Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and
clients.
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.gradle/caches/modules-2/files-2.1/io.netty/netty-codec-http2/4.1.27.Final/3769790a2033667d663f9a526d5b63cfecdbdf4e/netty-codec-http2-4.1.27.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for
rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and
clients.
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.gradle/caches/modules-2/files-2.1/io.netty/netty-codec-http/4.1.27.Final/a1722d6bcbbef1c4c7877e8bf38b07a3db5ed07f/netty-codec-http-4.1.27.Final.jar
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
CVE-2021-21295 - Medium Severity Vulnerability
netty-codec-http2-4.1.27.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients.
Library home page: http://netty.io/
Path to dependency file: /build.gradle
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.gradle/caches/modules-2/files-2.1/io.netty/netty-codec-http2/4.1.27.Final/3769790a2033667d663f9a526d5b63cfecdbdf4e/netty-codec-http2-4.1.27.Final.jar
Dependency Hierarchy: - grpc-netty-1.14.0.jar (Root Library) - :x: **netty-codec-http2-4.1.27.Final.jar** (Vulnerable Library)
netty-codec-http-4.1.27.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients.
Library home page: http://netty.io/
Path to dependency file: /build.gradle
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.gradle/caches/modules-2/files-2.1/io.netty/netty-codec-http/4.1.27.Final/a1722d6bcbbef1c4c7877e8bf38b07a3db5ed07f/netty-codec-http-4.1.27.Final.jar
Dependency Hierarchy: - grpc-netty-1.14.0.jar (Root Library) - netty-codec-http2-4.1.27.Final.jar - :x: **netty-codec-http-4.1.27.Final.jar** (Vulnerable Library)
Found in HEAD commit: 722089816e5192b667c19cb836256ef6da8be1ac
Found in base branch: master
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
Publish Date: 2021-03-09
URL: CVE-2021-21295
Base Score Metrics: - Exploitability Metrics: - Attack Vector: Network - Attack Complexity: High - Privileges Required: None - User Interaction: None - Scope: Unchanged - Impact Metrics: - Confidentiality Impact: None - Integrity Impact: High - Availability Impact: None
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.Type: Upgrade version
Origin: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj
Release Date: 2021-03-09
Fix Resolution (io.netty:netty-codec-http2): 4.1.60.Final
Direct dependency fix Resolution (io.grpc:grpc-netty): 1.39.0
Fix Resolution (io.netty:netty-codec-http): 4.1.60.Final
Direct dependency fix Resolution (io.grpc:grpc-netty): 1.39.0
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