Open GoogleCodeExporter opened 9 years ago
M1 to investigate.
Original comment by gears.te...@gmail.com
on 27 Jun 2007 at 7:12
Original comment by gears.te...@gmail.com
on 27 Jun 2007 at 7:19
Original comment by gears.te...@gmail.com
on 2 Jul 2007 at 6:59
Original comment by gears.te...@gmail.com
on 4 Sep 2007 at 11:16
Original comment by gears.te...@gmail.com
on 5 Sep 2007 at 12:10
Follow the bouncing Miletone!
Original comment by idisposa...@gmail.com
on 5 Sep 2007 at 3:00
One more on it's way. I think Chris had some questions about how much this
matters to
Gears. Maybe he will chime in.
Original comment by gears.te...@gmail.com
on 5 Sep 2007 at 3:35
Original comment by gears.te...@gmail.com
on 5 Sep 2007 at 4:40
It matters because any old exploit program can cause ANY Gears application on
any
WinSta (including ones for other sessions on a Terminal Server machine) to
crash or
corrupt things. That would really be a bad thing if someone was actually hoping
Gears would handle offline access. Simply put, this is obviously exploitable
and
releasing Gears with this easy fix ignored would be irresponsible.
Of course, that's just my opinion.
Original comment by idisposa...@gmail.com
on 5 Sep 2007 at 5:59
Marc, can you post a link to more details about the exploit? That would help us
understand why this is important.
Original comment by gears.te...@gmail.com
on 5 Sep 2007 at 6:45
Quoting from Larry's post linked above "If the ACL creates is too permissive,
then
things get scary. If the DACL grants full access, it means that a bad guy can
do
ANYTHING to your event - they can change it's state, they can set a new DACL on
it
(locking your application out), etc. Weak DACLs are a recipe for denial of
service
attacks (or worse - depending on the access rights granted and the
circumstances,
they can even enable elevation of privilege attacks)."
Original comment by idisposa...@gmail.com
on 5 Sep 2007 at 3:13
Original issue reported on code.google.com by
idisposa...@gmail.com
on 1 Jun 2007 at 6:03