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@bisq-network improvement proposals
https://bisq.wiki/Proposals
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Option for traders to use BSQ for the multisig security deposit to allow responsive traders that end up in arbitration to be compensated #410

Closed darawhelan closed 1 year ago

darawhelan commented 1 year ago

This is a Bisq Network proposal. Please familiarize yourself with the submission and review process.

This is a proposal to create a more equitable situation for responsive traders that end up though no fault of their own having their trades go to arbitration as a result of unresponsive trade peers.

The equability of the trade process for responsive traders with trades going to arbitration was negatively impacted by a the change to the donation address protocol and the subsequent required change to not pay out the security deposit of the trade peer to the arbitration case winner. Whilst I understand the need for both changes to decentralize the DAO and protect it from a malicious burning man attack, it does not change the fact that the changes created a worse outcome than previous for responsive traders entering arbitration.

I have been a trader on Bisq for a while but since the change to the donation address protocol I get a more frustrated than before when trades enter arbitration due to the inconvenience caused by the risks that come with being an offer maker on Bisq and receiving no compensation should I end up trading with an unresponsive peer. Prior to the change in the trade protocol I would have been compensated for both my time and having some of my BTC capital locked up from the unresponsive peers security deposit.

Therefore, I would like to propose a solution to the problem so that offer makers can be confident that should they trade with an unresponsive peer they would be compensated.

The solution I propose involves the maker, at the point of offer creation, being able to choose to use BSQ as the security deposit should they wish. This trade would then be available to offer takers that also use BSQ as their security deposit.

For this proposal I am defining the security deposit as the funds locked in a 2-of-2 multisig including the trade amount, which for this proposal is represented by a BSQ amount.

This would allow compensation to the responsive peer while also removing the possibility of a malicious burning man attack as no BTC would be need to be distributed. The arbitrator could also take a fee for the service by refunding less BSQ then was burnt resulting in profit for the DAO.

So using easy to use values:

1 BTC = $20.000 1 BTC = 20,000 BSQ 1 BSQ = $1

An example of a trade for 0.1 BTC going smoothly would be as follows:

An example of a trade for 0.1 BTC needing arbitration would be as follows:

The BTC buyer is happy they get compensation from the seller's security deposit for their inconvenience.

The DAO is happy that 2,600 BSQ was burnt and only 2,500 had to be compensated so the arbitration cost plus any BSQ printing costs have been covered.

Other benefits are:

Negatives

Things to consider

A large number of offers makers pay trade fees with BSQ and a large percentage of the higher trade volumes also pay trade fees with BSQ. Therefore, I am thinking that traders on altcoin markets will likely be familiar and comfortable enough to hold BSQ that it makes this a feasible protocol for traders that would rather receive than not receive compensation should they trade with an unresponsive peers.

Also, maybe, a BSQ holder will be more familiar with Bisq and trades done with this protocol would be a lot less likely to end in arbitration.

darawhelan commented 1 year ago

Closing due to lack of feedback.

HenrikJannsen commented 1 year ago

Thanks for the proposal. Some things which makes BSQ not a prime candidate for security deposit are: