Should Atomone be an ICS consumer for any blockchain?

[moul]

At present, I don't see any, but it's worth asking if there might be reasons to consider one.

If not, should we explicitly mention in the README that such a situation will never occur?

[imhyroglyph]

The idea is to make this a minimalist hub. Therefore, being a consumer seems contradictory to the mission - but I could be overlooking benefits that you may be seeing. Ideally, Atomone becomes a very successful parent chain / hub to consumer chains. Therefore, I would look at it from the opposite lens.

[giunatale]

I'm of the opinion this would go somewhat agains the spirit of the initiative. Right now the only ICS provider is the Cosmos Hub. Renting security from the chain we are forking from seem counterintuitive.

I personally believe that AtomOne should offer ICS services itself, as a producer chain. But that hinges on the success of the project itself.

[maxinmos]

If AtomOne wants to become an ICS provider, should we apply a mechanism similar to proof-of-liquidity to enhance the security of the ICS?

[jaekwon]

We can compensate this lack of ATOM neglecting all type of bridge or wrap token !

not sure what this means.

If AtomOne wants to become an ICS provider, should we apply a mechanism similar to proof-of-liquidity to enhance the security of the ICS?

i think the proof-of-stake aspect is good enough for security as is. Many questions left unanswered, like how do we ensure that validators can grow from 0 to 1; ICS1 assumes every validator runs every ICS chain, and a new validator won't be able to catch up from 0 to 1 within a day if there are a thousand shards, so validators need to e a given a chance to grow into its capacity, and maybe be given a loan for this, and given some guarantee against losing a validator spot after investing in its infrastructure so much.

If by "proof-of-liquidity" you mean like what Osmosis does with superfluid staking (what's the difference if so?), or generally using stake for other uses like use in liquidity pools, or allowing pool liquidity to be used as staking collateral?

Thinking...

[giunatale]

i think the proof-of-stake aspect is good enough for security as is. Many questions left unanswered, like how do we ensure that validators can grow from 0 to 1; ICS1 assumes every validator runs every ICS chain, and a new validator won't be able to catch up from 0 to 1 within a day if there are a thousand shards, so validators need to e a given a chance to grow into its capacity, and maybe be given a loan for this, and given some guarantee against losing a validator spot after investing in its infrastructure so much.

maybe time to rethink ICS too a bit?

If AtomOne wants to become an ICS provider, should we apply a mechanism similar to proof-of-liquidity to enhance the security of the ICS?

Kind of curious as well what PoL means? Maybe you are referring to Berachain? Can you explain?

[maxinmos]

Kind of curious as well what PoL means? Maybe you are referring to Berachain? Can you explain?

I'm referring to a proof-of-liquidity similar to that of BeraChain.

[jaekwon]

AtomOne shouldn't offer proof-of-liquidity or otherwise change the consensus from anything other than PoS. Same as with the IBC+ICS business, its consensus should also be set.

With superfluid-staking//proof-of-liquidity the security characteristic becomes really complicated. One, I don't think you would have the same maximum amount of stake, because the amount of LP tokens at stake depends not on the amount of "staking" tokens but depends on the exchange rate set by the AMM. If we were to temporarily depress the value of the other pool token, say the "other", so imagine if the "other" were to become suddenly devalued somehow, then lots of dollars would enter the pool, lots of "staking" tokens would leave, but the LP tokens remain the same (because nobody entered or left the pool, there were only trades). Now I can acquire a lot more LP tokens, a lot more in comparison to my holdings of "staking" tokens (assuming I had a lot of "other"). This example requires me to have a lot of "other" tokens, but the point is that voting power here is not capped by the "staking" token, but can be manipulated with "other". The amount of "other" I need is not proportional to the LP tokens printed; the more "other"/"staking" exchange rate goes up, the less-than-linear we need of "other".

Proof-of-stake is good we should stick with what we have more or less; at least with regards to the tokenomics the core shouldn't change. Different consensus/governance experiments belong in other chains/shards/hubs/partyhubs/zones. What matters most for AtomOne is the relatively fixed staking supply (minus exponential inflation). Liquidity is not a problem esp w/ 1/3 unstaked, and as a steady state utility the tx fee volume should be a better measure of the value of $ATOM1. If $ATOM1 is working so well that there is no liquidity and it is all being staked, then that's a good problem to have. It would happen because the tx fee revenue is high.

And this way if stakers don't want to sell, they don't even need to, and absolutely nobody can subvert them. But then of course splits/forks don't necessarily bring more intelligence in, if it's just full of insiders who never want to sell. This will be apparent in the market if 1/3 is unbonded and free vs when 0% is bonded, but theoretically and sociologically and morally speaking some of that inflation of staking tokens should be paid out to the users in a UBI sort of way; to ensure that the future generations of all the forks and splits and the greater Cosmos ecosystem have a financial system that is owned by more or less the people, and not a closed set of elites. Let UBI be an option for people though; clearly nobody should be required to identify themselves as any particular individual in order to use the system to buy their daily meals or find shelter. But I'm rambling.