If proper names are indeed descriptions in disguise, then they ought to behave like descriptions in all logical contexts--including the context of modal logic. But, as Marcus observed, they simply don't. The statement "Aristotle is Aristotle," for example, is necessarily true, whereas "Aristotle is the author of the Metaphysics" is merely contingent, since it is possible to imagine circumstances in which the historical Aristotle became, say, a swineherd instead of a philosopher.
It seems to me that since I started out thinking about Path Semantics using the Old Theory of Reference, that quality is biased toward that idea, and aquality might be thought of as the dual theory of reference.
http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/Archive/whose.html
It seems to me that since I started out thinking about Path Semantics using the Old Theory of Reference, that quality is biased toward that idea, and aquality might be thought of as the dual theory of reference.