Closed esune closed 1 year ago
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It would be good to use the Aries/DIDComm ~timing
protocol for this. May need to do some updates in ACA-Py and the BC Wallet to make it useful, but I think it is the right way to do expiries such as this.
@swcurran thanks for the tip! This looks like something the holder agent would also have to support to discard the proof if I was thinking more in terms of expiring it so that it wouldn't present the proof - correct? I.e.: vc-authn
adds an expires_time
attribute to the timing decorator to indicate the proof is not valid.
I was thinking more in terms of having vc-authn
delete (or at least "blacklist") unused proofs so that even if the holder scans the QR code they would not be able to push a proof.
I think we could (should?) implement both scenarios as the decorator is definitely very useful for both parties.
possibly UI/Front end scope if this story get completed before end of sprint
@popkinj let's try and connect wen you're starting to look into this. The ticket was mostly thought/focused on gatekeeping the validity of proofs in the back-end, however you are right that we might want to provide a way to return a message IF they are scanned after their validity time is expired.
@esune Do you still want to touch base on this ticket?
@popkinj and I synced-up: for the time being, we are going to ensure the UI gets a proof_status=EXPIRED
if the proof-request age is older than what indicated in its expiry time. Further tweaks/improvements to be discussed with next steps.
vc-authn
is used to access resources protected by OIDC authentication. As such, there should be a timout after which a proof-request that was not used will be marked asexpired
and removed from the queue of allowed authentication attempts.Note: a special scenario, if/when supported, would be multi-use proof-requests (see #64). This can be effectively worked-around by having each proof-request be unique, and the multi-use scenario be a "redirect" case that would trigger a brand new authentication attempt every time.