3. Clustering & Topic Modeling to Discover Higher-Order Patterns of Meaning - [E1] Grimmer, Justin.

[lkcao]

Post questions here for this week's exemplary readings:

1. Grimmer, Justin. 2013. “Appropriators not Position Takers: The Distorting Effects of Electoral Incentives on Congressional Representation.” American Journal of Political Science 57(3): 624-642.

[sborislo]

I appreciated Grimmer's methods, and I find his explanation for each party's polarized positions compelling. I do wonder how much of this phenomenon is a function of a political system where candidates are forced to align with one of two parties, creating an efficiency problem. In lay terms, are candidates in blue/red-dominated states merely using polarized talking points because they easily and effectively signal one's party identity, since party identity often matters more than a candidate's actual sentiments or qualifications in such states? This is even more likely now the case than in 2013.

[yueqil2]

This paper implies a huge potential to use textual analysis on American politics, especially on representative politics as "home style", which involves the strategies and behaviors politicians use to maintain local support and trust. When measuring "home styles", the author distinguished it by what legislators discuss, rather than the positions legislators take when discussing issues(p4). The former seems to be an open question, and the answer is a different topic. The latter seems to be a limited-choice question, and the answer is a particular attitude. What is the intrinsic difference between these two measurements? How should we choose between these two when doing research?

[Audacity88]

I have a similar question to sborislo above: is it possible to avoid increasing partisanship among the representatives of an increasingly divided country? Grimmer believes that if moderates spoke up more, things would be better; but I wonder if it's the kind of thing where both sides know it will come down to a partison vote, so it's more convenient to simply have the extreme positions articulated and then vote on it.

[volt-1]

The article mentions that electoral incentives affect representatives' policy positions and behavior. > how do voters' feedback and demands shape/ alter these behaviors? I wonder Is there a cyclical feedback mechanism where voters' preferences and feedback further exacerbate or mitigate representatives' extremist behavior?