Open abrahamjuliot opened 4 years ago
Sweet. This is perfect.
https://github.com/plaperdr/fingerprinting-in-style
Wow, this is very interesting. I'm looking forward to the paper and talk. This subject has been on my mind.
are you ready for some priming and probing 👽 ?
why is prototype lies here as well: it's out of date with out improvements
I've been collecting function concepts here (prototype lies being one), but I'm behind on updating these. Webgl, Emojis, and webRTC have a list of improvements. I to plan give this more focus soon.
title: Estimation of the time for calculating the attributes of browser fingerprints in the user authentication task of cultural learnings of browser for make benefit glorious track of kazakhstan some url: https://search.proquest.com/openview/86f7e90c68787855a85391876d850056/ pdf: link top right
edit: a more official URL: https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/abs/2020/84/e3sconf_TPACEE2020_01030/e3sconf_TPACEE2020_01030.html pdf: ^^ the full E3S Web Conf Vol 224 PDF is linked top right
50ms? But I do agree that webgl is time hogs. Compared to webgl, canvas is a saint
title: Who Touched My Browser Fingerprint?: A Large-scale Measurement Study and Classification of Fingerprint Dynamics url: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3419394.3423614 pdf: https://yinzhicao.org/fpmeasurement/imc20.pdf
That's this Song Li - > https://github.com/Song-Li/cross_browser
For example, we find that a certain emoji update at a mobile Chrome browser can reveal the fact that a Samsung browser is co-installed with the Chrome browser because the Samsung update introduces a new emoji. Similarly,for another example, the font list and the changes of fonts in fingerprint dynamics can be used to infer whether Microsoft Office is installed or even updated
This is already known: see MS bundled fonts in 1670199 . As for emoji's, I think any entropy from them is rather limited that fonts themselves don't already give from equivalency: but sure, there may be something extra there
For example, we have observed that the sample rate of audio card in Chrome may change together with the GPU renderer. The reason is that although some features are not directly related, the causes behind the changes may be. Specifically, in the aforementioned example, Chrome adopts DirectX to manage audio card on certain Windows machines: An update of DirectX will influence both the GPU renderer and the audio sample rate
Yikes. My understanding was that audio entropy (at least in FF) only comes from floating points. I might have to follow up on this
wow, table one just shows what a f__king mess the user agent devolved into
interesting static values' distinct groups
115k
41k
.. seriously, the web needs to get it's shit together16k
(and 14k unique .. wow) <-- really? must be a chromium thing14k
<- so additional/fallback languages here is quite painful14k
5.7k
5k
2k
1.2k
114
<-- I knew audio entropy was low (23 of those were unique)interesting - @pes10k : randomizing additional languages should be ASAP :) I know you have an issue for it
BrFAST: a Tool to Select Browser Fingerprinting Attributes for Web Authentication According to a Usability-Security Trade-off
Why can't they use the word "equivalency" (edit: where appropriate) . It is true that for example language and timezone can be largely correlated, but many languages share timezones, and many timezones can be used across one language (e.g. en-US has dozens, russian has seven timezones I think), and I wouldn't call these expensive to query
edit: @ViRPo Hey Peter, we meet again .. your diploma thesis was cited in the above research
title: fantistic timers and where to find them link: https://gruss.cc/files/fantastictimers.pdf
this is better than that 19.2mb pdf (you know the one I mean) which is not publicly available anyway
some light reading
also this which is somewhat interesting
For each row, the column identifies the conditional probability of the feature of the column given the feature of the row. The probability is interpreted as a gradient between yellow (0% probability) and red (100% probability)
that can successfully spoof a wide variety of fingerprinting features to mimic many different browsers including mobile browsers and the tor browser
Just run Tor Browser, with the right language on the applicable OS (VM), resize the window if needed - and only spoof edge case data if really needed. Seriously, it's not hard to make Tor Browser look like Tor Browser (plus you would want to be using a Tor exit node)
What? 5 days already and no love for the Gummy Browser .. I am bitterly disapppointed
title: Online Website Fingerprinting: Evaluating Website Fingerprinting Attacks on Tor in the Real World link: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/cherubin pdf: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec22summer_cherubin.pdf
PS: I've met Rob Jansen .. cool guy :)
"Gummy browsers" seems to be bringing nothing unobvious and novel.
The website fingerprinting paper is quite good.
I know it is pretty old, but it surely belongs here: https://research.google.com/pubs/archive/45581.pdf (and there are some impls on gh)
While it is designed to fingerprint not unique device, but device class, it may be possible to invent something to combat it.
Their scheme relies on the fact that users they consider as "attackers" are outnumbered by the ones giving their real fingerprints to the service. They give the same challenge to multiple users to collect statistics. That's why response sharing is possible. If one device gets a challenge, it is likely other ones will get the same soon. The fingerprinting party doesn't know the real response for a challenge (given that everything else is perfectly spoofed), it has to just check if it is present in its DB.
I think about a cryptocurrency of authentic devices sharing challenge-environment-fingerprint tuples and generating fingerprints for each other, the software to be implemented in browsers wanting to be privacy preserving. To get a new nonce data for another device a user must share one for own device. Though I am not yet sure how to make the devices behave honestly in fully decentralised setting. Also to protect privacy of users a threshold scheme is needed, so to prevent the network to know details on unique combinations.
The devil is that they may have supplied (and likely do it in recaptcha in a form of bytecode) a brand new code for each measurement. I mean not entirely brand new, but enough brand new to make it very hard to automatically reverse engineer it.
^ Ahh the picasso paper 👍 I never bothered to collect that one
Title: DRAWN APART: A Device Identification Technique based on Remote GPU Fingerprinting PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2201.09956.pdf Article: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researchers-use-gpu-fingerprinting-to-track-users-online/
https://blog.amiunique.org/an-explicative-article-on-drawnapart-a-gpu-fingerprinting-technique/
title: FP-Radar: Longitudinal Measurement and Early Detection of Browser Fingerprinting authors: Pouneh Nikkhah Bahrami, Umar Iqbal, Zubair Shafiq date: 14 Dec 2021 link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.01662 pdf: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2112.01662
title: Hacky Racers: Exploiting Instruction-Level Parallelism to Generate Stealthy Fine-Grained Timers authors: Haocheng Xiao, Sam Ainsworth date: 26 Nov 2022 link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.14647 PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2211.14647
not to be added, just FYI - https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/23/6/3087 - shame the code is old [1] and TZP isn't ready yet - there are plans afoot at tor project, and I've been beavering away at a new local version for a while now - 30% smaller, 30% faster, better type checking/lies, more metrics collected, all data (inclusive, i.e not just a hash but the underlying data) in objects, softer colors, smaller widths, less noise ... etc
edit: [1] also the code relies on always being able to correctly detect some global vars, such as os, version - and without maintenance it "breaks" things - it still gives a FP and is consistent but it reduces what is collected, e.g. user agent is always untrustworthy (because the version detection is out of date), or OS detection breaks in TB (due to system font patches)
title: Automatic Discovery of Emerging Browser Fingerprinting Techniques authors: Junhua Su, Alexandros Kapravelos date: ACM Web Conference 2023 pdf: https://www.kapravelos.com/publications/fptechniques-www23.pdf
interesting: https://github.com/wspr-ncsu/BrowserFingerprintingAD/blob/main/APIs and Code Snippet.md
I'm honestly struggling to see what is new in any of the 18 APIs they identified - may be they're new to being detected in scripts in the wild, but not new to FPing researchers and PoCs
https://github.com/cispa/browser-cpu-fingerprinting
Also I guess support of AVX in CPU (given that CPU is x86_64 and WASM is enabled) can be detected by trying to load WASM code using SIMD. If it is supported, it loads. If it is not, it errors. See https://github.com/mozilla/firefox-translations/issues/370
title: Fashion Faux Pas: Implicit Stylistic Fingerprints for Bypassing Browsers' Anti-Fingerprinting Defenses authors: Xu Lin, Frederico Araujo, Teryl Taylor, Jiyong Jang, Jason Polakis date: 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) link: https://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings-article/sp/2023/933600b640/1Js0Ecrxjzi pfd: https://www.computer.org/csdl/pds/api/csdl/proceedings/download-article/1Js0Ecrxjzi/pdf
i don't want to mess up your readme (plus this alerts you to add it to your collection): so when ever I post in here, that's your cue to DL and write up
Learning-based Practical Smartphone Eavesdropping with Built-in Accelerometer PDF: https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/24076-paper.pdf
It's a side-channel attack to record audio