🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨
This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!
Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.
OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for secure smart contract development. Starting in version 4.0.0 and prior to version 4.9.3, contracts using ERC2771Context along with a custom trusted forwarder may see _msgSender return address(0) in calls that originate from the forwarder with calldata shorter than 20 bytes. This combination of circumstances does not appear to be common, in particular it is not the case for MinimalForwarder from OpenZeppelin Contracts, or any deployed forwarder the team is aware of, given that the signer address is appended to all calls that originate from these forwarders.
When the verifyMultiProof, verifyMultiProofCalldata, processMultiProof, or processMultiProofCalldata functions are in use, it is possible to construct merkle trees that allow forging a valid multiproof for an arbitrary set of leaves.
A contract may be vulnerable if it uses multiproofs for verification and the merkle tree that is processed includes a node with value 0 at depth 1 (just under the root). This could happen inadvertently for balanced trees with 3 leaves or less, if the leaves are not hashed. This could happen deliberately if a malicious tree builder includes such a node in the tree.
A contract is not vulnerable if it uses single-leaf proving (verify, verifyCalldata, processProof, or processProofCalldata), or if it uses multiproofs with a known tree that has hashed leaves. Standard merkle trees produced or validated with the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree library are safe.
Patches
The problem has been patched in 4.9.2.
Workarounds
If you are using multiproofs: When constructing merkle trees hash the leaves and do not insert empty nodes in your trees. Using the @openzeppelin/merkle-tree package eliminates this issue. Do not accept user-provided merkle roots without reconstructing at least the first level of the tree. Verify the merkle tree structure by reconstructing it from the leaves.
By frontrunning the creation of a proposal, an attacker can become the proposer and gain the ability to cancel it. The attacker can do this repeatedly to try to prevent a proposal from being proposed at all.
This impacts the Governor contract in v4.9.0 only, and the GovernorCompatibilityBravo contract since v4.3.0.
Patches
The problem has been patched in 4.9.1 by introducing opt-in frontrunning protection.
Workarounds
Submit the proposal creation transaction to an endpoint with frontrunning protection.
Credit
Reported by Lior Abadi and Joaquin Pereyra from Coinspect.
The proposal creation entrypoint (propose) in GovernorCompatibilityBravo allows the creation of proposals with a signatures array shorter than the calldatas array. This causes the additional elements of the latter to be ignored, and if the proposal succeeds the corresponding actions would eventually execute without any calldata. The ProposalCreated event correctly represents what will eventually execute, but the proposal parameters as queried through getActions appear to respect the original intended calldata.
Patches
This issue has been patched in v4.8.3.
Workarounds
Ensure that all proposals that pass through governance have equal length signatures and calldatas parameters.
A function in the implementation contract may be inaccessible if its selector clashes with one of the proxy's own selectors. Specifically, if the clashing function has a different signature with incompatible ABI encoding, the proxy could revert while attempting to decode the arguments from calldata.
The probability of an accidental clash is negligible, but one could be caused deliberately.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in v4.8.3.
Workarounds
If a function appears to be inaccessible for this reason, it may be possible to craft the calldata such that ABI decoding does not fail at the proxy and the function is properly proxied through.
The ERC721Consecutive contract designed for minting NFTs in batches does not update balances when a batch has size 1 and consists of a single token. Subsequent transfers from the receiver of that token may overflow the balance as reported by balanceOf.
The issue exclusively presents with batches of size 1.
The functions ECDSA.recover and ECDSA.tryRecover are vulnerable to a kind of signature malleability due to accepting EIP-2098 compact signatures in addition to the traditional 65 byte signature format. This is only an issue for the functions that take a single bytes argument, and not the functions that take r, v, s or r, vs as separate arguments.
The potentially affected contracts are those that implement signature reuse or replay protection by marking the signature itself as used rather than the signed message or a nonce included in it. A user may take a signature that has already been submitted, submit it again in a different form, and bypass this protection.
Patches
The issue has been patched in 4.7.3.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance deploying a fix, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.
This issue concerns instances of Governor that use the module GovernorVotesQuorumFraction, a mechanism that determines quorum requirements as a percentage of the voting token's total supply. In affected instances, when a proposal is passed to lower the quorum requirement, past proposals may become executable if they had been defeated only due to lack of quorum, and the number of votes it received meets the new quorum requirement.
Analysis of instances on chain found only one proposal that met this condition, and we are actively monitoring for new occurrences of this particular issue.
Patches
This issue has been patched in v4.7.2.
Workarounds
Avoid lowering quorum requirements if a past proposal was defeated for lack of quorum.
The target contract of an EIP-165 supportsInterface query can cause unbounded gas consumption by returning a lot of data, while it is generally assumed that this operation has a bounded cost.
Contracts using the cross chain utilies for Arbitrum L2, CrossChainEnabledArbitrumL2 or LibArbitrumL2, will classify direct interactions of externally owned accounts (EOAs) as cross chain calls, even though they are not started on L1. This is assessed as low severity because any action taken by an EOA on the contract could also be taken by the EOA through the bridge if the issue was not present.
SignatureChecker.isValidSignatureNow is not expected to revert. However, an incorrect assumption about Solidity 0.8's abi.decode allows some cases to revert, given a target contract that doesn't implement EIP-1271 as expected.
The contracts that may be affected are those that use SignatureChecker to check the validity of a signature and handle invalid signatures in a way other than reverting. We believe this to be unlikely.
ERC165Checker.supportsInterface is designed to always successfully return a boolean, and under no circumstance revert. However, an incorrect assumption about Solidity 0.8's abi.decode allows some cases to revert, given a target contract that doesn't implement EIP-165 as expected, specifically if it returns a value other than 0 or 1.
The contracts that may be affected are those that use ERC165Checker to check for support for an interface and then handle the lack of support in a way other than reverting.
ERC2771Context: Return the forwarder address whenever the msg.data of a call originating from a trusted forwarder is not long enough to contain the request signer address (i.e. msg.data.length is less than 20 bytes), as specified by ERC-2771. (#4481)
ERC2771Context: Prevent revert in _msgData() when a call originating from a trusted forwarder is not long enough to contain the request signer address (i.e. msg.data.length is less than 20 bytes). Return the full calldata in that case. (#4484)
MerkleProof: Fix a bug in processMultiProof and processMultiProofCalldata that allows proving arbitrary leaves if the tree contains a node with value 0 at depth 1.
ReentrancyGuard: Add a _reentrancyGuardEntered function to expose the guard status. (#3714)
ERC721Wrapper: add a new extension of the ERC721 token which wraps an underlying token. Deposit and withdraw guarantee that the ownership of each token is backed by a corresponding underlying token with the same identifier. (#3863)
EnumerableMap: add a keys() function that returns an array containing all the keys. (#3920)
Governor: add a public cancel(uint256) function. (#3983)
Governor: Enable timestamp operation for blockchains without a stable block time. This is achieved by connecting a Governor's internal clock to match a voting token's EIP-6372 interface. (#3934)
IERC5313: Add an interface for EIP-5313 that is now final. (#4013)
IERC4906: Add an interface for ERC-4906 that is now Final. (#4012)
StorageSlot: Add support for string and bytes. (#4008)
Votes, ERC20Votes, ERC721Votes: support timestamp checkpointing using EIP-6372. (#3934)
ERC4626: Add mitigation to the inflation attack through virtual shares and assets. (#3979)
Strings: add toString method for signed integers. (#3773)
ERC20Wrapper: Make the underlying variable private and add a public accessor. (#4029)
EIP712: add EIP-5267 support for better domain discovery. (#3969)
AccessControlDefaultAdminRules: Add an extension of AccessControl with additional security rules for the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. (#4009)
SignatureChecker: Add isValidERC1271SignatureNow for checking a signature directly against a smart contract using ERC-1271. (#3932)
SafeERC20: Add a forceApprove function to improve compatibility with tokens behaving like USDT. (#4067)
ERC1967Upgrade: removed contract-wide oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow delegatecall annotation, replaced by granular annotation in UUPSUpgradeable. (#3971)
ERC20Wrapper: self wrapping and deposit by the wrapper itself are now explicitly forbidden. (#4100)
ECDSA: optimize bytes32 computation by using assembly instead of abi.encodePacked. (#3853)
ERC721URIStorage: Emit ERC-4906 MetadataUpdate in _setTokenURI. (#4012)
ShortStrings: Added a library for handling short strings in a gas efficient way, with fallback to storage for longer strings. (#4023)
SignatureChecker: Allow return data length greater than 32 from EIP-1271 signers. (#4038)
UUPSUpgradeable: added granular oz-upgrades-unsafe-allow-reachable annotation to improve upgrade safety checks on latest version of the Upgrades Plugins (starting with @openzeppelin/upgrades-core@1.21.0). (#3971)
Initializable: optimize _disableInitializers by using != instead of <. (#3787)
Ownable2Step: make acceptOwnership public virtual to enable usecases that require overriding it. (#3960)
UUPSUpgradeable.sol: Change visibility to the functions upgradeTo and upgradeToAndCall from external to public. (#3959)
TimelockController: Add the CallSalt event to emit on operation schedule. (#4001)
Reformatted codebase with latest version of Prettier Solidity. (#3898)
ECDSA: Add a function toDataWithIntendedValidatorHash that encodes data with version 0x00 following EIP-191. (#4063)
MerkleProof: optimize by using unchecked arithmetic. (#3745)
Breaking changes
EIP712: Addition of ERC5267 support requires support for user defined value types, which was released in Solidity version 0.8.8. This requires a pragma change from ^0.8.0 to ^0.8.8.
EIP712: Optimization of the cache for the upgradeable version affects the way name and version are set. This is no longer done through an initializer, and is instead part of the implementation's constructor. As a consequence, all proxies using the same implementation will necessarily share the same name and version. Additionally, an implementation upgrade risks changing the EIP712 domain unless the same name and version are used when deploying the new implementation contract.
Deprecations
ERC20Permit: Added the file IERC20Permit.sol and ERC20Permit.sol and deprecated draft-IERC20Permit.sol and draft-ERC20Permit.sol since EIP-2612 is no longer a Draft. Developers are encouraged to update their imports. (#3793)
Timers: The Timers library is now deprecated and will be removed in the next major release. (#4062)
ERC777: The ERC777 token standard is no longer supported by OpenZeppelin. Our implementation is now deprecated and will be removed in the next major release. The corresponding standard interfaces remain available. (#4066)
ERC1820Implementer: The ERC1820 pseudo-introspection mechanism is no longer supported by OpenZeppelin. Our implementation is now deprecated and will be removed in the next major release. The corresponding standard interfaces remain available. (#4066)
ERC721Consecutive: Fixed a bug when _mintConsecutive is used for batches of size 1 that could lead to balance overflow. Refer to the breaking changes section in the changelog for a note on the behavior of ERC721._beforeTokenTransfer.
Breaking changes
ERC721: The internal function _beforeTokenTransfer no longer updates balances, which it previously did when batchSize was greater than 1. This change has no consequence unless a custom ERC721 extension is explicitly invoking _beforeTokenTransfer. Balance updates in extensions must now be done explicitly using __unsafe_increaseBalance, with a name that indicates that there is an invariant that has to be manually verified.
Create2: optimize address computation by using assembly instead of abi.encodePacked. (#3600)
Clones: optimized the assembly to use only the scratch space during deployments, and optimized predictDeterministicAddress to use fewer operations. (#3640)
Checkpoints: Use procedural generation to support multiple key/value lengths. (#3589)
Arbitrum: Update the vendored arbitrum contracts to match the nitro upgrade. (#3692)
Breaking changes
ERC721: In order to add support for batch minting via ERC721Consecutive it was necessary to make a minor breaking change in the internal interface of ERC721. Namely, the hooks _beforeTokenTransfer and _afterTokenTransfer have one additional argument that may need to be added to overrides:
function _beforeTokenTransfer(
address from,
address to,
uint256 tokenId,
+ uint256 batchSize
) internal virtual override
ERC4626: Conversion from shares to assets (and vice-versa) in an empty vault used to consider the possible mismatch between the underlying asset's and the vault's decimals. This initial conversion rate is now set to 1-to-1 irrespective of decimals, which are meant for usability purposes only. The vault now uses the assets decimals by default, so off-chain the numbers should appear the same. Developers overriding the vault decimals to a value that does not match the underlying asset may want to override the _initialConvertToShares and _initialConvertToAssets to replicate the previous behavior.
TimelockController: During deployment, the TimelockController used to grant the TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE to the deployer and to the timelock itself. The deployer was then expected to renounce this role once configuration of the timelock is over. Failing to renounce that role allows the deployer to change the timelock permissions (but not to bypass the delay for any time-locked actions). The role is no longer given to the deployer by default. A new parameter admin can be set to a non-zero address to grant the admin role during construction (to the deployer or any other address). Just like previously, this admin role should be renounced after configuration. If this param is given address(0), the role is not allocated and doesn't need to be revoked. In any case, the timelock itself continues to have this role.
Deprecations
EIP712: Added the file EIP712.sol and deprecated draft-EIP712.sol since the EIP is no longer a Draft. Developers are encouraged to update their imports. (#3621)
ERC721Votes: Added the file ERC721Votes.sol and deprecated draft-ERC721Votes.sol since it no longer depends on a Draft EIP (EIP-712). Developers are encouraged to update their imports. (#3699)
ERC-721 integrators that interpret contract state from events should make sure that they implement the clearing of approval that is implicit in every transfer according to the EIP. Previous versions of OpenZeppelin Contracts emitted an explicit Approval event even though it was not required by the specification, and this is no longer the case.
With the new ERC721Consecutive extension, the internal workings of ERC721 are slightly changed. Custom extensions to ERC721 should be reviewed to ensure they remain correct. The internal functions that should be considered are _ownerOf (new), _beforeTokenTransfer, and _afterTokenTransfer.
ECDSA: recover(bytes32,bytes) and tryRecover(bytes32,bytes) no longer accept compact signatures to prevent malleability. Compact signature support remains available using recover(bytes32,bytes32,bytes32) and tryRecover(bytes32,bytes32,bytes32).
⚠️ This is a patch for three issues, including a high severity issue in GovernorVotesQuorumFraction. For more information visit the security advisories (1, 2, 3).
GovernorVotesQuorumFraction: Fixed quorum updates so they do not affect past proposals that failed due to lack of quorum. (#3561)
ERC165Checker: Added protection against large returndata. (#3587)
LibArbitrumL2, CrossChainEnabledArbitrumL2: Fixed detection of cross-chain calls for EOAs. Previously, calls from EOAs would be classified as cross-chain calls. (#3578)
⚠️ This is a patch for a medium severity issue affecting SignatureChecker and a high severity issue affecting ERC165Checker. For more information visit the security advisories (1, 2).
SignatureChecker: Fix an issue that causes isValidSignatureNow to revert when the target contract returns ill-encoded data. (#3552)
ERC165Checker: Fix an issue that causes supportsInterface to revert when the target contract returns ill-encoded data. (#3552)
ERC4626: add an extension of ERC20 that implements the ERC4626 Tokenized Vault Standard. (#3171)
SafeERC20: add safePermit as mitigation against phantom permit functions. (#3280)
Math: add a mulDiv function that can round the result either up or down. (#3171)
Math: Add a sqrt function to compute square roots of integers, rounding either up or down. (#3242)
Strings: add a new overloaded function toHexString that converts an address with fixed length of 20 bytes to its not checksummed ASCII string hexadecimal representation. (#3403)
EnumerableMap: add new UintToUintMap map type. (#3338)
EnumerableMap: add new Bytes32ToUintMap map type. (#3416)
SafeCast: add support for many more types, using procedural code generation. (#3245)
MerkleProof: add multiProofVerify to prove multiple values are part of a Merkle tree. (#3276)
MerkleProof: add calldata versions of the functions to avoid copying input arrays to memory and save gas. (#3200)
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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨
This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!
Here is everything you need to know about this update. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.
What changed?
✳️ @openzeppelin/contracts (4.6.0 → 4.9.3) · Repo · Changelog
Security Advisories 🚨
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts vulnerable to Improper Escaping of Output
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts using MerkleProof multiproofs may allow proving arbitrary leaves for specific trees
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts's governor proposal creation may be blocked by frontrunning
🚨 GovernorCompatibilityBravo may trim proposal calldata
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts TransparentUpgradeableProxy clashing selector calls may not be delegated
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts contains Incorrect Calculation
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts vulnerable to ECDSA signature malleability
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts's GovernorVotesQuorumFraction updates to quorum may affect past defeated proposals
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts ERC165Checker unbounded gas consumption
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts's Cross chain utilities for Arbitrum L2 see EOA calls as cross chain calls
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts's SignatureChecker may revert on invalid EIP-1271 signers
🚨 OpenZeppelin Contracts's ERC165Checker may revert instead of returning false
Release Notes
4.9.3
4.9.2
4.9.1
4.9.0
4.8.3
4.8.2
4.8.1
4.8.0
4.7.3
4.7.2
4.7.1
4.7.0
Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.
Commits
See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.
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