mend-for-github-com[bot]
commented
1 year ago :heavy_check_mark: This issue was automatically closed by Mend because the vulnerable library in the specific branch(es) was either marked as ignored or it is no longer part of the Mend inventory.
CVE-2021-21295 - Medium Severity Vulnerability
netty-codec-http-4.1.13.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients.
Library home page: http://netty.io/
Path to dependency file: /foxtrot-sql/pom.xml
Path to vulnerable library: /home/wss-scanner/.m2/repository/io/netty/netty-codec-http/4.1.13.Final/netty-codec-http-4.1.13.Final.jar,/home/wss-scanner/.m2/repository/io/netty/netty-codec-http/4.1.13.Final/netty-codec-http-4.1.13.Final.jar,/home/wss-scanner/.m2/repository/io/netty/netty-codec-http/4.1.13.Final/netty-codec-http-4.1.13.Final.jar
Dependency Hierarchy: - foxtrot-core-6.3.1-7.jar (Root Library) - transport-6.0.1.jar - transport-netty4-client-6.0.1.jar - :x: **netty-codec-http-4.1.13.Final.jar** (Vulnerable Library)
netty-all-4.1.42.Final.jar
Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers and clients.
Library home page: https://netty.io/
Path to dependency file: /foxtrot-server/pom.xml
Path to vulnerable library: /foxtrot-server/pom.xml
Dependency Hierarchy: - :x: **netty-all-4.1.42.Final.jar** (Vulnerable Library)
Found in HEAD commit: ffb8a6014463ce8aac1bf6e7dc9a23fc4a2a8adc
Found in base branch: master
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
Publish Date: 2021-03-09
URL: CVE-2021-21295
Base Score Metrics: - Exploitability Metrics: - Attack Vector: Network - Attack Complexity: High - Privileges Required: None - User Interaction: None - Scope: Unchanged - Impact Metrics: - Confidentiality Impact: None - Integrity Impact: High - Availability Impact: None
For more information on CVSS3 Scores, click here.Type: Upgrade version
Origin: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj
Release Date: 2021-03-09
Fix Resolution: 4.1.60.Final