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Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.
Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.
The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.
When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.
The overlay driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate.
Impact
Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration.
Patches
Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.
Workarounds
In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For example, use the registry.k8s.io/pause image and a --mode global service.
For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features.
The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in host mode instead of ingress mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the ingress network.
If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec. For example, iptables -A INPUT -m udp —-dport 4789 -m policy --dir in --pol none -j DROP.
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.
Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.
The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.
When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.
An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation.
On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the xt_u32 module has been:
This rule is not created when xt_u32 is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.
Impact
Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, overlay networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees.
It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may rely on Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability is no longer guaranteed.
Patches
Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.
Workarounds
Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary (see GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw) in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet.
Ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
Background
#43382 partially discussed this concern, but did not consider the security implications.
Mirantis FIELD-5788 essentially duplicates #43382, and was created six months earlier; it similarly overlooked the security implications.
#45118 is the ancestor of the final patches, and was where the security implications were discovered.
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.
Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.
The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.
Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.
When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.
Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded.
On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the xt_u32 module has been:
These rules are not created when xt_u32 is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.
Impact
Encrypted overlay networks on affected configurations silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams.
The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network.
Patches
Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.
Workarounds
Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary (see GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw) to prevent all VXLAN packet injection.
Ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
Background
#43382 partially discussed this concern, but did not consider the security implications.
Mirantis FIELD-5788 essentially duplicates #43382, and was created six months earlier; it similarly overlooked the security implications.
#45118 is the ancestor of the final patches, and was where the security implications were discovered.
In Docker CE and EE before 18.09.8 (as well as Docker EE before 17.06.2-ee-23 and 18.x before 18.03.1-ee-10), Docker Engine in debug mode may sometimes add secrets to the debug log. This applies to a scenario where docker stack deploy is run to redeploy a stack that includes (non external) secrets. It potentially applies to other API users of the stack API if they resend the secret.
This PR contains the following updates:
v17.12.0-ce-rc1.0.20201201034508-7d75c1d40d88+incompatible->v20.10.24+incompatibleGitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2023-28842
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (
dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in
dockerdand is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.The
overlaynetwork driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.
When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the
u32iptables extension provided by thext_u32kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.The
overlaydriver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate.Impact
Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration.
Patches
Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.
Workarounds
registry.k8s.io/pauseimage and a--mode globalservice.hostmode instead ofingressmode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing theingressnetwork.iptables -A INPUT -m udp —-dport 4789 -m policy --dir in --pol none -j DROP.Background
Related
CVE-2023-28841
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (
dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in
dockerdand is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.The
overlaynetwork driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.
When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the
u32iptables extension provided by thext_u32kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation.
On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the
xt_u32module has been:This rule is not created when
xt_u32is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.Impact
Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result,
overlaynetworks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees.It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may rely on Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability is no longer guaranteed.
Patches
Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.
Workarounds
xt_u32kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.Background
Related
CVE-2023-28840
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (
dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in
dockerdand is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.The
overlaynetwork driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.
When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the
u32iptables extension provided by thext_u32kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the
INPUTfilter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded.On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the
xt_u32module has been:These rules are not created when
xt_u32is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.Impact
Encrypted overlay networks on affected configurations silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams.
The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network.
Patches
Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.
Workarounds
xt_u32kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.Background
Related
CVE-2019-13509
In Docker CE and EE before 18.09.8 (as well as Docker EE before 17.06.2-ee-23 and 18.x before 18.03.1-ee-10), Docker Engine in debug mode may sometimes add secrets to the debug log. This applies to a scenario where docker stack deploy is run to redeploy a stack that includes (non external) secrets. It potentially applies to other API users of the stack API if they resend the secret.
Release Notes
docker/docker (github.com/docker/docker)
### [`v20.10.24+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.23...v20.10.24) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.23...v20.10.24) ### [`v20.10.23+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.22...v20.10.23) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.22...v20.10.23) ### [`v20.10.22+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.21...v20.10.22) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.21...v20.10.22) ### [`v20.10.21+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.20...v20.10.21) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.20...v20.10.21) ### [`v20.10.20+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.19...v20.10.20) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.19...v20.10.20) ### [`v20.10.19+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.18...v20.10.19) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.18...v20.10.19) ### [`v20.10.18+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.17...v20.10.18) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.17...v20.10.18) ### [`v20.10.17+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.16...v20.10.17) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.16...v20.10.17) ### [`v20.10.16+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.15...v20.10.16) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.15...v20.10.16) ### [`v20.10.15+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.14...v20.10.15) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.14...v20.10.15) ### [`v20.10.14+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.13...v20.10.14) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.13...v20.10.14) ### [`v20.10.13+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.12...v20.10.13) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.12...v20.10.13) ### [`v20.10.12+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.11...v20.10.12) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.11...v20.10.12) ### [`v20.10.11+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.10...v20.10.11) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.10...v20.10.11) ### [`v20.10.10+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.9...v20.10.10) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.9...v20.10.10) ### [`v20.10.9+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.8...v20.10.9) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.8...v20.10.9) ### [`v20.10.8+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.7...v20.10.8) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.7...v20.10.8) ### [`v20.10.7+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.6...v20.10.7) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.6...v20.10.7) ### [`v20.10.6+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.5...v20.10.6) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.5...v20.10.6) ### [`v20.10.5+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.4...v20.10.5) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.4...v20.10.5) ### [`v20.10.4+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.3...v20.10.4) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.3...v20.10.4) ### [`v20.10.3+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.2...v20.10.3) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.2...v20.10.3) ### [`v20.10.2+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.1...v20.10.2) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.1...v20.10.2) ### [`v20.10.1+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.0...v20.10.1) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v20.10.0...v20.10.1) ### [`v20.10.0+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v1.13.1...v20.10.0) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v17.12.0-ce-rc4...v20.10.0) ### [`v17.12.0-ce-rc4+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v17.12.0-ce-rc3...v17.12.0-ce-rc4) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v17.12.0-ce-rc3...v17.12.0-ce-rc4) ### [`v17.12.0-ce-rc3+incompatible`](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v17.12.0-ce-rc2...v17.12.0-ce-rc3) [Compare Source](https://togithub.com/docker/docker/compare/v17.12.0-ce-rc2...v17.12.0-ce-rc3)Configuration
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