Decentralists party and AtomOne hub have different governing bodies.

[jaekwon]

UPDATE I split this out entirely so ATOM ONE doesn't include the Decentralists much at all except once by reference. And this seems right, because the Decentralists should be its own independent project. They complement one another but they also should not mix together excessively so as to allow for independent development. This is more decentralized thank linking them too early too soon forcing us to figure everything out at once.

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The Decentralists is a party of equal individuals. The AtomOne hub is a proof-of-stake hub based on $ATOM1. They are related but different. It's almost like one is the democratic view of the other. How many $ATOM1 does one have to own to be a Decentralist? I suppose it doesn't matter as long as you can prove your worth on chain e.g. even through contributions and discussions. But Decentralists I suppose can be expected to have at least one.

The main thing is, they are different governing bodies, so this should be reflected in all aspects of the document.

[moul]

How about ensuring that Decentralists never control more than 50% of $ATOM1 shares and voting power, and possibly even less, like 1/3? This way, the proof-of-stake hub will always be primarily governed by its end-users, promoting decentralization.

AtomOne will eventually fork, and Decentralists may create/assist other forks over time. I prefer an AtomOne hub where Decentralists have a positive impact without dominating it. In other words, I want to make it more decentralized and user-centric. Decentralists can also hold shares in ATOM1, ATOM3, and other forks, allowing them to persist over time.

On the other hand, Decentralists' governance can be more limited to aligned peers with higher commitment.

[jaekwon]

I like it except this part: "How about ensuring that Decentralists never control more than 50% of $ATOM1 shares and voting power, and possibly even less, like 1/3?"; I think the Decentralists are in theory up to 100% aligned with $ATOM1 in the beginning, and it can drift over time naturally, and some precautions must be taken as a result.

[moul]

I'm all for the alignment we're aiming at (100%). Yet, I believe this proof-of-stake hub could be stronger when its stakers have a say, like voting rights. Maybe we can start at 100% and then gradually share more control with the stakers. How about aiming for a 50% share in a few years?

I think everyone who's really into building good stuff will want to be part of Decentralists. However, I feel it's not as effective in spreading control as Gno's proof-of-contribution and GovDAO. But, by combining it with the stakers, we get the best of both worlds: lots of people involved and high-quality contributions, covering both builders and users.

[jaekwon]

I updated the README with a form of mild integration into governance. Lots to iron out about this.

[jaekwon]

I split this out entirely so ATOM ONE doesn't include the Decentralists much at all except once by reference. And this seems right, because the Decentralists should be its own independent project. They complement one another but they also should not mix together excessively so as to allow for independent development. This is more decentralized thank linking them too early too soon forcing us to figure everything out at once.

[OrionUnix]

Above all, only people who have had an ATOME ONE for a certain length of time should be able to vote, and voting power should not be linked to the number of ATOME ONEs you have. I mean, we'd have to make sure that voting is done under fairly strict conditions, to avoid any one person or group putting forward a proposal that could harm the ecosystem.

[jaekwon]

If we do this then we make it difficult for ATOM1/ATOME/ATMO holders to make necessary transfers (e.g. wallet migrations) without unnecessarily punishing them.

For the purpose of this experiment we should make $ATOM1 the staking token, and this means it SHOULD be linked to the number of tokens you have.

For non-stake-based weighting I would look at the Decentralists.md file, and github.com/decentralists/ and consider creating more structure and contributing to the disucussions, but creating a democratically weighted body creates a new governing body, and this raises a LOT of new questions, and I believe trying to figure out all of the details of the Decentralists is a tall order (because we NEED to get this constitution mostly perfect before laucnhing) and therefore while we can begin to fund such an initiative (with a lot of tooling and UX etc to go with it; maybe it is several open source projects interwoven together like GMail and GoogleDocs and GoogleSheets etc; and maybe integration between these two distinct bodies in governance should be done as child-chains generated from AtomOne; and we can have a variety of experiments that blend these approaches.

But as you can see from the github history, before I did try to integrate the Decentralists in, but this made the main document and the model way too complex. It is worth minimzing the objective for the purpose of AtomOne, and this is also more aligned with the concept of the minimal hub.

tldr; let's keep it simple if possible.

[floridamanfintech]

"Above all, only people who have had an ATOME ONE for a certain length of time should be able to vote, and voting power should not be linked to the number of ATOME ONEs you have. I mean, we'd have to make sure that voting is done under fairly strict conditions, to avoid any one person or group putting forward a proposal that could harm the ecosystem."

New to using Github, so hopefully this shows up correctly in thread.

I like where your head is at on this one. Maybe ATOMones staked for longer could have a slightly heavier voting weight.

and/or: I like the idea of validator votes to be only worth 50% of what their delegations are, whereas an individual delegator voting is worth 100% of their ATOMones. This could make it a bit harder for validator cartels to form.

For instance, Exodus wallet delegates ATOMs to Everstake. So Everstake is voting with the voting power of all Exodus users who decide to stake and hold ATOM on their Exodus address. These are not folks who typically are engaged in governance processes. If Everstake is voting with this weight 1 to 1, is that really reflective of what the "community" wants?

[0xFDg]

For my point of view we need a filter into the governance. Is it right for the people to vote on the future of the chain ? Or better, is it right that someone without knowledge vote and decide the future of the chain without data, knowledge or any other competence ? For me w can do only 2 thing:

Decentralists :

1. They are entities that predict the future of the chain, imagine someone in front of 100 streets making decisions blindfolded, it's crazy. Decentralist have the role to select a shortlist of 3-4 best roads, illuminating them and the hub-users chose one of this 3.
2. They are people with skills, how? By passing an exam, we create an exam with technical questions about the chain with topic on Defi finance, economy and ATOM1 technology, if you pass the exam and if you have at least 1 ATOM1 in stake, you are one of the Decentralists.

For me other solutions have not sense.

[0xFDg]

And also Decentralist can be divide in sub area with 2-3 managers for each area.

1. Technology
2. Finance - Defi
3. Marketing
4. Data Blockchain analysis

[giunatale]

The Decentralists is a party of equal individuals. The AtomOne hub is a proof-of-stake hub based on $ATOM1. They are related but different.

and

And this seems right, because the Decentralists should be its own independent project. They complement one another but they also should not mix together excessively so as to allow for independent development.

From Jae pretty much encapsulates my feelings as well. I don't think we want to "institutionalize" the Decentralists in AtomOne.

But there are interesting points about governance here, maybe we want to carry them over in #40

For instance, Exodus wallet delegates ATOMs to Everstake. So Everstake is voting with the voting power of all Exodus users who decide to stake and hold ATOM on their Exodus address.

@floridamanfintech this is new to me, wow. I mean the reason why CEXs don't vote is because of the custodial nature of their stake, here you are telling me that a private company is delegating user's stake for governance voting. Interesting..