Closed devos50 closed 5 days ago
@synctext I've 'refactored' this issue as we discussed last week.
I've verified the basic setup using an isolated exit node, an isolated Dispersy tracker and a single Tribler instance, that anonymous downloading is working well and the exit nodes are paid correctly. I will now scale up the experiment and add more nodes. This allows me to explore a basic freeride policy, in the case of oversupply and undersupply.
After #3502 is merged, the market is production-ready 👍
"Our live token economy: measuring and mitigating real-world attacks" Detection of fraud on our live network and attacking our own network with live Sybil attacks could be The Big Next Paper... Cue "incremental personal PageRank". Merge trust of barter, voting, and trade transaction graphs.
Small game fallacy: http://unenumerated.blogspot.com/2015/05/small-game-fallacies.html?m=1
Current status:
I think the code is ready for an experimental release. I will do some more testing and work towards structural end-to-end testing on our testnet network. This also allows me to analyze the efficiency of our scheduling algorithms at the exit node/relay nodes and get some insights into the efficiency of our free-rider prevention mechanism overall.
Now that direct payouts are working (see #3776), I will focus on end-to-end integration experiments. I will start building these experiments in isolation but eventually, they will join the TrustChain testnet. Scientific goal: experimentally prove that free-riders are allocated less resources at exit nodes/relays.
Oops, misclick on the Projects page... :face_with_head_bandage:
Proof-of-Work as Anonymous Micropayment: Rewarding a Tor Relay
In this work, the authors propose a mechanism to reward Tor relay nodes, based on Proof-of-Work requirements by cryptocurrencies. Tor clients obtain Proof-of-Work shards and can turn them in later for preferential treatment.
They also propose a hierarchical token bucket algorithm to ensure QoS for "free" and "paying" clients. This is related to our slotted mechanism implemented in relay and exit nodes.
Thesis final chapter brainstorm (updated with estimated importance to the lab as a whole):
Final thesis chapter idea (as also briefly discussed yesterday): Tribler: 15 years of research on managing the Internet commons. Also, see here. This will be a journal paper, suitable for a single-blind review policy.
What problem did we solve? We design, implement and evaluate a fully decentralized infrastructure to address free-riding behaviour in shared-resource systems, oriented around three key components: community accounting, reputation mechanisms and resource allocation. These three components together are capable of detecting fraudulent behaviour, e.g., record withholding and the Sybil Attack.
Key contributions:
Related work on decentral marketplace with tokens: FileBounty: Fair Data Exchange
Their system uses Semi-trusted third party, Merkle-Damgård and Sponge Construction, Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature scheme, and obviously zkSNARKs. This is a fascinating theoretical result. However, "an Ethereum smart contract serves for dispute mediation" and all these complex components are not suitable for real-world usage at "Facebook" deployment levels.
I have started a write-up on this ecosystem here. Using this issue as a place-holder for the images in the document.
Reacting to: https://github.com/Tribler/tribler/pull/5689 and https://github.com/Tribler/tribler/issues/5676. Much progress towards freeriding prevention :1st_place_medal:
This issue has most likely been deferred in favour of tag-related improvements so I'm un-assigning myself for now 👍
It seems like this issue was part of completed PhD work. I'll close it.
This issue will be the main discussion place for our ongoing project: "A blockchain-based token economy to prevent bandwidth free-riding" (the title is open for discussion). The basic idea is to create a micro-economy within the Tribler platform for earning, spending and trading bandwidth tokens. This brings together various research topics, including blockchain-powered decentralized market, anonymous downloading and hidden seeding. Trustworthy behavior and participation should be rewarded while cheating should be punished. A basic policy should prevent users from selfishly consuming bandwidth without giving anything back. This directly addresses the tragedy-of-the-commons phenomena.
Our initial release should provide basic primitives to earn, trade and spend tokens. Our work could be extended with more sophisticated techniques like TrustChain record mixing, multiple identities, a robust reputation mechanism for tunnel selection, global consensus and verifiable public proofs (proof-of-bandwidth/proof-of-relay).
High-level overview:![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/325224/35796657-8674c372-0a5d-11e8-948e-3b45064c0492.png)
Initial architecture diagram:
Related issues:
Related work:
Open tasks (subject to change):
Must have:
Should have: