111a7d17e8c52

fe5fc7dd98575771640d9009385456cf236bf5b41d26967b1ce04ebbdb404160425a4d5ee04c8ae09bfe28ca33bf9e76

a43f69548b2704956d0875a0f25145d0e203e8845bf282475a8f816340f2e8f6375c5276d1178a2a0fe1a16c5668ce52

3e2f846c073bf75bb2558fdec06531ddb1f970371fa32faae61fc5b8423d4bdda53eee2c5cb0abdbf5242f5e82f4de83

898b6a9dd8aa935c2be29bafc9a469f2f787868a3064407d79173ac5fc086492adc5ea29491d9245876ba0b29573936

33c9998eb47b3ae1344c13a44cd59aefda3a19afa85912f6dc8452675245d6b56925a1f7d853d814f80e98a1c4890b0a6

a84c83a8eded34c585c98b2df6ab19--0054147db54544d77a9efd9baf5ec96a80

b430e170d6e7c22fcf75261e9a3a71--151ab3e05a23e9ccd03a6c49830dabb9e

9281faf279c31ae40b13e6971dd2fb8--1c926fb3bd99f4a586ed476e4683163892

f3958581bf8c24235cd2a415513b7f--1f8dcfaebbcd7e71c2872e0ba2fc6db81d6

51cf654a21d33c78eae6662e62392--f226086b5959eb96bd30dec0ffcbf0f0918

6cd11721507f416f1c39901addafb--23eff00dde0ee27dabad28c1f4ffb8b09e8

76f1e1a77c1e6fb735ab517d79b76--586f30907c3849c363145bfdcdabe3e2e4

688cbd5688ff968e984b201b474730--8ce219552e235dcaf1c694be122d6339e

d4ff8df70bf358cd165e6eb487ccfc5--90fb0cd574155fd8667d20f97ac464eca67

bdb6a8ee64184159362d45d79b6a4--c2904dc8bbb569536c742fca0c51a766e8

36d0da8fac1c1abd99744e9b50164f--ca932ccaa30955f2fffb1122234fb1524f7d

e3a8e0044de1ed4fe05cab8702a5--f6827dc5af661fbb4bf64bc625c78283ef8

36c6985bb2bfb836bd0c8d5397332--f78cabf7a0e7ed3ef2d1c976c1486281f56

a6503354b87219b466f2f7a0b65c4

Table 3 lists MD5 and SHA256 hashes are associated with Maui Ransomware files.

_Table 3: File names and hashes of Maui ransomware files_MD5 HashSHA256 Hash4118d9adce7350c3eedeb056a33353465b7ecf7e9d0715f1122baf4ce745c5fcd76

9dee48150616753fec4d6da16e99e9b0e7c460a80f740d455a7521f0eada145d8ac1ac692d6bb0fe776620371fca02b

60cac8db23c4cc7ab5df262da42b78fda3a19afa85912f6dc8452675245d6b56925a1f7d853d814f80e98a1c4890b0a6

a84c83a8eded34c585c98b2df6ab192d02f5499d35a8dffb4c8bc0b7fec5c2830207029d83fd46a4a89cd623103ba232

1b866428aa04360376e6a390063570c50b839f2fc3ce5a385b9ae1c05def3a458d258005f39d72ce47c111a7d17e8c52

fe5fc7dd98575771640d9009385456a452a5f693036320b580d28ee55ae2a399b0056b7cc2e305d4ccb0ac0a8a270d3f

ceb21ef6fc2eb13521a930cea8bd9fa6e1efd70a077be032f052bb755443583b9fe1713f638f85f20ea56fd09d20a96cd6

d288732b04b073248b56cdaef878802e7d6e80d7a60e17f9ffbd62fcbbeb87bdb1de1dd6b0b75879d8b8aef80b562e

c4fad365d7abbc629bcfc1d386afa6--0054147db54544d77a9efd9baf5ec96a80b

430e170d6e7c22fcf75261e9a3a71

Table 4 lists MD5 and SHA256 hashes associated with H0lyGh0st Ransomware files.

_Table 4: File names and hashes of H0lyGh0st ransomware files_SHA256 Hash99fc54786a72f32fd44c7391c2171ca31e72ca52725c68e2dde94d04c286fccd*F8fc2445a9814ca8cf48a979bff7f182d6538f4d1ff438cf259268e8b4b76f86*Bea866b327a2dc2aa104b7ad7307008919c06620771ec3715a059e675d9f40af*6e20b73a6057f8ff75c49e1b7aef08abfcfe4e418e2c1307791036f081335c2df4d10b08d7dacd8fe33a6b54a0416eecdaed92c69c933c4a5d3700b8f5100fad541825cb652606c2ea12fd25a842a8b3456d025841c3a7f563655ef77bb672192d978df8df0cf33830aba16c6322198e5889c67d49b40b1cb1eb236bd366826d414ed95d14964477bebf86dced0306714c497cde14dede67b0c1425ce451d3d7Df0c7bb88e3c67d849d78d13cee30671b39b300e0cda5550280350775d5762d8

MD5 Hasha2c2099d503fcc29478205f5aef0283b9c516e5b95a7e4169ecbd133ed4d205fd6a7b5db62bf7815a10a17cdf7ddbd4bc6949a99c60ef29d20ac8a9a3fb58ce54b20641c759ed563757cdd95c651ee5325ee4001eb4e91f7ea0bc5d07f2a974429b6b54e10a96e6c40e1f0236b01b2e818126be163eb7df2194bb902c359ba8eeaf6896b361121b2c315a35be837576de4ee611533a28648a350f2dab85bb72ae268cb7ab778564e88d757db4152b9fa

\* from Microsoft blog post on h0lygh0st

Contact Information

NSA Client Requirements / General Cybersecurity Inquiries: CybersecurityReports@nsa.gov

Defense Industrial Base Inquiries and Cybersecurity Services: DIB_Defense@cyber.nsa.gov

To report incidents and anomalous activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center at Report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870 or your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.

Media Inquiries / Press Desk:

• NSA Media Relations, 443-634-0721, MediaRelations@nsa.gov
• CISA Media Relations, 703-235-2010, CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov

Revisions

• February 9, 2023: Initial Version

• • *

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa23-040a

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