ATOM vs ATOM1 integration & genesis distribution

[jaekwon]

I have been arguing that it is necessary for ATOM1 to make slashing in order to ensure an improvement in the distribution set's intelligence in making security decisions.

Proponents of no-slashing forks argue that there should be no mutation of the distribution set, and that token holders will naturally sell their ATOM1 and buy ATOM (and vice versa) depending on their interest. The problem with this argument is that this doesn't hold in the security model that we should be building for -- one where a decentralized adversary with a much larger power base & treasury than the market cap of ATOM1 itself.

While this might seem like a remote possibility, the reader has to understand that in all likelihood JPMorgan did sink the Titanic with the intent to kill some of those onboard such as Strauss (who was the head and treasurer of a public advisory watchdog group which tasked itself with overseeing the development of what became the "Federal" Reserve), that the US Constitution never gave the "Federal" Reserve the power it wields today, that it came from meetings behind closed doors from Jekyll Island and has over the past decades the dollar has stripped the populace from its wealth by control from what is in actuality a private corporation that created the present day situation wherein the dollar will soon hyper-inflate due to the collapse of the dollar hegemony and petrodollar empire. This is just one example of how determined an adversary can be in the power-game of finance. And any intelligent global adversary will keep its enemies closer, and hold ownership of something that poses a threat. Ergo these adversaries will not sell their $ATOM1 for $ATOM, or certainly not at the rate that we expect them to. They would instead naturally accumulate $ATOM1 if it is a viable threat to the status quo, and use these $ATOM1 tokens in the most harmful way possible--to vote again to turn $ATOM1 into money, and thereby dilute the intelligence of the chain, or something just as damaging.

(this is where many people get frustrated, claiming that these are just nutty conspiracy theories without any refutation; but what are they even doing in crypto if they don't agree with why Satoshi made Bitcoin, as memorialized in the first Bitcoin transaction as a link to a news article about the damning insecurity of our financial system? they are naive capitalists with no frame of reference Donny, and we don't write for them, we write for the initiated with ears to hear.)

The real problem is that there is nothing at stake in an airdrop, and tokens given without anything at stake, with nothing earned, makes for a poorer distribution than the alternative. This creates an unnecessary selling pressure if there is a market, and if there isn't a market it would remain and fester in governance.

Furthermore giving a 1:1 no-slashing airdrop fails to exercise the function of slashing and creates precedent for lack of accountability. We WILL see governance voting used maliciously against the will of the rational and/or principled minority, and we WILL see those who are opposed to the autonomy of a minority exert their airdropped voting power not to sell but to suppress innovation of competition, because it is possible to do so (or in the very least it is an evolutionary cat and mouse game). It is trivial to concoct fork suppression strategies that incentivize say $ATOM1 holders to keep their tokens and to use it for harm. The question is not whether these meta-strategies matter and whether they will be deployed, but when, and so the pertinent question for us from first principles is how we can ensure that we can survive despite it. Some (or "They" since they are other) will always frame it as this or that and chide us for splitting (while slashing YES voters), but splitting is NEEDED as an existential matter and so we must exercise this power and ensure that this option remains open for future generations and not closed for a while by public sentiment manipulation as it is happening now.

On the other hand if there is some skin in the game to get say $ATOM1 from $ATOM after genesis, then this can improve the distribution and creates by fiat an (initial or ongoing) integration, and can prevent a mass selloff of the original staking token which isn't at this time beneficial to anyone. This can be accomplished by a variety of means as a second stage to come after genesis, where genesis is an opinionated post-slash distribution, but any $ATOM holder can still participate and acquire $ATOM1 as long as they are willing to put up the skin so to speak. And this ensures that there more cost to the sufficiently capitalized adversary. We could allow some ATOM to bid for ATOM1 up to a limit. If we 100% slash YES voters for ATOM1 then letting ATOM bid for half of ATOM1 seems pretty reasonable. This way if you voted YES you will get slashed on genesis but if you participate with everyone else on the post-genesis mechanism (whatever that is) then in the end you would end up with about half as much as someone who voted NO (roughly speaking).

There are many ways to implement this second $ATOM1 acquisition mechanism from $ATOM. The best approach would maybe incentivize the early $ATOM->$ATOM1 acquirers a slight incentive over those who come later, but not in such a way that there is egregious favoritism for early participants. More like how Ethereum did their fundraiser, less like a typical bonding curve.

Will this be enough to appease the masses and ensure harmoney rather than discord, while also ensuring a higher cost to a global adversary? We can't know unless we try. We know that some people will always be unhappy, and we know that some shills will be hired to promote discord. We ourselves will have to deal with the need to advertise our hub as more secure than the alternatives and the discord that comes from that, but also we should be comfortable with competition dynamics.

Arguably what matters is the degree of slashing for genesis and the degree of integration for the post-genesis mechanism (if any). Whatever it ends up being, as long as there is substantial penalty to those who voted YES for a proposal that should not have passed (by the nature and spirit of OUR real unwritten constitution) for genesis and real skin in the game and limitations for the secondary mechanism, the narrative is secure; and we will be better set up for the next round of splitting where the slashing can be more or less and other parameters tweaked.

[AloisLIEN-SetC]

Another view is not to slash YES voters at all, but to award a bonus to NO voters and NWV voters so that the latter - all of us - have more weight in governance from the start.

It's a question of perspective. We do not begin the story of ATOM1 with a penalty for people who think via the brains of influencers but with a bonus for those who value their sovereignty. We remain with a view of positivity.

[jaekwon]

Yes this makes sense too. Psychologically people are more accepting of an "incentive" even if it is merely phrased as one and in actuality is no different than punishment.

It doesn't work in some contexts, such as an individual validator's slashing. It would be ludicrous to consider an individual slashing an "incentive", as if we are but cannibals eager to eat each other up (may the most hungry win!), even if it is an incentive in a slight way.

But when it comes to a mass slashing like this where the outcome is about 50:50 I don't see why we cannot simply phrase it as an incentive, and give more to those who voted NO. So sure, let's go with that.

If you give 2x the ATOMs for NO voters (where say 50% voted NO) and leave everyone else the same, then you end up with 150% of the original number of ATOMs, and this ultimately is the same as a 33% reward for NO voters and a 33% penalty for YES voters (if we keep the number of token the same).

If you give 3x the ATOMs for NO voters, you end up with 200% of the original number of ATOMs, and this ultimately is the same as a 50% reward for NO voters and a 50% penalty for YES voters.

These kinds of adjustments would be sufficient, and we wouldn't necessarily need a separate secondary mechanism to acquire $ATOM from $ATOM1, but nobody really benefits from a sudden collapse of $ATOM and we aren't there yet where selling all of our $ATOM is the "right thing" to do. It makes sense to support the secondary mechanisms (such as $ATOM bidding for $ATOM1 and/or the $phATOM and $phATOM1 merge potential) in order to ease the transition from one world order to the next. But the support of a secondary mechanism must be limited and balanced against the need to slash YES voters for genesis.

How much SHOULD stakers be punished for voting something that is clearly insecure according to the AtomOne community? How much should they be forgiven? Relatively slashed enough to drastically improve governance intelligence and alignment. 100% is an option from first principles. Anything less is a kind of forgiveness, and we can certainly experiment with forgiveness, but we should feel less bound if the experiment fails and we need to make another fork. A third fork for the same purpose as AtomOne would be seen as too many attempts with failures (twice) and should be avoided if at all possible, so this points toward a higher penalty for voting YES. And we should also consider how good of an indicator #848 is, whether it is confusing even for aligned members. But it isn't confusing, as clearly the proponents are in favor of not just "halvening" but making $ATOM a monetary token, and indeed this has been the agenda of ATOM2.0 since the beginning, even as coauthored by an FC member of the ICF who has a keen interest in turning $ATOM into money. I don't see any valid responses to the security concerns around this goal at all. Whatever experiment we create, we should raise the bar and certain that this won't happen again for a long duration of time until another split/fork must necessarily be created due to inevitable generational redistribution of wealth.

[giunatale]

I think finding true alignment is not just a matter of looking at voters of proposal 848. We had other governance proposals that could be used to refine the filtering, prop 69 and prop 82 for example. Future ATOM1 distribution should be weighted on how you voted on all those IMHO. But yes, slashing initially should be done or the risk you mentioned can possibly materialize. I am possibly even advocating for more aggressive slashing here that slashes even prop 848 no-voters that e.g. voted yes on prop 82. My guess is it could allow to identify with more confidence people that would support the vision.

I am also personally mostly in favor of some post-genesis acquisition method. I am a bit afraid though of the prospect of attracting the same crypto "degens" that made 848 pass on the Hub in the first place. But I guess this is a risk that will always be there. Maybe some incentive to bring ATOM over to get phATOM? this also in order to bootstrap governance power for the partyhub. You might get some phATOM1 too so without governance voting power? I don't know maybe I am talking silly.

[jaekwon]

Thank you for your feedback. This feedback is good, we can do surveys but we do need validation for this to work. I agree with 82. Maybe we make it 848 and 82 as pure proposals, 69 was "biased".

phATOM* anything phat silly.

[jaekwon]

Besides framing all of this in terms of rewards rather than slashing, which I think is great overall because (a) it legitimately is arguably an incentive because the vote is split and (b) it prevents the worst discord between the splits because one side is completely removed; there is still the question of how much reward an ABSTAIN/NO-voter should get, and it seems that the answer should depend on the actual ratio of YES:NO+NWV and no-voters can inherit the blend of rewards (and this is "complete" in the sense of accountability by some measure); and if we wanted to we could maybe add a slight did-not-vote penalty on top.

My point is that ABSTAIN/no-vote does have a good base model for how to calculate genesis distribution.

[AloisLIEN-SetC]

And imo, to be totally fair, we should distinguish those who forgot to vote the prop 848 from those who never vote because they don't care (looking for example at props 69 and 82).

[jaekwon]

Never-voters: if they never voted, well, did they delegate to a validator? Then that should be sufficient if for example they fully trust the validator, or are trying to support that validator. If they as a validator did not vote, then... yeah if a validator never voted... but what about new validators that recently joined? and for unstaked ATOMs that cannot vote, can't they be protected as a class since they are already being punished through inflation?

Regarding 848/82 non-voters: Some people need to unstake momentarily just to redelegate a third time, or for other reasons, like to move to another address. Some amount seems reasonable, like maybe 1~5% penalty seems reasonable. Minor penalty, anyone could be subject to this. And if this is too high then we will just be incentivizing everyone to vote automatically. That would be worse, to support zombie voters.

[0xFDg]

For me the best idea is to consider the participation ratio, i.e. if the chain is protected with 2/3 of the tokens in staking, we can airdrop 2/3 +5% to those who voted NO to Prop 848 and 1/3 -5% to those who voted yes. This way if ATOM1 reaches the safe threshold it will be that at least ALL people who voted "no" agree with airdrop and it will be a huge signal of strength. The best and great result for the new ATOM1! On the contrary, it is the risks of work, all or nothing, but if it works, it will be magnificent

[0xFDg]

Another Idea is to constrain who vetod YES to prop 848 to claim directly phATOM1, the only interest in persone against ATOM1 is to sell the fork, in this way will sell only the LSK token without damage the chain !

[Antimodez]

A little backatory to explain my vote- my first foray into crypto was through a friend who turned me on to luna. From there I expanded into the cosmos and chains beyond the eco. I was a nuclear engineer for a good chunk and later earned my doctorate in another field in which I toil away with love for my work. I represent the competent layman- learning in this industry while running large teams out in the regular world.

Even as a layman, I knew what I was voting on. The purpose of staking is to secure the chain, and the inflation acts as a reward to compensate stakers. With atoms inflation it specifically punishes non-stakers to encourage staking.

This is easy to understand if you're any steps past a beginning retail buyer.

There is fear of the precedent it sets by punishing those who voted yes. I can see this, and atom governance, going this way.

That being said, the first priority is to ensure the successful launch, as Jae said, another fork after would cast a large shadow.

I feel there should be a priority to no/nwv. I believe there should be a slash penalty for yes as outlined. Vesting options as well. I like the ideas for various snapshots within the vote, as there was much movement to no when the whiff of an airdrop occurred. The current solution is simple enough (always apply Occam's Razor) that it will be able to be explained. The rationale needs to be tight for this to be palpable.

[giunatale]

For me the best idea is to consider the participation ratio, i.e. if the chain is protected with 2/3 of the tokens in staking, we can airdrop 2/3 +5% to those who voted NO to Prop 848 and 1/3 -5% to those who voted yes.

@diegocreta In my mind this is not as simple. distributing ATOM1 like that doesn't guarantee in some sense that governance (which is not strictly related to block production which is where the 2/3 target staking ratio matters) will be aligned. But maybe completely slashing to 0 no voters might be too harsh? yet I agree with the initial post from jae where he states that from first principles, slashing them to 0 is the safest and most logical approach.

Another Idea is to constrain who vetod YES to prop 848 to claim directly phATOM1, the only interest in persone against ATOM1 is to sell the fork, in this way will sell only the LSK token without damage the chain !

I am not entirely against doing something like that. In general, since phATOM1 -> ATOM1 conversion would be somewhat rate-limited (i.e. you can't convert phATOM1 to ATOM1 like a regular unbonding), at least it would limit impact on governance since phATOM1 would have no governance rights (and it would require time to convert all of them back to ATOM1, stake them and get governance rights).

I feel there should be a priority to no/nwv. I believe there should be a slash penalty for yes as outlined. Vesting options as well. I like the ideas for various snapshots within the vote, as there was much movement to no when the whiff of an airdrop occurred. The current solution is simple enough (always apply Occam's Razor) that it will be able to be explained. The rationale needs to be tight for this to be palpable.

@Antimodez appreciate your opinion, "competent layman" is kinda funny. Yes it should have been pretty easy to undestand for anyone in this industry that is past the "beginning stages". But it's also true some people are blinded by greed and "less supply means numba go up cause less selling pressure" also was a pretty easy to understand (but flawed) message, and an enticing narrative for the more naive retail user. Anyway, wanted to comment something more specific about your quoted text above. If we want to "keep it simple" doing multiple snapshots during the voting period is kinda not doing that. I understand your frustration regarding airdrop chasers, but at the same time we can't assume everyone that switched did it for that. I think just one snapshot at the end of the voting period is sufficient. Airdrop won't be perfect, it's impossible. We just need to do our best to build a governance community that is as much aligned as possible to the vision.

[jaekwon]

At the risk of getting people upset because of uncertainty, I'll stake an initial try at this.

1. Everything is phrase as a reward. This keeps it positive (and since the YES/NO was split around the middle, it is not just sugar coating it is legitimate) and also ensures that wrong-voters get at least some modicum of stake by default. And this type of learning-encouraging-forgiveness seems good especially in these early days.
2. You inherit your delegatee/validator's vote with no penalty.
3. If you voted YES, you get no reward, but you get the same amount of $ATOM1 as $ATOM.
4. If you voted NO, you get a 2x reward, so $ATOM1 == $ATOM x3.
5. If you voted NWV, you get the same as NO, but 5% more, or 10% if the NWV did succeed in veto.
6. If you voted ABSTAIN, or you did not vote, or you were not staked, in all of these cases you get the blend of YES/NO of those who did vote, so if everyone else voted NO then you get the NO reward; but with 10% penalty for not voting on something important.
7. Only the ICF is slashed.

For #4, with 3x (2x reward) for NO voters, given that Y=73.165M voted YES and N=68.336M voted NO+NWV, the resultant distribution would have voted NO on prop 848 with 73.70% of the voting power, but with 2x (1x reward) for NO voters the resultant distribution would have voted NO with 65.13% of the voting power. Notice that both 73.70% and 65.13% are both under the Constittuional Majority of 90%. In order to reach the Constitutional Majority of 90% we would need the reward to be 9x (very high). So do we make it that high?

Otherwise, how can we possibly hope to achieve a constitutional majority? I mean, we probably will at some time, but it would be better if we could guarantee it somehow... that eventually a constitutional majority can be achieved. Not sure how this can be done without lowering the constitutional majority which I don't recommend.

[COverS8]

Airdrop part from issue #16 brought here from @giunatale suggestion

AIRDROP suggestion

By the mintscan explorer

List of the top 1,000 accounts with the highest holdings of ATOM is between 19.98M-26K Atom

1,634,664 accounts majority holds 0.. to 26,000 Atom

1:1 distribution wouldn't be fair in nowadays anymore because the Cosmos early contributors holds significantly more Atom than the later comers because of the Atom higher price in fiat which prevented acquiring a larger amount of Atom financially. That doesn't mean that the later smaller holders wouldn't be one of the most enthusiastic cosmonauts and would be wrong that their skin in the game would continue to be low with Atom-One hub too like in the Cosmos hub. So I suggest for sub 5,000 Atom stakeholders some kind of multilpliers that the distribution would be more equal and decentralized right from the beginning. Multipliers could consist from e.g. Atom-One contributions, Cosmos hub-4 voting history, Cosmos loyalty; staking duration since Cosmos hub-4 launch etc.

Would be good to have seperate data out based on these 1,634,664 accounts staked lets say top 5 as follow

How many staked Atoms most of these 1,634,664 accounts holds (the avg.)?

Second greatest Atom accounts

3rd .. 4th .. 5th

[boliwar]

Don't you think you're overcomplicating things with these ratios and percentages and stuff? People made a choice by voting. Those who didn’t vote are not interested. Who voted “YES” and take airdrop ATOM1 this let the goat into the garden. They (YESsers) love commercial things and will buy ATOM1.

[COverS8]

The main reason for the fork lies in the past and controversial proposals of the Cosmos hub and other controversies. While the mentioned proposals are among the most disputed, there's other proposals too to consider add to these. Disputes arose because the opposing interests solely focused just on how to make Atom monetary value to pump with whatever desperate artificially ideas or integrating experimental tech into the hub. When the hub minimalism side always consistently prioritized everything the safety first, that anything experimental or making any changes which could endanger the hub, its operations and its users shouldn't be directly integrated into the hub or be done, instead exercising these experiments outside from the hub or on own chain. Despite the disrespect on Atom and its performance in monetary value perspective which is funny from this opposite side as they suppose to be with Cosmos and Atom, Atom thrived in 2021 and they do understand the markets 100% the fact that in 2022 the whole crypto market crashed too which resulted in the meltdown of over 2T in crypto total value. Their deep desperation and desperate unsustainable ideas stems from very long 2022-2023 bear market and nothing else. Another with proposals is community pool abuses and opaque or full lack of in transparency and accountability towards to community. So therefore bad decisions/decision makers should be slashed and good ones rewarded. Airdrop is important for adoption but should be considered well by the fundamentals of hub minimalism , but it should not be only influence for anyone to join AtomOne which is open for everyone and not depending from airdrop. Now is the right time to address all other issues that often caused disappointment in the Cosmos hub and its community. I just want to remind everyone of these fundamental reasons and the fork's idea, good if it sparks the smarter ones. But together will be decided what will be the best for AtomOne

[floridamanfintech]

I tend to agree with excluding those who have shown they are eager and willing to vote in ways we've deemed harmful to the hub. Imagine the founding fathers of the United States giving voting power to citizens of the UK because the US was a "fork" of the UK.

There has been some talk of "alignment" in other threads in here. To ensure maximum alignment, I believe the decision to exclude those not in alignment is good for the cause.

Instead of worrying about appeasing the current sloshy-ness (which can be traced all the way to the titanic, fed reserve, etc. aforementioned) around the Cosmos Hub, a full fledged exclusion for some parties is appropriate. Those that discount the minority opinion as "conspiracy theory" will only be a burden on what is trying to be accomplished.

In addition, we should be looking outward at how to bring those outside of crypto, who may share similar beliefs, into the sphere of an $ATOM1 constellation. Those who understand the scam of central banks and the like, are less likely to find ATOM1 if they have to sift through the grifter garbage patch elements that are the current Cosmos Hub.

How do we bring new participants to crypto or cosmos > appeasing everyone around the hub

[COverS8]

@floridamanfintech Thanks for the feedback

[discoverdefiteam]

Otherwise, how can we possibly hope to achieve a constitutional majority? I mean, we probably will at some time, but it would be better if we could guarantee it somehow... that eventually a constitutional majority can be achieved. Not sure how this can be done without lowering the constitutional majority which I don't recommend.

prop #82 & prop #848, both provide an opportunity to verify the alignment of intentions for Gaia compared to the initial vision of the minimal hub Gaia set out to be.

Data for Prop 82:

• 71.02M voted YES
• 58.71M voted NO + NWV
• For every 1.00 NO + NWV, there was 1.2096746721 YES votes.

  Data for Prop 848:

• 73.165M voted YES.
• 68.336M voted NO + NWV
• For every 1.00 NO + NWV, there was 1.070665535 YES votes.

Gauge Metrics

1. If you voted YES on #848, and YES on #82 , you get additional 50% less $ATOM1 as $ATOM
2. If you voted YES on #848, and ABSTAIN on #82, you get 21% less $ATOM1
3. If you voted ABSTAIN on #848, and YES on #82, you get 21% less $ATOM1.
4. If you voted NO + NWV on#848, and NO + NWV on#82, you get the 92% from results of the other gauges, distributed evenly as $ATOM1

The goal in my example here is to find gauge metrics that:

• further reward aligned participants
• incentivize conviction voting, opposed to zombie voting
• modular to any slashing decision gauge for prop #848

Understanding the dataset if we combined the two props will reveal if this gauge will serve beneficial or harmful to the genesis distribution and alignment.

[boliwar]

There are people who couldn't vote for #82 because there was no wallet at the time. But they voted on item #848. What to do with them?

[COverS8]

Atom was distributed based on early contributions, there never was an airdrop. For this reason, the only option for latecomers has been to buy Atom token with their own funds. This is why I proposed in addition to 1:1 airdrop with criterias that smaller Atom holders would receive a multiplier. The goal would be to distribute "skin in the game" more evenly, which would also incentivize more participation in the governance and voting. The airdrop could be partially locked at the beginning, although there are many opinions with this, some see it as forcing, but from the project perspective vesting is about longer-term commitment.

But in a nutshell, I'm hoping that AtomOne contributors could find some more equal and decentralized solutions for the distribution than e.g. 26,000 Atom stakeholder would get 26,000 Atom1 and let's say 100 Atom stakeholder would get 100 Atom1.

I checked and didn't find any of our explorers so if someone could scrape out the data of staked Atom account balances in some kind of order to see what is the average stakeholdings per accounts https://github.com/QuokkaStake/cosmos-wallets-exporter

[giunatale]

There are people who couldn't vote for #82 because there was no wallet at the time. But they voted on item #848. What to do with them?

We would have to find a methodology to combine the snapshots at the two different times that actually go beyond this issue. Stakers might have exited as well prior to 848 and for most of them their staked ATOMs have either increased or decreased between the two snapshots. So there's some work to do there. Maybe @michaelfrazzy you could help design this?

In general I think something like @discoverdefiteam proposed is a good starting point. Plus I also would like to know what others think about @COverS8 idea because I personally am not against it. Also maybe worth considering following what @jaekwon and initially @AloisLIEN-SetC were proposing, which would be a "bonus" pre-mint for more aligned voting behavior instead of a slash, but I am on the fence on this one. I kinda like the idea of a slash, it delivers a powerful message.

In addition, we should be looking outward at how to bring those outside of crypto, who may share similar beliefs, into the sphere of an $ATOM1 constellation. Those who understand the scam of central banks and the like, are less likely to find ATOM1 if they have to sift through the grifter garbage patch elements that are the current Cosmos Hub.

How do we bring new participants to crypto or cosmos > appeasing everyone around the hub

this is a fair point. Jae was talking about "acquisition methods" for $ATOM post-genesis, maybe something should be thought also to incentivize external participation. But imho this is more for post-genesis as well. I think we want to be inclusive with the airdrop but focus on Cosmos Hub governance. This is an ideology-based split after all, and it involves the Cosmos Hub stakers first and foremost.

[jaekwon]

The goal would be to distribute "skin in the game" more evenly

I can't agree with this because it just incentivizes people who split their wallets using programs. Everything has to be pro-rata linear, no curves, with rewards and/or punishments, and possibly premines. The rewards, punishments, premines make it not a perfect "fork", but it does make it an "air-drop" I believe, but for our purposes because it is about alignment of vision I am going to call this a "split".

I'm going to update my definition of split though. Before it said:

• Split: a fork including the original (if it survives) that preserves the overall invariant that any specific token or member that goes to one fork does not appear in any other.

Here is the new proposed definition.

• Split: an air-drop of a chain that modifies the distribution based on staker voting activity in both consensus and governance through their cryptographic signatures as well as any other criteria based on a well defined and prominent self-reinforcing constitution.

[MichaelFrazzy]

@giunatale @jaekwon more than happy to take a stab at how we could linearly weight between multiple proposals. A couple ideas come to mind (super basic starting examples), in order from lowest to highest airdrop multiplier:

• 2 Yes
• 1 Yes, 1 Abstain
• 1 Yes, 1 No
• 1 Yes, 1 No with Veto
• 2 Abstain

Etc in this way up until 2 No with Vetos as the highest multiplier. We could even make it a perfectly linear scale like Jae mentioned.

With 2 proposals it'd get a little messier due to all the combos between them needing defined, but we could just assign an airdrop multiplier to each combo. Similar to Gnoland but assigning a greater variety of multipliers to the greater variety of vote options.

The other more straight forward option is we set a multiplier to each option per vote, then those 2 multipliers sum for the final multiplier. Basically the same idea just viewed a little differently.

Example: a No With Veto vote is worth 1.0 per proposal, so if someone voted No with Veto both times that'd be 1.0 + 1.0 = 2.0. So they'd get 2x their snapshotted ATOM value during the airdrop. Or yes would be 0 or maybe 0.1, so if someone voted yes twice they'd get 0 or maybe x0.2 their snapshotted ATOM.

We could always create an actual equation/algorithm of some kind if a simpler idea like these 2 doesn't end up covering everything. But maybe we don't even need to get much more complex.

[tintin2828]

Those who voted no with veto or no in the last proposal which qualified for GNO land to be considered and those who did not vote this proposal and got overwritten by a validator yes vote should also be considered as not all had visibility on Jae's messaging for this time.

[giunatale]

@tintin2828 as I've replied in the issue you've opened

due to how governance work it's a duty of stakers to override their validator's vote if it does not align, or re-delegate accordingly. You inherit your validator vote otherwise. This is the social contract of current cosmos governance. We can't alter this assumption when coming up with the distribution.

and regarding proposal 69 and gno.land, you can see from the discussion above we are agreeing we should consider only prop 82 and 848.

@MichaelFrazzy I kind of like the idea from @discoverdefiteam where you redistribute the amount you slash from yes-voters to others, and this way you can pretty much do this mirroring more or less the current ATOM supply.

The other more straight forward option is we set a multiplier to each option per vote, then those 2 multipliers sum for the final multiplier.

I would say let's do this. Seems also easier to do in the context of having to cross-correlate two snapshots where the account-set will not overlap perfectly and staked amounts will also be different.

[MichaelFrazzy]

@giunatale I really like the idea to add slashed tokens back into the airdrop, sounds great. That combined with the multiplier sum between two (or however many) different proposals.

Slashing made a little less of an impact than expected when we simulated prop 69. Adding the slashed amount to strictly No with Veto (maybe No voters also) would magnify that impact and overall alignment. As soon as we get the validator JSON I can create an initial sim of this asap!

[jaekwon]

So I suggest for sub 5,000 Atom stakeholders some kind of multilpliers that the distribution would be more equal

This is game-able, so we cannot make such a modification, no project should. It just rewards people who split their wallets in anticipation. This taints the distribution; a priori everyone knows that the distribution was distorted such that, of the whales, the ones that hide better are rewarded while the whales who are more transparent about their holdings are punished. Incentivizing loophole-perverts doesn't seem like a good idea. While we might get the effect you desire (plus the loophole-pervert whales avoiding penalties) it creates the precedent of making such a decision (that incentivizes lying, in essence).

If you want a project that incentivizes more equality it should be a project that splits off from AtomOne, or a project like the Decentralists which is meant to be different than Gaia/AtomOne's PoS model. It is more directly associated with the goal you want to accomplish.

If you really think the sub-xxxx reward is a good idea, I think it should be a new constitutional chain that pre-disclaims in the constitution that large accounts will be slightly punished to incentivize breaking all wallets down into smaller chunks. But if this was good, the chain mechanism itself should be punishing non-compliant large-wallets regularly, not once in a while upon airdrops.

[jaekwon]

@MichaelFrazzy I kind of like the idea from @discoverdefiteam where you redistribute the amount you slash from yes-voters to others, and this way you can pretty much do this mirroring more or less the current ATOM supply.

This negates the goal of turning a punishment into a reward. It is more apparently a punishment for those who voted YES; a psychological effect. Also while this will make sense initially it will become a cause of confusion later as the supply changes between the two.

[jaekwon]

Don't you think you're overcomplicating things with these ratios and percentages and stuff? People made a choice by voting. Those who didn’t vote are not interested. Who voted “YES” and take airdrop ATOM1 this let the goat into the garden. They (YESsers) love commercial things and will buy ATOM1.

Here are some of the consequences of what you are suggesting.

1. psychologically, those YES voters will be less inclined to join AtomOne because they will see AtomOne negatively. It becomes more of a hostile split.
2. this creates a precedent of 100% slashing for a single wrong vote that didn't even lead to damanges (yet). we don't even do that yet for validators who double-sign -- because there might be software bugs, but also because we are still learning ourselves. It makes more sense to retain users who have learned, who will not repeat the same mistake, than to expel them and engender hostility. If there were damages then the analysis should be different.
3. the same may happen to you. you may make one wrong vote, and regret it soon after.

I think we should get a minimal GOV-ONLY chain running with all the YES voters and ICF slashed to zero (from the 848 proposal only, not even 82), and ask this distribution what it wants most.

(We only support binary proposals so we need to be very careful about what proposals are asked and what order.).

@giunatale @jaekwon more than happy to take a stab at how we could linearly weight between multiple proposals. A couple ideas come to mind (super basic starting examples), in order from lowest to highest airdrop multiplier:

* 2 Yes

* 1 Yes, 1 Abstain

* 1 Yes, 1 No

* 1 Yes, 1 No with Veto

* 2 Abstain

Etc in this way up until 2 No with Vetos as the highest multiplier. We could even make it a perfectly linear scale like Jae mentioned.

With 2 proposals it'd get a little messier due to all the combos between them needing defined, but we could just assign an airdrop multiplier to each combo. Similar to Gnoland but assigning a greater variety of multipliers to the greater variety of vote options.

The other more straight forward option is we set a multiplier to each option per vote, then those 2 multipliers sum for the final multiplier. Basically the same idea just viewed a little differently.

Example: a No With Veto vote is worth 1.0 per proposal, so if someone voted No with Veto both times that'd be 1.0 + 1.0 = 2.0. So they'd get 2x their snapshotted ATOM value during the airdrop. Or yes would be 0 or maybe 0.1, so if someone voted yes twice they'd get 0 or maybe x0.2 their snapshotted ATOM.

We could always create an actual equation/algorithm of some kind if a simpler idea like these 2 doesn't end up covering everything. But maybe we don't even need to get much more complex.

Just calculate how much each should get for 82 and 848 and blend the results by address. What you suggested doesn't work because the amount that one has before and after is different, and, people could have changed their addresses; right?

The relative weighting between 82 and 848 could also be not 1:1. Maybe we just use the nominal ATOM amounts for each and say that 848 should be weighted more because it is more recent.

[MichaelFrazzy]

@jaekwon what do you mean by turning punishment into reward in this case? Are you proposing to not slash at all or to slash and burn, opposed to slash and redistribute to no voters?

And sounds great, seems like we agree there. I definitely ranted out the thought process a bit but essentially that's what @giunatale and I concluded. Really good point about someone potentially using a different address for each proposal... maybe we will fully separate the proposals like you mentioned if that changes the end results. With both methods the airdrop should be the same after the proposals are weighted, so simplicity would definitely win out.

I'll set up the sim so we can quickly mess around with the weights, that's been the part I'm most excited about with this sim haha.

[jaekwon]

@jaekwon what do you mean by turning punishment into reward in this case? Are you proposing to not slash at all or to slash and burn, opposed to slash and redistribute to no voters?

I'm proposing that we ONLY slash the ICF. See comment above https://github.com/atomone-hub/genesis/issues/12#issuecomment-1831327478 Nobody else gets slashed.

Would increase complexity a bit more

It is simpler to maintain two tools. One that makes a recommended distribution based on a single proposal's vote, and a second tool to blend several of distributions. It is more complex to do anything else, isn't it?

[jaekwon]

I kinda like the idea of a slash, it delivers a powerful message.

Does the ICF and all YES voters deserve the same penalty?

I'd say the ICF deserves to get slashed because they aren't doing a satisfactory job, and it was a foundation made for the chain.

I think whether one voted YES or NO has more to do with, were they exposed to the counter-arguments against 848. And it would be better that they learn that they need to be more proactive in understanding proposals before voting on them, and then participate in AtomOne, than to turn them away and create tension, losing a supporter potentially forever.

It would be better if we included the YES voters (many who have expressed to me that they have changed their mind after learning about our point of view) to a lesser extent than the NO voters, and allow them to participate given that they agree to abide by the constitution after having understood the rationale and spirit of it. And make sure there are ways for voters to be better educated about each proposal, through ways to ensure that proposals AND the best arguments for and against are all broadly shared via on-chain mechanisms and specified in the constitution.

The question can be boiled down to this. Do they really deserve to get slashed down to 0? Why not 10%? 20%? 30%? Do we really want to risk severing the relationship with EVERYONE who voted YES?

I think the answer to the above is more clearly no.

Then the questions that follow are: 1) How much should they be included relative to NO voters? 2) What are the other mechanisms by which $ATOM holders can acquire $ATOM1 (or get voting power) 3) What is the characteristic of the resulting blend distribution? How does it relate to the Supermajority (2/3) and Constitutional Majority (90%)? What past proposals would or would not have passed a CM with the new distribution? 4) What if a CM cannot be reached when it needs to be reached? E.g. troll whales staking $ATOM1 just to deny constitutional proposals. If we lower the CM below say 90%, it violates the purpose of having it so we can't do that. It would make more sense to punish stakers who are vote against the constitution, such that the CM may be reached over time, but troll whales would only deny constitutional amendments while otherwise arguably abiding by the constitution (or only violating it deniaby). Thinking...

[MichaelFrazzy]

@jaekwon what're you thinking we do with ICF's slashed tokens at this point?

Some additional complexity in terms of simming it maybe, but not by an insane amount. In that case I'm all for whatever is easiest to actually roll out, so sounds great.

The difference on my end is whether I can self contain it into 1 clean database + script like I did the Gnoland airdrop sim. Instead I'd probably mirror what you mentioned so it's cleaner to maintain long term in exchange for some extra steps to run it. A separate script and db for each proposal and then a 3rd script to aggregate, perform any calculations, and output to some human readable format for analysis.

[jaekwon]

It's in the README.md. Instead we create a 10% premine. Please read the draft first. https://github.com/atomone-hub/genesis#genesis-distribution (though it is a draft and not complete nor consistent, it is the current working state.

[MichaelFrazzy]

Just reading your 2nd comment now. I 100% agree, the place holder I have written down is a 0.2 multiplier if someone voted yes on both proposals. Somewhere in the 0.1-0.3 ballpark sounds reasonable.

I'll make sure it's an easily modifiable parameter when the sim is done so we can see what different yes multipliers look like tied to a snapshot

[MichaelFrazzy]

It's in the README.md. Instead we create a 10% premine. Please read the draft first. https://github.com/atomone-hub/genesis#genesis-distribution (though it is a draft and not complete nor consistent, it is the current working state.

Ah thank you! I was only reading the comments. I'll set up some PRs as soon as everything is in a good place, happy to help with any docs too

[jaekwon]

I have written down is a 0.2 multiplier if someone voted yes on both proposals.

We can't do this because it isn't fair for anyone who moved addresses. We shouldn't be punishing wallet migrations. Therefore, let's just keep these independent and do a linear blend at the end.

It would be interesting to see whether the new distribution passes or fails any prior proposals with a constitutional majority.

[jaekwon]

Instead of worrying about appeasing the current sloshy-ness (which can be traced all the way to the titanic, fed reserve, etc. aforementioned) around the Cosmos Hub, a full fledged exclusion for some parties is appropriate. Those that discount the minority opinion as "conspiracy theory" will only be a burden on what is trying to be accomplished.

I have to say I do love the principle. Let's encourage these people to sell what they get of their own accord. Then there will be less harsh feelings, and they will regret their own actions down the line. ;)

One thing I'm looking out for: the resulting genesis distribution must be capable of passing (with supermajority, or constitutional majority depending) what must be passed, AND have enough buffer to guard against the distribution becoming diluted again.

Also, it is really up to those who voted NO, to decide on the genesis distribution. It wouldn't make sense if the NO voters don't agree with the resulting distribution. If they would rather use a different genesis distribution, then there is no value to the rejected distribution at all.

In addition, we should be looking outward at how to bring those outside of crypto, who may share similar beliefs, into the sphere of an $ATOM1 constellation. Those who understand the scam of central banks and the like, are less likely to find ATOM1 if they have to sift through the grifter garbage patch elements that are the current Cosmos Hub.

Fully agreed. Please make a new issue to start the discussion about how to attract the right people into our community, those who are aligned and want to participate as equals.

[COverS8]

So I suggest for sub 5,000 Atom stakeholders some kind of multilpliers that the distribution would be more equal

This is game-able, so we cannot make such a modification, no project should. It just rewards people who split their wallets in anticipation. This taints the distribution; a priori everyone knows that the distribution was distorted such that, of the whales, the ones that hide better are rewarded while the whales who are more transparent about their holdings are punished. Incentivizing loophole-perverts doesn't seem like a good idea. While we might get the effect you desire (plus the loophole-pervert whales avoiding penalties) it creates the precedent of making such a decision (that incentivizes lying, in essence).

If you want a project that incentivizes more equality it should be a project that splits off from AtomOne, or a project like the Decentralists which is meant to be different than Gaia/AtomOne's PoS model. It is more directly associated with the goal you want to accomplish.

If you really think the sub-xxxx reward is a good idea, I think it should be a new constitutional chain that pre-disclaims in the constitution that large accounts will be slightly punished to incentivize breaking all wallets down into smaller chunks. But if this was good, the chain mechanism itself should be punishing non-compliant large-wallets regularly, not once in a while upon airdrops.

Agree, would be gameable bc we don't have the tools to define multiple accounts from one main account if those are not created from one derivation path I guess. And thanks for giving your views as smarter one for the issues!

[COverS8]

Fully agreed. Please make a new issue to start the discussion about how to attract the right people into our community, those who are aligned and want to participate as equals.

Whattabout Airdrop2, after Airdrop1 with own criterias to attract more ppl to Atom-One? But I think the AtomOne hub's main attraction will stems from the effort to address and improve the flaws that have disappointed Atom stakeholders in the Cosmos hub. Perhaps a survey could be conducted to list the concerns from the Cosmos hub community, and those deemed viable suggestions by AtomOne contributors would be fixed in the fork far as possible while more challenging and complicating ones would be processed after the launch. At the same keeping up the Cosmos hub community what will be fixed and improved which causes natural interest. And also listen to what they don't like, as long as it's in line with the AtomOne hub vision.

[MichaelFrazzy]

I have written down is a 0.2 multiplier if someone voted yes on both proposals.

We can't do this because it isn't fair for anyone who moved addresses. We shouldn't be punishing wallet migrations. Therefore, let's just keep these independent and do a linear blend at the end.

It would be interesting to see whether the new distribution passes or fails any prior proposals with a constitutional majority.

Exactly. Separate values per airdrop so that even if they used 2 separate addresses to vote yes, they'd get 0.2. Or whatever amount we assign per proposal and total, yes votes could be 0.05 for one proposal and 0.15 for another (just throwing out random multipliers for illustration). That way even if they used two separate wallets they receive the same total as someone who used one

[jaekwon]

Fully agreed. Please make a new issue to start the discussion about how to attract the right people into our community, those who are aligned and want to participate as equals.

Whattabout Airdrop2, after Airdrop1 with own criterias to attract more ppl to Atom-One? But I think the AtomOne hub's main attraction will stems from the effort to address and improve the flaws that have disappointed Atom stakeholders in the Cosmos hub. Perhaps a survey could be conducted to list the concerns from the Cosmos hub community, and those deemed viable suggestions by AtomOne contributors would be fixed in the fork far as possible while more challenging and complicating ones would be processed after the launch. At the same keeping up the Cosmos hub community what will be fixed and improved which causes natural interest. And also listen to what they don't like, as long as it's in line with the AtomOne hub vision.

Additional airdrops: I think it would be most appropriate for the chain to answer that after genesis, but that we add a way for this to happen (with consideration for consistency with $PHOTON and other concerns) through the constitution, and that the constitution should should specify the conditions in which this is allowed. It would make sense to allow, for a limited % of atom inflation, and there would need to be clear proof of value for the dilution.

Related: In a way Prop #82 distribution inclusion should be decided by NO or NO+weighted(nonvoter+ABSTAIN voting sets, and is itself the first decision to make. I think this will pass easily. This should not be seen so much as an additional airdrop, but a linear blending of proposal-based-distributions.

• [ ] TODO: consider: a Constituional Majority should be required for such an inflation to pass, and the inflation shouldn't affect $PHOTON holders at all (this is an dilution only of non-$PHOTON $ATOM1 holders/stakers).

[floridamanfintech]

Fully agreed. Please make a new issue to start the discussion about how to attract the right people into our community, those who are aligned and want to participate as equals.

@jaekwon

I've been brainstorming and working on this the last few days. I should be ready to open the topic in a few days

[tbruyelle]

Here are a few points that came to my mind as I read all these conversations:

1. How to deal with weighted votes ?

Although it is a minority, some voters use weighted votes, such as 0.6 yes and 0.4 no, or other combinations. The vote endpoint allows this, but it's not possible with Kepler; you have to use another client or the CLI to submit a weighted vote. As far as I know, this is mainly used by validators "trying" to perhaps better represent their delegations. Even though there are very few weighted votes, they probably represent a lot of voting power, so I think we need to handle them properly.

Options to consider regarding weighted votes :

• If the YES weight > X, the voter is considered a full YES voter. For example, if X=0, we consider that any weight given to YES is a full YES vote, while if X=0.5, we consider that it's only a YES vote if the weight given to YES is more than 50%.
• We could also do more complicated things like propagate the weight to the distribution algorithm, and apply the weight to the account balance bonus or slash. But when we combine that with the fact that we could use more than one proposal to define the distribution, I think it gets way too complicated.
• ?

2. Filter out dust accounts

We have seen a lot of dust accounts created just to vote and skew the vote distribution of some proposals, I suggest we exclude them by simply excluding all accounts with less than 0.1 ATOM from the ATOM1 distribution. This may sound unnecessary, but I see no reason to pollute ATOM1 with these accounts.

3. Account balance and bound percentage

Given an account with X atoms, do we weight the bonus or slash according to the percentage of staked atoms ? For example let's consider 2 accounts :

• 1,000 atoms with 900 staked, voted YES
• 1,000 atoms with 1 staked, voted YES Will they be penalized the same way?

The same question applies to NO voters, should a "1atom staked account" receive the same bonus as "1,000atoms staked account" ?

Probably the fair way is to apply the bonus or slash only to the staked amount, and maybe this is something that was clear to everyone from the beginning, in which case sorry for asking ^^.

But if we only penalize the staked balance, some hostile whales with huge unstaked balances might slip through the cracks and come to ATOM1 with that huge balance. That could be problematic, right?

[giunatale]

1. How to deal with weighted votes ?

What's the problem about going pro-rata as also suggested by @albttx here: https://github.com/atomone-hub/genesis/issues/18#issuecomment-1840901384?

You essentially separate the stake using the % of the weighted vote. If you voted 50% yes, 40% no and 10% NWV, the 50% of your stake is counted as yes, 40% as no and 10 as nwv.

We could also do more complicated things like propagate the weight to the distribution algorithm, and apply the weight to the account balance bonus or slash. But when we combine that with the fact that we could use more than one proposal to define the distribution, I think it gets way too complicated.

I don't think it is. I think this is the actually easier and more fair way and coding this I don't see it as particularly hard. It all depends how you implement it.

2. Filter out dust accounts

That's a very good point. A lot of these vote YES on every proposal it seems, they are there mainly to farm airdrops. Probably some minimal threshold (like 5 ATOMs or something) might be beneficial indeed. However it is also true that these dust accounts will eventually appear anyway likely.

3. Account balance and bound percentage

Proportional to stake and what % of your stake voted yes/no/nwv (to be consistent with the weighted vote stuff). The liquid (unstaked) ATOMs will have another separate rule and they will contribute to the total ATOM1 in your account, but should not be "aggregated"

In your example, say you only get 50% of the unstaked ATOM, and 20% if you vote YES

1,000 atoms with 900 staked, voted YES

they get 900 0.2 + 100 0.5 = 230 ATOM1

1,000 atoms with 1 staked, voted YES

They get 999 0.2 + 1 0.5 = 200.3 ATOM1

[giunatale]

Do they really deserve to get slashed down to 0? Why not 10%? 20%? 30%?

Not 0. I think something between 30-50% would be sufficient. The amount they get slashed, will (potentially, if we follow this approach) be redistributed to no votes so if the "original" voting distribution was 50:50 it would become more or less 25:75 if its 50% slash. We can then maybe count 80% unstaked ATOM and 100% with no bonus for abstainers. But probably this should be actually data-driven, tweaked upon looking at how example distributions might affect reaching CM as stated at point 3-4 at the bottom of the comment.

Do we really want to risk severing the relationship with EVERYONE who voted YES?

I don't think they care, most of them would probably just dump their $ATOM1. I am sorry, I will be a bit "harsh" here, so I'll remark before that this is strictly my personal opinion and it comes from a "hot head". While I think some yes voters might truly change their mind, I think we have to distinguish (but it's nuanced and probably impossible to truly do) who is right now interested in embarking in this experiment, and who is just after the prospect of an airdrop.

TLDR; I think ultimately, yes voters should not be slashed to 0 (but if they voted yes on both 82 and 848 they should probably be slashed significantly) but they should be slashed.

What are the other mechanisms by which $ATOM holders can acquire $ATOM1 (or get voting power)

On the market? 🤣 jokes aside, I think I said it earlier, maybe $ATOM holders can be somehow incentivized to bring $ATOMs over to be bonded for the $PHOTON version of $ATOM (whatever that is called, say phATOM for now). Not sure how (and if they actually get phATOM down the line), but all I am saying is that the $ATOM that might be used to acquire $ATOM1 should be accumulated on AtomOne for the "partyhub" idea. Not "burned" or anything like that. Probably that was obvious but nonetheless..

[jaekwon]

In the end what we need is a page where you can enter your address, and the page will consult the data and tell you that you get XYZ $ATONE because:

prop848( weighted(YES:50%,NO:50%,NWV:0% = 2.0average)x 1200ATOM = 2400ATONE) + prop82( NWV(2.1) x 100ATOM = 210ATONE ) = 2610ATONE

The real version should show quite a bit like the blend resulting from your delegations, as well as the list of delegations, and it would be nice to show how the blend ratios are derived from the table of delegations, all in one page.

We should do the same for gno.land.

but if they voted yes on both 82 and 848 they should probably be slashed significantly

By missing out on both rewards. In the above example, and what I was aiming for, was linearly (prop848() + prop82()). Are you suggesting that there be an extra penalty for having voted YES on both? I think a linear blend of two is conceptually simpler, and we can keep the framing as a reward. In any case, if you miss out on the 2x reward for both it is effectively a significant punishment.

[tintin2828]

Jae, That $ATONE calculation looks fine if agreed, but would have been nicer if NWV for 82 could have had a bit more significance but do not agree that we should do the same with gno.land ? unless I misunderstood or it will be the other way round for gno.land similar to example u have provided, but prop 82 is the main one prop82( weighted(YES:50%,NO:50%,NWV:0% = 2.0average)x 1200ATOM = 2400ATONE) + prop848( NWV(2.1) x 100ATOM = 210ATONE ) = 2610ATONE Think we already promised how gno.land will be distributed and the criteria was communicated. It might not be fair to change what was agreed...

[cosmosatomatom1]

Shouldn't we calculate the cases where the validator voted for prop848 and the cases where the person voted directly? If Cosmos voted directly from the perspective of realizing democracy, the weights of yes, no, nwv, and abstain would have to change.

[giunatale]

Shouldn't we calculate the cases where the validator voted for prop848 and the cases where the person voted directly? If Cosmos voted directly from the perspective of realizing democracy, the weights of yes, no, nwv, and abstain would have to change.

https://github.com/atomone-hub/genesis/issues/12#issuecomment-1836984602

As I've written before

due to how governance works it's a duty of stakers to override their validator's vote if it does not align, or re-delegate accordingly. You inherit your validator vote otherwise. This is the social contract of current cosmos governance. We can't alter this assumption when coming up with the distribution.

If we treat the two cases differently, we could end up benefitting lazy voters (that didn't vote yes themselves but inherited the yes from validators) and I don't think this is right.

Also, while it's true that governance needs improvements, striving for a "democratic" system within PoS is not really achievable without crippling the PoS system itself. PoS is not democracy